HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE

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HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE

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BY

FRANK C. BOWEN

(Author of "The Golden Age of Sail," "The King's Navy," &c.)

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TO

THE ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE

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FOREWORD.

It is with great pleasure that I accept the invitation, with which I have been honoured by the author, to write a short Foreword to this History.

Mr. Bowen's book is the result of much painstaking research, and in producing it he has rendered a lasting service to the Royal Naval Reserve and has fulfilled a long-felt want.

This book should be read by all who are interested in the Seamen of our Empire, and I hope that many of my brother officers of the Royal Navy, Royal Naval Reserve and Mercantile Marine may find time to peruse it. Co-operation and understanding between these three services cannot be too close, and not the least useful function performed by Mr. Bowen's work should be to strengthen the existing bond between them.

The fact that our Mercantile Marine, and consequently the Royal Naval Reserve, has always included many of the world's finest seamen has never been doubted, but to many the wonderful way in which these officers and men adapted themselves to the needs of the Royal Navy in the Great War came as more than a surprise.

There is no need for me to eulogise the wonderful war record of the Royal Naval Reserve. Their war work received well-merited recognition by the award of 5,314 Honours; the gratification of the whole Naval Service in these awards was, however, tempered by the knowledge that a total of 6,393 officers and men of this magnificent Force had lost their lives during the War.

This History shows the extent to which the Royal Naval Reserve is dependent on the help and co-operation of the Shipowners and Marine Superintendents of the principal Shipping Companies; their assistance is one of the chief factors which contributes to the success of the Royal Naval Reserve to-day.

For the purpose of safeguarding the interests of R.N.R. Officers and Men who read this History, I must sound a note of warning: the last Chapter, entitled "The Force To-day," deals with existing regulations. Due to many causes, these regulations are continually undergoing minor changes and must not be taken as gospel.

In conclusion, I have nothing but praise for Mr. Bowen's work, and venture to think that no ship's library or cabin book-shelf will be complete without this volume.

L. CLINTON-BAKER,

Admiral Commanding Reserves.

INTRODUCTION.

Ever since there has been a fighting Navy the Merchant Service of the country has had to act as its reserve, both in personnel and material. In mediæval days Kings seldom thought it worth their while to maintain a standing Navy; when they wanted fighting ships they borrowed them from the merchants, together with the men to take them to sea. Neither merchants nor merchant seamen received any credit for their service; if the naval actions were successful it was the knight in command of the fighting men who increased his reputation. Later, man-of-war and merchant ship types began to diverge, so that it was necessary to maintain a material Navy, but in the interests of economy the personnel was cut down to the lowest possible level. When men were wanted the Press Gang supplied the deficiency, and although the historical novelist generally refers to the activities of the gang in tearing unoffending landsmen from their homes it was on the trained merchant seamen that they always had their eye.

In the middle of last century, after several abortive attempts, the authorities succeeded in putting this matter on a really secure foundation, so that not only were the naval authorities able to calculate on a definite number of merchant seamen ready to hand as soon as war broke out, but the men themselves, instead of being forced into the naval service against their will, were keen enough to undergo a sound naval training.

At first this force met with very considerable opposition and one cannot but admire the pluck of its sponsors in sticking to their guns in face of so much discouragement. In the early days there were faults in plenty, but these were in process of time eradicated, the numbers of the establishment slowly increased, and the scope of the Reserve's functions was gradually widened, until at the outbreak of war Great Britain had the finest reserve that has ever backed a Navy in the history of the sea. It was soon given an ample opportunity for showing its value. The merchant seaman is proverbially resourceful (his every-day calling forces him to be so) and the Reserve quickly found itself with all the odd jobs of the Fleet, jobs that were outside the average naval man's conception of his work and to which he had no time to attend in these days of specialisation. The Germans had

introduced an entirely new phase into naval warfare and to the Reservists mainly fell the job of countering it. They did their work magnificently and it was very largely due to them that the country was not starved, a service that was recognised by the extraordinary number of honours and decorations awarded to the Force.

To write for the first time the history of this Force, its discouraging beginnings, the difficulties of its organisation, the false starts and experiments that had to be made, the immense work of the officials on shore in welding their heterogeneous material into a magnificent striking weapon, with some account of what that weapon achieved—this has been my aim, an aim prompted by an intense admiration for the merchant seamen in peace and in war.

Published serially in the columns of *Lloyd's List and Shipping Gazette*, this history has attracted considerable attention, and it is now presented in more permanent form.

F. C. B.

London,
February, 1926.

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HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE.

Chapter I. *Early Days.*

THE Mercantile Marine has acted as a reserve for the Navy, in personnel as well as material, as long as fighting fleets have existed, and the principle of impressing merchant seamen for naval service which is generally put to the credit of King John was only an improvement and regularisation of the practice which had existed from time immemorial. The severity of the Press Gang depended entirely on the needs of the moment, and although all sorts of land fish came into its net the theory was always that it confined itself to trained seamen. Unfortunately the supply of such trained seamen did not nearly meet the demand, so that through the greater part of the history of the Navy the King's ships have been manned very largely by landsmen. The plight of the Merchant Service was quite as bad, and the favoured practice of the impressing officers of combing through the crews of merchant ships when they reached soundings on their way home was not so much to avoid undue interference with the commerce of the country, as to get men who had at least the advantage of one round voyage and who therefore knew something of their work. This system of impressment seems to bear but little resemblance to the present highly organised and magnificently efficient Royal Naval Reserve, but the germs of the force were there, and it must not be forgotten that even after the scheme for the formation of a proper mercantile reserve had been put forward and moulded into tolerably good shape, the authorities still retained their right to press seamen when necessary.

The first attempt at the proper organisation of the Navy's Mercantile Reserves was made in 1696. Colbert's scheme for the French Inscription Maritime had proved itself an almost unqualified success, and it was very largely by its aid that the French Navy was able to inflict serious defeats on the Mistress of the Seas. But the English adaption of the scheme was at best a half measure, and the conditions ruling in France under Louis XIV. were very different from those in Britain under William III., with the result that the registry led to no good results and was soon abandoned.

A reserve from which great things were hoped in the Napoleonic War was the Sea Fencibles, which was raised in 1798 on a plan put forward by Captain Home Riggs Popham. The recruits consisted of fishermen, coasting seamen and the like, and were trained as pikemen and in gunnery when opportunity offered. The force was under an Admiral Inspector, and each district was under the command of a captain receiving £1 10s. a day and 5s. for clerical assistance, while under him

were any number of commanders up to three or four, on £1 a day. The men were paid 1s. for every drill or muster, and in the beginning about 9000 were raised. These were chiefly in the Home Counties and in Yorkshire, but as the war went on and the press gang became more active they appeared all round the coasts of England, Scotland and Ireland. In 1805 Lord Castlereagh boasted that this force was an efficient guard against invasion, but the inquiry that was instituted found that it was quite useless and was being used principally to screen men from the attention of the press gang or militia authorities. At that time there were 30,000 men in the Sea Fencibles, and in spite of this condemnation the force remained active until 1810, and then dragged out its existence until the peace.

There is one particular instance of Naval Reserve work which deserves special mention, the almost forgotten occasion on which the Trinity House and merchant seamen defended the capital against invasion for two years. After the breaking of the Truce of Amiens, it became obvious that Napoleon had by no means abandoned his scheme of invasion, and the apprehension in England was redoubled. The Ministry had publicly announced that they were quite confident that the Navy could carry out any function that it was called upon to fulfil, but the public were not so easy in their minds, and it was very well known that the fleet was in no condition to spare the ships and men necessary for a fixed defence. There was something like a panic as fuller and fuller details of the invasion flotilla came across the Channel, when the Elder Brethren of Trinity House came forward with the offer to equip, officer and man ten frigates, which were then laid up for lack of crews, and to moor them across the Thames below Gravesend. The offer was immediately accepted, and the Sea Fencibles being in very poor odour, Trinity House immediately commenced to raise its own corps of 1200 men under the name of the Royal Trinity House Volunteer Artillery. It was composed practically entirely of merchant seamen and their officers. William Pitt, as Master of Trinity House, was Colonel. Captain Cotton, the Deputy-Master, was Lieutenant-Colonel, and the Captains, of which two were supplied to each ship, were selected from the Elder Brethren. Practically all of the Lieutenants were Younger Brethren of Trinity House.

The dockyards were already working almost to the limits of their ability, so that it was some time before the frigates were ready, but in the meantime the volunteers drilled on shore on the Tower Wharf and on the open space which is now enclosed by Trinity Square. It was on Oct. 12, 1803, that the first four frigates—*Vestal*, *Heroine*, *Iris* and *Unité*—were delivered from Woolwich and Deptford dockyards, when they were manned by 600 volunteers, and, under the Trinity House colours, went down to their stations. They were followed by *Daedalus*, *Modeste*, *Retribution*, *Quebec*, *Solebay* and *Resource*. Lieutenant-Colonel J. Cotton was the senior officer and shared the command of the *Heroine* with Captain R. Lewin, but in the event of actual invasion it was agreed that two naval captains were to take command, and they also maintained their station in the Lower Hope on board the Royal yacht *Royal Charlotte*. As soon as the news of the victory of Trafalgar was received in London, the Trinity House volunteers were disbanded and the ships immediately paid off, the haste with which it was done suggesting that

by that time all the hands were rather tired of the job. At the same time there is no doubt that the presence of these ships gave confidence in the capital, which was absolutely invaluable for the conduct of the war, and, although he might have mentioned the merchant seamen, Lord Castlereagh did not exaggerate when he thanked the force with the expression, "The Corporation of Trinity House have, by their own patriotic efforts and energies, extended the means of security, and so effectively contributed to the defence of the Thames as to render it impregnable against any attempts that the enemy might be daring enough to make through that channel on the capital of the Empire."

The last years in which reliable figures of the operations of the Press Gang are available are the years from 1811 to 1813, when the gangs were responsible for pressing into the Royal Navy 29,405 men. But during this period 27,300 deserted, a large proportion of whom were men who had been pressed, and in addition to landsmen it was estimated that the Press Gangs employed 3000 useful seamen who would have been far better afloat. These figures were used with telling effect when the operations of the Press Gang were being discussed, while the published cost of the system was astounding.

A practical move towards the formation of the R.N.R. as it exists at present occurred in 1834, when Sir James Graham brought forward his famous ticket system, founded on a suggestion made by Nelson in 1803. Nominally, his scheme was to improve the status of the merchant seamen, and by doing so to increase his numbers, but the idea of a naval reserve was very prominent in his mind. This bill was dropped, but in 1835 was passed the first Merchant Shipping Act, which covered very much the same ground and provided for a modified registry of British seamen.

This system of registration was not a success, principally because of the terrible prevalence of desertion which was then the greatest shipping problem of the day. There is no doubt that the seamen were scandalously treated by their employers, and nobody had yet appeared to bring their case before the public, but at the same time it must be remembered that the merchant seaman of the 'thirties was generally a character who did not respond readily to kindness.

It was as early as 1846 that Captain Sulivan, R.N., later to be Admiral Sir B. J. Sulivan, endeavoured to call the attention of the authorities and the public to the necessity of a naval reserve of fully trained seamen, the Merchant Service being the only direction from which such trained men could possibly be claimed. This scheme for a Naval Reserve was remarkably similar to the one that was ultimately adopted, but at the time its sponsor was laughed at for his pains.

In 1847 Captain J. H. Brown, the first Registrar-General of Seamen under the Board of Trade—the work had existed before his day, though not the office—suggested the formation of a voluntary Naval Reserve that would give the country all that it required. In many respects it coincided with the scheme put forward by Captain Sulivan in the previous year, the differences in detail being easily explained by the fact that the naval officer always had the needs of the Fleet before his eyes to the exclusion of other considerations, while hard experience had taught the Registrar that the difficulties to be overcome were very great indeed.

In spite of all opposition—opposition which frequently degenerated

into personal attack — Captain Brown stuck to his guns, and in the end he had the satisfaction of seeing provision for the enrolment of 5000 reservists introduced into the 1852 Navy Estimates. Unfortunately, political considerations caused this clause to be dropped, but it led directly to the questionnaire of 1853 and the foundation of the Naval Coast Volunteers.

Although in the early 'fifties the French and British were drawing towards an entente which resulted in the alliance of the Crimean War, naval authorities on both sides of the Channel were anxiously watching one another, and the report of the French Manning Commission of 1851 gave many British officers a good deal of food for thought. It was stated that 16,000 men were serving in the Imperial Navy and that another 48,500, including all classes, were serving in the Merchant Service, and, being registered, could be called up immediately. Of these merchant seamen it was reckoned that 40,000 would be trained to naval duties and that a further 20,000 men would be found in the naval towns and the Army who would be able to render good service in the Fleet when stiffened by properly trained seamen.

The famous questionnaire of 1853 was addressed to every British Consular officer who was in any position to give an opinion of value concerning the British merchant seamen. The result must have been discouraging to the men who were trying to build up a strong naval reserve from the Merchant Service. In almost every case the sailor was condemned. Sometimes it was on this ground; sometimes on that. Sometimes the officers were included in the condemnation; sometimes they escaped. Scarcely one dared to suggest that there might be something radically wrong with the general conditions of service of the day. But it did good in that it aroused interest and caused a more general desire for a thorough inquiry into the whole subject.

The Naval Coast Volunteers were founded by Act 16 and 17 Victoria, Cap. 73, passed on Aug. 15, 1853. The regulations established that the force was not to exceed 10,000 men, raised by voluntary enlistment from seamen and other suitable men, but not from deep-sea or long-trip seamen and men who might join the Navy. It specially set forth that they must not be militiamen, and it is to be feared that it was from the classes who wished to be screened from this force that they were principally recruited. The minimum height was 5 ft. 3 in., and the men signed on for five years, serving four weeks' training per year and receiving the pay of an able seaman during that time. Their uniform was lent them for the period of their training, and when possible this training took place in ships which could take them to sea, but in no circumstances were they to be carried more than 50 leagues from the shore in peace time. In time of war they were called up for service, but even then they must not be taken more than 100 leagues from the coast. In 1863 Captain Cyprian Bridge, later the famous Admiral, had them on board the *Hawke* at Queenstown in batches of 200 at a time. They were practically all inshore fishermen, and he noted in his diary that they were almost inevitably dirty. An Act of 1863 repealed the distance limitation, and it was pointed out to all future recruits that in time of war they could be sent anywhere, but those who had already enrolled could still claim the privilege. The force was abolished in 1873.

Political considerations during the war with Russia of 1854 and 1855 did not permit the use of the Press Gang, although the Admiralty still had the right to enlist seamen in this manner in the beginning, but great hopes were entertained of the help that would be afforded by the Merchant Service. In 1854 there were 266,500 seamen registered as being in the Merchant Service, but, in spite of generous enlistment bounties, only 400 of these volunteered for service with the fleet that went with Napier to the Baltic. In the campaign of the next year only 300 came forward, but as the wages of the able-bodied seamen had risen from 45s. a month to 65s. and there was plenty of work to do in the transport and supply services, while the war was not of a particularly popular nature, this is easily understood.

On July 29, 1856, in consequence of the unhappy experiences of the Crimean War, an Act of Parliament was passed by which the coastguard was transferred to the control of the Admiralty in order that it might be more readily employed for the manning of the Royal Navy. Coastguard officers were by this Act allowed to command Royal Naval Coast Volunteers, and an organisation was built up in which the Royal Naval Reserve had its early foundations.

In 1857 Admiral Sir B. J. Sulivan was appointed as one of the two nautical advisers to assist the President of the Board of Trade in administering the Acts relating to merchant shipping. It has already been mentioned how keen he was on the formation of a Royal Naval Reserve on modern lines, and he took the opportunity to lay a paper before the President, who consented to bring it to the attention of the First Lord, who had it printed. It thus came to be one of the principal subjects discussed by the Manning Committee of 1858, whose naval reserve scheme was almost identical with the one put forward by Admiral Sulivan, except that it omitted the two items on which he relied for its success and did not provide nearly enough men. One of these items was the contributory pension fund, which would give officers a pension of £20 and men a pension of £10 when they reached the age of 50. He anticipated that this scheme would create a permanent reserve which could be established by compulsory service for every officer and man in the Mercantile Marine. In the event of the compulsory scheme not being adopted, he suggested a voluntary system, by which 40,000 volunteers would serve a year in a man-of-war for training, and be available for any necessary service when called upon in case of emergency. For this there would be a £20 pension at the age of 50 and a further £10 from the Seamen's Fund. In addition, he would have established school ships in all the principal British harbours, preference being given to the sons of seamen.

In 1858 a Royal Commission to inquire into the manning of the Navy was appointed in consequence of the poor result of the appeal for recruits for the Baltic Expedition. One of the instructions issued was that the Committee should determine what means were available in case it became necessary to man thirty or forty sail of the line at short notice. Great interest was taken in the question by the Prince Consort and Queen Victoria, the Commissioners being Admiral Lord Hardwicke, in the chair, Lord Chandos, Mr. W. S. Lindsay, Lord Cardwell, and Messrs. Martin, Elphinstone, Shepherd and Green. From the very beginning the Chairman was strongly in favour of re-

viving the Press Gang in certain circumstances.

The Manning Committee issued its report in February, 1859, the minority consisting of Mr. W. S. Lindsay, the famous historian of the Merchant Service. The majority report approved the continuous service system as long as the country was not at war, but a reserve of seamen had to be maintained and it was suggested that this should be from the Merchant Service, very much on the lines of Admiral Sulivan's suggestion. To begin with, however, they suggested that better victualling and clothing should be granted to the men of the Royal Navy, for although the continuous service system had been inaugurated in 1852, the results were not by any means satisfactory by 1859. At that time the Reserves were reckoned as consisting of (a) 6000 Marines quartered ashore at the different ports, which the Committee suggested should be increased to 11,000 men, who were well qualified to garrison the seaports in time of peace, and who in war could be embarked at short notice and their places taken by soldiers and militia; (b) 10,000 men in the Coastguard, which it was proposed to increase to 12,000; (c) the Coast Volunteers, on whom the Committee did not place very much reliance, but who might be quite useful as gunners for coast defence; (d) short-service pensioners who had retired after ten years' service with a pension of 6d. a day. Their number was not large, but if the principle were extended to the Royal Marines, it was a body of men that might be very greatly increased. It was suggested that the Mercantile Reserve should be termed the Royal Naval Volunteers, and that inducement should be held out to them to volunteer in the form of payments for short periods, pension at fifty to fifty-five, the right of admission to the Coastguard and the participation in the benefits of the Greenwich Hospital. The seamen should engage to practise gunnery and to serve in case of need. As far as the Volunteer Force was concerned, very considerable reliance was placed on the influence of the Marine Department of the Board of Trade, both as to the selection of the men and the business of persuading them to enrol.

The Committee of 1859 also recommended the establishment of a number of training ships solely for the purpose of recruiting seamen for the Royal Naval Reserve. These ships were to be under the Registrar-General of Ships and Seamen for the Board of Trade, which would be far more convenient than having them under the Admiralty. The military part of their training was to be conducted by coastguard officers, and each ship was to be capable of accommodating 100 lads as boarders, and, in addition, a number of local boys as day-boys. It was realised that the admission of the latter would mean keeping the ship tied up to the quay, and would be a very serious disadvantage, but it was hoped that when this system was perfected the service might dispense altogether with the special training ships for the Navy and train boys both for the Navy and the Merchant Service in the same ship, effecting a great economy and bringing about a far better feeling between the two services. As far as numbers were concerned, it was suggested that the Admiralty should send in 1200 boys, and that an equal number should come in from the different ports. At the conclusion of four years' apprenticeship at sea, following training in these ships, a youngster would be eligible for the Royal Naval Reserve, the first engagement to be for five years. Many ship-

owners saw great merit in the scheme for giving merchant seamen a naval training, and one well-known Liverpool man stated that he would go further and have at least ten or fifteen thousand boys at one time passing through the training schools on two-year courses. He would then pass them through the Navy for three years, at the conclusion of which they would be paid off into the Naval Reserve for service in merchantmen. Unfortunately, the Navy had only recently seen the advantage of long service over the three-year period for which men previously enlisted, and this suggestion caused very considerable opposition, opposition that was very largely responsible for wrecking the elaborate scheme. The estimated cost of this system was £40,000 a year, and it was anticipated that it would provide annually at least 1200 first-class boys fit for service both in the Navy and Merchant Service.

The Royal Naval Reserve is so closely connected with the training ship *Conway* that some mention of her origin is well merited. The school was founded in 1859 owing to the efforts of Mr. T. P. Horsfall, M.P., in conjunction with the Committee of the Mercantile Marine Service Association. Mr. Horsfall wrote to the Admiralty and requested the loan of an old warship for the training of mercantile cadets, but at first they would not hear of any such scheme, and asked him whether his Majesty's ships were built to be converted into school ships. He maintained his attitude, however, and, ably backed by the Mercantile Marine Service Association, he was finally given the 28-ton frigate *Conway*, which had been laid up for some time at Devonport. The original Board of Governors consisted of twelve members of the Council of the Mercantile Marine Service Association and twelve shipowners and others who were elected by the donors and subscribers to the ship's funds. By 1861 the original *Conway* had proved herself inadequate for the work that she was doing, and accordingly she was replaced by the 51-gun frigate *Winchester*, which had been laid up in Chatham, and took her name. In time she also became inadequate, and she was replaced by the 90-gun line-of-battleship *Nile* in 1875.

Always connected with the *Conway* in keen but friendly rivalry is the *Worcester* in the Thames, which has done precisely the same work for the R.N.R. in precisely the same manner. She was established in 1862, very largely by the keenness of Mr. William Munton Bullivant, who was Honorary Secretary for a large number of years, and who was helped in his efforts by Mr. Richard Green, the well-known shipowner, and others. A ship was lent by the Admiralty, which was fitted out at the promoters' expense, and the Thames Marine Officers' Training Ship Association was founded. As in the case of the *Conway*, it became necessary to get a new ship after a few years, and the line-of-battle ship *Prince Frederick William* was fitted.

There was one member of the 1859 Manning Committee, however, who refused to belittle the Merchant Service officer as a fit companion to his naval cousin. This was Mr. W. S. Lindsay, who maintained that there were a large number of well-educated young men in the Merchant Service, most of whom were in no way inferior in capacity or social position to those in the Royal Navy. Since the Merchant Shipping Act had been passed all Merchant Service officers were required to sit for an examination before a competent

public board prior to taking command of a ship, and this was amply sufficient to guarantee their standing. From these he would form a reserve of naval officers, to be embarked in men-of-war whenever the reserve of seamen, the coastguard and the Naval Coast Volunteers were called out. He suggested that quite a small gratuity as a retaining fee would be sufficient to secure their services.

By the Naval Reserve Act of 1859, 22 and 23 Vict., Cap. 40, her Majesty was empowered to establish a reserve force of volunteer seamen under regulations that were to be framed by the proper authorities. This was later extended to apply to the colonies as well as home waters. It will be noticed, however, that it applied only to seamen; the reserve of officers was to come later.

One of the men who had much to do with the original formation of the R.N.R. was Edward, Viscount Cardwell, who is now principally remembered for his efforts in abolishing the purchase of Army commissions, but who deserves to be well remembered by the Merchant Service and the Reserve. He was born in 1813 and called to the Bar in 1838, entering Parliament four years later. In 1847 he became M.P. for Liverpool, and so interested himself very keenly in merchant shipping matters, being President of the Board of Trade, and responsible for the framing and passing of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854. With the interests of the shipowners at heart, he secured relief from a number of dues which were strangling the Merchant Service, and formed the Mercantile Marine Department of the Board of Trade, as well as laying the foundation of the Meteorological Department. In 1858 he was the most active member of the Manning Committee, but after that his attention veered more in the direction of the Army, and his final office was as Secretary of War.

When the Royal Naval Reserve was founded the Comptroller-General of the Coastguard, under whose control it passed, was Commodore Hastings R. Yelverton. He was born in Ireland in 1808, his original name being Henry, which was changed to Yelverton by Royal Sign Manual in 1849. He entered the Navy in 1823 and steadily worked his way up until he attained fame in the Crimean War, being one of the few officers who greatly increased their reputation by the Baltic Campaigns of 1854 and 1855. For this work he was given the Order of the Bath, and in August, 1859, he was appointed Comptroller-General of the Coastguards. Promoted Rear-Admiral in 1863, he further increased his reputation ten years later by capturing the Spanish *Intransigente* man-of-war in face of the insurgent fleet and batteries, which threatened to blow his ships out of the water. He retired owing to ill-health in 1878, and died almost immediately afterwards.

At the same time Admiral Sir Charles Napier put forward a scheme for a further Naval Reserve which was remarkably like the idea of the Royal Fleet Reserve some forty years later. According to his idea men should be required to serve ten years in the Navy and would then be eligible for a short service pension. They were, however, to be able to stay on in the Naval Reserve under the regulations in force, and at the expiration of their full 21 years' service (10 years having been served in the regular Navy and the remainder in the Reserve) were to be entitled to the long service pension. This scheme was not proceeded with, possibly because it might have tended

to weaken the determination of the authorities to have the new reserve for merchant seamen only.

One of the first mistakes that the authorities made with regard to the Naval Reserve was that they did not insist on a uniform. Merchant seamen went on board the drill ships for their 28 days' training in ordinary clothes, which made a considerable difference to the training of the men and their pride in the service. During actual service in the fleet they received the uniform and the same bedding, victualling, &c., as the men of the regular Navy.

At the same time, in spite of all the disadvantages, recruits rolled in steadily. A great step forward was when several of the seamen's unions in the north took up a decided attitude in favour of the Reserve, and advised their men very strongly to join. Then a party of naval officers and Board of Trade officials attended meetings of seamen in various ports and explained to them most carefully the advantages of joining the Reserve, a practice which was uniformly successful. Towards the end of April, 1860, it was announced that 850 seamen had already enrolled, every one of them able bodied seamen with at least five years' service at sea, and all under 40 years of age. At the same time, not all the recruits were quite satisfactory, for the bounties that were offered had induced a good many most undesirable characters to join up, which not only kept away the better men, but had a very serious effect on the general discipline of the Reserve. However, steps were immediately taken to rectify this, and in eighteen months there was a quite satisfactory state of affairs reported; 5000 men had registered themselves, and although this was only a small proportion of the personnel of the merchant service it was a very useful reserve.

The Royal Naval Coast Artillery was not considered to be at all a satisfactory force as a Naval Reserve, and in 1860 it was remarked that the numbers were decreasing rather than increasing. Lord Clarence Paget stated that one of the reasons for this was that men were under the delusion that the Admiralty wished to trap them, and that this feeling was fostered by the fact that the Government would not give the assurance that the men were only to be called up if war were actually declared.

At first, both the Royal Naval Coast Volunteers and the Royal Naval Reserve drilled in the coastguard ships in the various centres. These coastguard ships were generally old 74-gun ships that had been cut down to 60's, when they had auxiliary screw engines fitted into them, but one or two of them were bigger and one or two smaller. The districts and the ships were as follows: Hull, H.M.S. *Cornwallis* (60), with H.M.S. *Lively* as tender for coastguard duties. The district extended from Berwick to Cromer. Next came the Harwich district, which was from North Yarmouth to Ramsgate, and had H.M. 60-gun ship *Pembroke* at Harwich, with the *Dolphin* as tender. The Newhaven district had the guardship *Dauntless*, but she spent most of her time in Southampton Water, which was one limit of the station, the other being Folkestone. On account of the old smuggling tradition on this coast she had three tenders, the *Argus*, *Mermaid* and *Active*. The Weymouth district had the *Colossus* (80), with the *Wickham* as tender, the district extending from Lymington to Salcombe, and including the Isle of Wight. H.M.S. *Russell* (60) had the Falmouth district, which was from Plymouth to the Bristol Channel; and for the Milford district there was the 60-

gun *Blenheim*, with the *Royal Charlotte* as tender, the area extending from Gloucester to Carnarvon. In Liverpool there was the 80-gun *Majestic*, with the *Seamew* as tender, for the Isle of Man was still inclined towards smuggling. Scotland and Ireland each had two districts, the Scottish being the Clyde with H.M.S. *Hogue* (60) and the *Royal Albert*, and the Leith with H.M.S. *Edinburgh* (60) and the *Victoria*. The 60-gun ships *Hawke* and *Ajax* had the Irish coast, with headquarters at Queenstown and Kingstown respectively. This coast-guard service was a backwater of the Navy, while there was no great enthusiasm in the Royal Naval Coast Artillery, except for those men who contrived to get a retaining fee both from it and from the Militia at the same time. Therefore, the Royal Naval Reserve men had little enough incentive to make themselves efficient.

The first official inspection of the Tyneside Division of the Royal Naval Reserve was made by Commodore the Hon. W. S. Yelverton on July 24, 1861, and may be taken as typical of many of these early inspections. The number of men enrolled in the Division was then considerably over a thousand, and the daily attendance at drill on board H.M.S. *Castor* (which had just been commissioned in Newcastle) was between seventy and a hundred, the men commencing their month's drills as their ships came into port. It was reported that the Navy recruiting offices, or rendezvous, as they were called in the old days of the Press Gang, had been closed up at Shields, Sunderland, and various other ports on the North East coast, as it was decided that the Naval Reserve stations were quite sufficient for all the purposes of recruiting for the Navy. The Commodore also inspected H.M.S. *Hasty*, screw gunboat, in which the Tyne Reserve men had been taking their "great gun practice" at sea, and expressed himself as being very well satisfied with everything that he saw. It must be remembered that in those days the Tyne was of the greatest importance to the Royal Naval Reserve, which depended very largely on the coasting seamen, who would always be available, and the coal trade was very largely in the hands of the "Geordie" brigs, which carried large crews.

Chapter II. The Enrolment of Officers.

IT has been recorded that, with the exception of Mr. Lindsay, the R.N.R. commission was against the creation of commissioned ranks in the Reserve, but in the summer of 1861 the Bill to establish Royal Naval Reserve officers was argued before the House of Lords. The Duke of Somerset was its sponsor, and maintained that in case of war there were not nearly sufficient Lieutenants for the Navy, a contention which was denied by the Earl of Hardwicke, but which was generally accepted by those best acquainted with the service. The Duke of Somerset observed that the merchant service officer was quite fitted to live in a wardroom, just as Mr. Lindsay had maintained two years previously, and that the officers of the Mercantile Marine themselves would be quite willing to serve if inducement were offered them. Some had got ahead of their opportunity, and had enlisted in the ranks, the Reserve at that time containing 13 men with master's tickets and 60 men with mate's tickets, but the proposed Bill did not suggest that anybody not possessed of a master's ticket, or without experience in the command of steamers, should be enrolled. Another plank of the opposition was that, if war broke out, a Bill of this kind could be passed through both Houses in a week, a strange point to follow the objection that all the training that could be given to a merchant officer would not be sufficient to fit him to take up his duties in a battleship. The Earl of Hardwicke, who had voted in favour of the Press Gang, was one of the bitterest opponents of the Bill, and at the third reading he made the extraordinary statement that merchant seamen were not true sailors; they were merely navigators who understood the propulsion of vessels by steam! When one considers the training through which a merchant service officer had to go in those days, for it must be remembered that every one of them had served in sail, this statement appears extraordinary. However, the objections were not taken very seriously, and the Bill was read for the third time in the House of Lords and passed on July 4, 1861.

The passing of the Royal Naval Reserve Officers Act of 1861 provided for the raising of a force of officers, but very little else, and all details were intentionally left very vague. The whole matter was in the nature of an experiment, while the preliminary debates had shown a good deal of opposition. The Government, therefore, very wisely left the results of the provisional arrangement to speak for themselves, and so pave the way for a more permanent measure later on, and they were not long in doing so.

The regulations under which it was proposed to enrol officers under the 1861 Act could not be described as over generous on the part of the Admiralty, or over satisfactory to men who had the command of first-class merchant ships. Indeed, the question of relative rank was a very thorny one for many years afterwards, and, in the reminiscences of liner captains of the 'sixties, 'seventies, and 'eighties we find frequent reference to their feelings in this matter. There were to be only two ranks in

the Royal Naval Reserve, and not more than 400 officers in all at any time. The senior officers were to be lieutenants; their number was not to exceed 130, and they were to rank with but after lieutenants of the Royal Navy. To qualify for this, a man had to be in command of a merchant ship, holding an extra master's certificate under the Merchant Marine Act of 1850 or the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, and to have had the command of a vessel of not less than 500 tons gross for at least three years. He was then eligible for appointment as lieutenant or master in the Naval Reserve, and the Chairman of the Mercantile Marine Service Association in Liverpool immediately wrote to the "Times," pointing out the very strong feeling that existed among the best men eligible for appointment at the poor prospects held out. The first mates of similar vessels, who had sailed as first mates for at least two long sea voyages to India, China, the Cape, South America or the Pacific, or who should have served as first mate for two years in a steamer of not less than 700 tons gross, were eligible for appointment as sub-lieutenants. Naturally, the man who had held rank as chief officer in one of the crack Atlantic liners did not much relish the idea of messing in the gun-room and did not hesitate to express his views.

As far as drill was concerned officers were required to undergo a course of drill and gunnery instruction on board the district drill ship at the big mercantile ports in their respective districts, these drill ships being established at London, Shields, Sunderland, Hull, Southampton, Falmouth, Bristol, Liverpool, Leith, Greenore, Dublin and Queenstown. In the original regulations the length of this drill was left very vague. As regards discipline, Royal Naval Reserve officers were subject to naval discipline when attending drills or when called out for actual service, and they would then be liable to lose their commissions by order of the Admiralty for offences against the rules, discipline, or character of her Majesty's service in the same manner as regular naval officers.

The promotion regulations were not particularly encouraging, R.N.R. sub-lieutenants being eligible for promotion to lieutenant when fully qualified by their command in the Merchant Service, and then only at the discretion of the Admiralty. Captain Crutchley, of the Union Line, who was afterwards Secretary of the Navy League, tells in his reminiscences how he applied for promotion, but was told by the Admiral Commanding Reserves that a sub-lieutenant's commission was all that the Captain of a Cape mail steamer had any reason to expect, a decision that rankled in his memory until the day of his death. On the other hand, R.N.R. officers who in actual service might obtain the special approbation of their Lordships might be eligible to receive regular commission in the Navy in the same rank as that in which they might be serving at the time. In this event they were to be treated in all respects as officers on the permanent strength of the Navy, but naturally they were at a disadvantage in being very much older than their messmates, and also it was made quite plain that these commissions would be given with a very sparing hand indeed, and only in recognition of very exceptional service. Officers who on actual service should distinguish themselves in action with the enemy, or in exceptional circumstances in peace time, were eligible, at the conclusion of their service only, for promotion to higher rank in the Naval Reserve, but only on an honorary basis.

The uniform regulations were laid down somewhat vaguely in the Act, it being notified that officers would wear the uniform of their corresponding rank in the Navy, with such distinction as her Majesty might later approve. As regards pay they were to receive the pay of corresponding ranks in the Royal Navy while on active service, in addition to a small retaining fee per annum. In the matter of compensation for wounds or hurt also they were to rank with their messmates in the regular service, and this same regulation applied to the widows of officers dying on actual service. They were not to be accommodated in the drill ships when undergoing their instruction, but were to live ashore and to receive a subsistence allowance of five shillings a day for lieutenants, and two shillings for sub-lieutenants, but when embarked for active service they were to receive the messing allowance of their rank. Applications for appointment and training had to go through the Board of Trade to the Admiralty.

At the same time the seamen of the Reserve received an annual retaining fee of £6, and when called out the pay and allowances of their rank. They had precisely the same prospects of promotion as the regular seamen or petty officers of the Navy, and long service men were to receive a pension of not less than twelve pounds per annum after sixty years of age. A man with not less than ten years' continuous satisfactory service to his credit was eligible for all the benefits of Greenwich Hospital; in fact the relative attractions of the service were very much greater for a lower deck rating than they were for a commissioned officer.

A good deal of confusion was caused in the old records of the early days owing to the Force being sometimes known as the Royal Naval Reserve and sometimes as the Royal Naval Volunteers. The latter was a provisional title that only lasted a very short time and soon gave way to the Royal Naval Reserve.

After the passing of the 1861 Act the Admiralty laid down its precise uniform regulations, which, except for minor matters, were practically the same as hold to-day, the stripes on the cuff being formed of two waved lines of quarter-inch gold braid, intercepting one another; but, of course, the executive curl had not then been introduced. The engineers wore purple velvet between the stripes, and the buttons were to be of the usual Navy pattern with the letters R.N.R. superimposed. Instead of the anchor on the epaulette and shoulder strap, it was provided that officers of the Reserve should wear a badge consisting of a silver anchor in the centre, surrounded by the words "Royal Naval Reserve" embroidered in gold. The cap badge was, however, different.

Within a week of the passing of the Royal Naval Reserve Officers Bill a public meeting of shipowners, commanders and officers of the merchant service was held at the London Tavern to consider the regulations which had been framed by the Government, under which the masters and mates of merchant vessels might be given commissioned rank in the R.N.R., for it must be remembered that the Bill was purposely made in very general terms with the idea of allowing the strict regulations to be framed and altered by the authorities as circumstances warranted. Mr. Lindsay, who had done so much for the force, took the chair, and while expressing his disappointment that only five or six thousand merchant seamen had accepted the terms of the R.N.R.—forgetting that they were still

liable to the Press Gang—declared his conviction that, given reasonable regulations, there would be no difficulty in finding 400 first-class Mercantile Marine officers who would enrol their names in the Royal Naval Reserve and who would make a huge difference to recruiting for the lower deck. Speakers who followed agreed with him, but it was generally objected that it was most unfair to ask the captain of a liner to serve under a lieutenant R.N. without any hope of a better position. The resolution was moved that the rank of lieutenant offered by the Government would be accepted provided that it would imply complete equality with the corresponding rank in the Royal Navy, and that R.N.R. officers would not be called upon to serve under any officer of inferior rank to that of Commander R.N. It was further resolved that the Royal Naval Reserve should be put on a footing as far as possible analogous to that which the volunteer force on shore occupied in relation to the Army.

Mr. Lindsay submitted the four resolutions of the meeting to the Duke of Somerset, who replied that the question of whether the qualifications were unnecessarily high would be reconsidered with the assistance of the Mercantile Marine, but that the risk of officers of the Mercantile Marine being called upon to serve under the command of junior lieutenants of the Navy would not occur in the ordinary course of events, as in ships commanded by lieutenants no other officers of that rank were employed. On the other hand, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty did not think that they could enter into any positive engagement on this point, as they considered it necessary to provide that, in the case of death or absence of a commanding officer, the command of a ship should devolve upon the senior officer of the Royal Navy present, just as the command of a field force did when regular soldiers and volunteers were operating together.

The second London Tavern meeting of officers of the Royal Naval Reserve was held just before Christmas, 1861, when Mr. W. M. Bullivant, the Honorary Secretary, wrote to the Duke of Somerset informing him of the following resolutions: (1) That the meeting being convened in consequence of the promulgation of the regulations for officers of the Merchant Service desirous of enrolling themselves as officers in the Royal Naval Reserves, the Commanders and Officers present accept same and pledge themselves to co-operate with the Government; (2) That the Commanders and Officers now present desire to assure her Majesty of their loyalty and that they will at all times be prepared to co-operate in the Navy whenever their services are required for national defence or for upholding the honour of the British flag; (3) That the thanks of the meeting be tendered to the Admiralty for the opportunity given to the Merchant Service to co-operate with the Navy, and especial thanks for Lord Clarence Paget for the support that he has always given to the officers of the Merchant Service; (4) A message of condolence on her Majesty's recent bereavement.

In reply their Lordships wrote expressing their satisfaction that the proposals had been so warmly approved, and Lord Clarence Paget wrote as a private individual thanking the Chairman and the officers who had passed the resolution and suggesting that it was very necessary for each individual officer to study the numerous books on gunnery which were in use in H.M. school ships *Excellent* and *Cambridge*, a copy of which would be supplied to every qualified applicant

who made the request through the Board of Trade. He pointed out that at present it was impossible for the Government to do more than to offer such instruction as might be found on board the training ships, but that it was most desirable for officers of the reserve to attend on practice days on board the school ships either at Portsmouth or Devonport, where as much practical knowledge of gunnery might be acquired in a few hours as would repay them all their trouble. He indicated that the Government might be inclined to regard most favourably any application made by shipowners for the loan of guns or ammunition to enable the captains —providing they themselves were R.N.R. officers and had sufficient R.N.R. ratings on board to work at least one gun—to exercise officers and men during their voyages. He also suggested that it was very necessary for the decks of all large sailing ships on long voyages to be strengthened to enable them to carry a stern chaser, for the fact that they had one heavy gun mounted would greatly lessen the chances of capture by privateers, the enemies most to be dreaded by merchant ships. This last suggestion, however, was not carried out, for privateering was officially abolished soon afterwards.

Most of the credit for forming the Royal Naval Reserve goes to the Duke of Northumberland and Lord Clarence Paget, as they had the more picturesque work of carrying the measures through Parliament, but the then Registrar-General of Seamen, Captain J. H. Brown, R.N., had far more to do with it than most people realise. He was a veteran of the Battle of Trafalgar, having been a midshipman in H.M.S. *Prince* in the action, so that he carried into his duties of Registrar-General a thorough knowledge of the requirements of the Fleet. This knowledge was invaluable, and for the work he did he was made a Companion of the Bath on the recommendation of the Duke of Somerset.

It was soon found that a regulation which did not admit any lieutenant who did not hold an extra master's certificate under the Mercantile Marine Act of 1850 or the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, with its requirement of sea time, was far too stringent, and it was modified before the work of enrolling the officers had actually begun. Arrangements were also made which permitted officers who belonged to any ship of not less than 500 tons burthen to enter the Reserve. At the same time the *Conway* at Liverpool took up the idea of R.N.R. officers very keenly, and has never lost its connection with the Force.

At the end of 1861 the whole of the R.N.R. scheme was surveyed and a report published. It pointed out that at first the scheme seemed in danger of absolute failure, but that it was saved by the action of the men in Scotland and on the North East Coast, who were known for their prudence and their admirable system of unions and benefit societies. They were addressed by officers and officials from headquarters, and after giving the matter most careful consideration, threw themselves wholeheartedly into it, with the result that from 10 or 12 enlistments a week, the number went up to over 200. Just over 8000 men were enrolled, and there were 600 on the waiting list, all fully qualified able seamen. It was pointed out that there were only 15,000 able seamen in the Navy of the day, so that the Reserve was most valuable. Of the 8000 men enrolled, 6000 had qualified in gunnery, only 850 were on leave for

long voyages, while 5000 were engaged in the coasting trade, and were immediately available. The report wound up with the suggestion that the regulation which maintained that the £6 a year retaining fee was forfeited immediately a man was embarked in a man-of-war should be repealed, and that he should receive the annual retainer as long as he was in the Reserve, no matter where he was serving.

Those who had suggested that the merchant seamen would not be willing to fulfil their obligations of service in the R.N.R. learnt their mistake as the result of an incident which followed hard on the heels of the unfortunate Trent affair. All the seamen who were under training on board H.M.S. *President*, in the City Canal, West India Docks, signed a letter to the Commanding Officer of the ship, as follows:— "Having heard that our flag has been insulted by an American ship of war, and people who claimed its protection forcibly taken under it and made prisoners, we are ready to fulfil our engagement and protect the honour of our flag, Queen and country whenever called upon. We request that you will make this known in the proper quarters." A similar letter was addressed to the commanding officers of nearly all the other Reserve training ships round the coast. The men training on board the *Trincomalee*, at Sunderland, paraded the docks and principal streets of the town, preceded by the Union Jack and a band, and when they returned to the ship passed a resolution pointing out to the Government that they wished to show that they were not being paid their retaining fee for nothing, and that when any crisis arose the Reserve was ready to fulfil its contract.

The possible value of the Reserve was also shown in an incident which occurred at the beginning of 1862, when feeling over the Trent affair was at its height. The Government of Antigua decided that the command was in a very poor position to defend itself, and accordingly arrangements were made with captains of merchant ships in port by which, at a given signal, the crews could make their way to the battery which commanded the entrance to the harbour but which had been left practically without a garrison. Instead of finding, however, that the men so called would be useful for little but ammunition carrying, the Governor was delighted to find that they included quite a number of Naval Reservists who had received a good groundwork in gunnery and who were ready and willing to serve in the batteries. This incident had a very considerable effect on the feeling towards the Royal Naval Reserve, and was widely discussed at the time.

Until proper regulations were laid down for the formation of a Reserve Officers' Corps quite a number of certificated men enlisted in the ranks. In January, 1862, it was announced that on New Year's Day, out of 8229 men enrolled in the Royal Naval Reserve, 24 had masters' certificates and 17 of these had sailed in command of ships, while 116 had mates' certificates and 38 had actual experience in that rank. In the *Trincomalee* and one or two other drill ships unofficial arrangements were made to drill captains and mates by themselves if they desired it, but there were no rights in the matter. Immediately the regulations were published permitting commissioned ranks in the R.N.R. there were a large number of applicants for lieutenants' commissions, and before very long it had to be announced that the applications outnumbered the vacancies. One cause of this was that a certain

number of the vacancies were reserved until 1864 for officers who were abroad on long voyages.

The first R.N.R. commission was that of honorary lieutenant, which was granted on February 22, 1862, to Charles Henry Evans Judkins, the Commodore of the Cunard Line, and bore seniority of November 17, 1846. Two days later the appointment of the first four active lieutenants was published, George C. Carrew, with seniority February 18, 1851, David R. Comyn (April 20, 1852), Allen W. Young (February 7, 1853), and David H. Johnston (April 25, 1856). In August, 1862, a commission as honorary lieutenant was granted to Thomas Crosby, with seniority April 3, 1826. The seniority given was the date on which the officer had, by his certificates and sea time, first satisfied the requirements of his rank. Between February and October commissions had been granted to 57 active and 33 honorary lieutenants and to 34 active and two honorary sub-lieutenants.

Although he is not usually associated with the sea except through his shipowning ancestors, Mr. Gladstone really had quite a keen interest in it, was always intensely proud of his honorary position of Elder Brother of Trinity House, and, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, did good work for the R.N.R. He visited Sunderland in October, 1862, and was met at the docks by the full force of the R.N.R., who were in training in the *Trincomalee*, and who were drawn up on the quayside under Captain Heard. The speech he made was enthusiastically received, and, as showing the ideals of the R.N.R. at the time, it is interesting.

"My friends of the Royal Naval Reserve," he said, "and especially your gallant commander, I hope you will not think I use the words of idle compliment when I state that I have seen nothing in the whole course of my most deeply interesting visit to the North of England with greater interest or satisfaction than your body gathered on this occasion. I do not believe, among all the measures that have been taken by the Government, or suggested for the purpose of National Defence, a wiser suggestion has ever been made, or better measures adopted, than the incorporation of the Naval Reserve. It is a measure in its spirit essentially pacific, and at the same time it is a measure, as we know perfectly well from the experience of last winter, which has proved to be quite effective. I must not presume to make myself a judge of military or naval discipline, but I have spent some weeks on board a Queen's ship, and I never spent a portion of my life with greater satisfaction. And, if I may be allowed to say so, I see in you the indications, not to be mistaken, of the same spirit of self-denying discipline and resolution which have made the name of British sailors so famous throughout the world. Accept my best wishes for your health and prosperity, and of my certain confidence that you have rendered a great service to your country, as well as taking the wisest course for yourselves, in becoming members of the Naval Reserve."

Meanwhile, just as the success of the French methods of raising a naval reserve had been one of the primary causes of the institution of our own, so the organisation of the British caused the French to examine their resources. The result was a committee of inquiry in 1862 which examined the most experienced shipowners and master mariners among a host of other witnesses. Curiously enough, the general tendency was now to condemn the Inscription

Maritime, but one cannot help feeling that behind this condemnation was a large measure of self-interest. The owners stated that the liability to naval service from the age of twenty to fifty was the cause of many young men abandoning the idea of the sea as a profession, and that it was ridiculous for a university graduate who took to the sea to be forced to serve as a seaman. As none of them offered any alternative scheme for manning the Navy, however, and as all the witnesses seemed to have little interest in the needs of the Fleet at all,their testimony was very largely discounted, and although the inquiry led to a number of useful reforms it did not abolish the Inscription, which exists to this day.

Commodore Alfred P. Ryder, who succeeded to the position of Comptroller-General of the Coastguards in April, 1863, was an officer still in the early 'forties, who had made a great name for himself in the command of the six-gun paddle ship *Vixen* at Bluefields in 1848, when certain British subjects suffered outrages at the hands of the Nicaraguans. He was in command of a frigate in Napier's Baltic Expedition of 1854 and died with the rank of Admiral of the Fleet in 1888.

The Act of 1861 was admittedly in the nature of a trial, and the measure which put the matter on a proper footing was officially the Officers of the Royal Naval Reserve Act, 1863, 26 and 27 Victoria, cap. 69. It began by enumerating the men who were eligible for the commissions to be distributed: persons who were or who had been masters, mates or engineers of merchant ships, or who had formerly been commissioned officers, masters or engineers in the Indian Navy or in the East India Company's naval service. The duty of enrolment lay with my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and they had the right to include as many eligible officers as they considered fit in the circumstances ruling at the time, and also had the right to make regulations for the relative rank of these officers and those of the regular Navy. Such officers were, of course, in all respects to be subject to the laws, regulations and customs for the time being in force for the government and discipline of the Navy. At the same time the officers on reserve to the Royal Navy, who already held their commissions under a different scheme, and who were not connected with the Merchant Service, were still to continue in the service of her Majesty. The pay and allowances were to be such as the Admiralty might from time to time appoint, but the allowances or pensions in respect of hurts or wounds, and the widows' pensions, were to be the same as those of an officer in the Royal Navy of corresponding rank. The Act repealed and replaced the former Act, 24 and 25 Victoria, cap. 129, and was very much more elastic in its clauses.

To be eligible for a commission as lieutenant, officers had to be masters of British ships, under 45 years of age, holding certificates of competency and having had the command of ships of not under 500 tons for not less than two years, being actually afloat and in command at the time of their making their applications. Officers under 45 years of age who had attained the rank of master or over in the Royal Indian Marine or in the East India Company's naval force were also eligible. Sub-lieutenants were required to be 35 years of age, to be chief mates of British ships, to hold master's or chief mate's certificates of competency, to have sailed as master or chief mate in vessels of not less than 500 tons

for not less than two years, and to be actually afloat at the time of application. Officers under 40 years of age who had attained the rank of second master or over in the Indian forces were admitted.

To qualify for the rank of engineer, an officer had to be under 40, to hold a first-class engineer's certificate, and to be in charge of engines of over 100 nominal horse-power at the time of his making the application. Officers from the Indian services must have attained the rank of engineer or higher, and to be under 40 years of age. The first and second-class assistant engineers had to be under 40 and possess professional qualifications, but for the rank of second-class assistant engineers they need not have served afloat for a period of three years. Engineer officers of the Reserve were not required to undergo drill.

At the same time, provision was made for the appointment of honorary officers not exceeding 160 in all. The establishment consisted of 30 honorary commanders, officers who had held lieutenants' commissions for not less than five years and who were over 50 years of age. In addition, there were 130 honorary lieutenants and sub-lieutenants, the quota to be divided as appeared necessary at the time. For the rank of honorary lieutenant an applicant had to be possessed of all the qualifications of a lieutenant on the active list, but must be over 35 years of age, although he need not possess a certificate of competency. Owners of seagoing pleasure yachts of over 20 tons register who commanded as masters in their own yachts, and superintendents of mercantile marine offices who had served at sea as masters, were eligible. For the rank of honorary sub-lieutenant a man had to be deputy superintendent of a mercantile marine office, and to have served as chief mate or master in the merchant service. Officers on the honorary list were not required to undergo drill, nor were they liable to be called up for sea service except in cases of emergency, and even then not unless they had been on the active list for some time. In addition, it was provided that for distinguished action in the face of the enemy an officer might be promoted to the rank of honorary captain of the Naval Reserve on the conclusion of his active service. The honorary list was also open to officers who wished to retire, either with the rank that they held in the Reserve or with a higher rank.

Lieutenants and sub-lieutenants on the active list were required to undergo 28 days' drill and gunnery instruction every year, to be carried out on board one of the district drill ships. In the event of their being absent from England for over a year they were to be allowed to carry out this drill on board one of her Majesty's ships abroad, provided that she carried a gunnery lieutenant. Officers could, however, after examination, obtain a report to the effect that they were competent to instruct and drill men of the Reserve, in which case they were required to come up for the drill in the ordinary way, but if they contrived to pass the test they were dismissed after seven days instead of the routine 28. While attending their drills in the various training ships, officers were to live ashore and to be allowed 10s. a day subsistence for lieutenants and 7s. for sub-lieutenants—a very considerable advance on the 1861 allowances.

Under the 1863 Act the number of officers was not to exceed 700, against 400 in the 1861 measure. This number was to be divided as follows: 130 lieutenants, 270 sub-lieutenants, and 100 engineers, each grade ranking with but after the corresponding

ranks in the Royal Navy. All officers were to be appointed by the Admiralty, but their applications had to be made through the Board of Trade.

At the end of June, 1863, it was found that out of 18,712 applications received no fewer than 16,313 men had been enrolled at the chief ports, and that this number included over 2500 petty officers in the Merchant Service, the finest merchant seamen that the country could produce.

Although the Bristol Division had the distinction of contributing the first man to the Royal Naval Reserve, by the third of January, 1864, the fourth anniversary of its establishment, only 900 men were enrolled, which shows the difference in keenness between the Northern ports and the South. At the same time, the division based in H.M.S. *Daedalus* had a fine reputation for smartness, and lived up to it.

In July, 1864, the old red, white and blue squadrons were abolished in the Navy, and the whole of the regular Service flew the White Ensign. Among the subsidiary regulations that followed this change was the fact that the Blue Ensign was to be borne by ships in any public office, and by ships commanded by Royal Naval Reserve officers, which had at least a third of their crew in the Reserve, the ensign to be accompanied with a Union Jack with a white border forward. It could not be worn by any merchant steamer of under 1000 tons gross, or sailing ship of under 800 tons burthen, and each individual ship had to obtain an Admiralty warrant.

Such ships as cared to avail themselves of the permission of the Admiralty to carry a defensive armament were to be supplied with two 32-pounder smooth-bore guns, of either 25, 32 or 42 hundredweight, according to the build of the ship and her ability to stand the weight. Each gun was to carry forty round shot with filled flannel cartridges and a hundred quill friction tubes, while four rounds per man per annum was allowed for practice. Should officers or men ship in a vessel so defensively armed they were allowed to carry out their drills on board in the course of their voyage, being only subjected to a test drill of two days which, if satisfactorily passed, freed them from any further liability for the year. Should a ship so defensively armed and wearing the Blue Ensign encounter a man-of-war, the officer commanding the latter was empowered to board and inspect her, providing always that he was superior in rank to the R.N.R. officer in command.

The old system of putting the R.N.R. and the Coast Artillery into the coastguard ships soon proved itself unsatisfactory, so that, in 1865, there appeared the first eight purely Royal Naval Reserve drill ships, many of which had originally been coastguard ships. H.M.S. *President* was in the West India Docks, H.M.S. *Castor* at North Shields, H.M.S. *Eagle* at Liverpool, as she was for many years afterwards, H.M.S. *Daedalus* at Bristol, H.M.S. *Trincomalee* at West Hartlepool, H.M.S. *Brilliant* at Dundee, H.M.S. *Winchester* at Aberdeen, and H.M.S. *Active* at Sunderland. To take the naval officers borne in H.M.S. *President*, which was then moored in the City Canal, she carried a commander, a master, two staff surgeons and a surgeon, a paymaster, and an assistant paymaster, with two extra paymasters for service in the coastguard office. Other ships were officered on a similar scale, the point that the Royal Naval Reserve men were there to get their training appearing to be a minor consideration in the Admiralty appointments.

In the estimates for 1865 the sum set aside for the Royal Naval Reserve was £205,052, which included the retainer for 16,000 seamen, drill pay and all incidental expenses. In the same estimates the sum of £22,000 was set aside for the generally condemned Coast Volunteers. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that there were certain charges with regard to the upkeep of the drill-ships, &c., which were included in other votes, and which did not appear in connection with the reserves at all. It was estimated unofficially that after saddling it with all possible charges, the cost of the invaluable Royal Naval Reserve was well under a quarter of a million.

Although the Reserve had been making excellent progress, there was a certain amount of feeling that it had attracted comparatively little public attention from my Lords themselves, but in September, 1865, the First Lord of the Admiralty, that same Duke of Somerset who had taken such a prominent part in the House of Lords debates which led to the establishment of the Reserve, went down to the drill ship *President*, in the West India Docks, with a considerable staff and watched a display of gun-drill by the reservists under training on board. At its conclusion he was pleased to declare himself delighted with everything that he had seen, and maintained that the men "had acquitted themselves in a way not to be surpassed on board the *Excellent.*" It is to be feared that this latter remark was more polite than truthful, but it gave encouragement that was very badly needed.

Commodore John Tarleton succeeded Commodore A. P. Ryder as Comptroller-General of the Coast-guard in April, 1866, and both on this occasion and later the Royal Naval Reserve owed a lot to him. He had been commander of the screw frigate *Fox* during the second Burmese War in 1851, and did very useful work on the Irrawaddi, being promoted captain in 1852. To get a little ahead of the history, he was appointed admiral-superintendent of the Royal Naval Reserve on January 1, 1875, with his flag in H.M.S. *Penelope*, the coast-guard ship at Harwich. He died in 1880, having been beloved by everybody who came into contact with him. He had proved his gallantry in action, and although he was a strict disciplinarian on board, he knew how to relax when the circumstances of the moment demanded it, a knowledge which was of the greatest value in the early days of the R.N.R. The opinion in which he was held by the Royal Family is shown by the fact that when the Duke of Edinburgh first went to sea it was in the ship that Commodore Tarleton commanded.

As President of the Board of Trade Sir Stafford Northcote made a speech to the cadets on board H.M.S. *Conway* in the Mersey in October, 1866, and spoke very highly of the Royal Naval Reserve and the work that it was doing, especially mentioning the work of the training ships. At that time there was an industrial improvement that was having a very distinct effect on the recruiting of the Navy, and the service was beginning to place more and more reliance on the naval reserves. There was therefore more than a trace of self-interest in the announcement he made that the Admiralty intended to do all that it could to provide more facilities for the training of youngsters for the Merchant Service, an intention which, unfortunately, was not to bear much fruit.

The recommendations that had been put forward by the 1859 Committee for the establishment of a number of training ships that would

fit youths both for the Royal Navy and Merchant Service were allowed to rest at the Admiralty until 1867, when a Joint Committee was appointed by the Navy and the Board of Trade to go into the matter thoroughly, and it was to this that Sir Stafford Northcote referred. After debating the subject it was decided that the expense of these new training ships would be a very serious item in the Naval Estimates, and accordingly the project was abandoned altogether, a decision which caused very considerable feeling at the time.

When stock came to be taken in the summer of 1866 it appeared that 17,021 lower-deck ratings were then enrolled on the list, but that of this number 1318 had failed to present themselves for drill. This figure must be taken as exceedingly satisfactory, for it included all causes and was not a net loss to the reserve. Some of these men had been discharged from their ships abroad, some of them were sick, while others had died, but had not been entered as dead on the books of the Registrar for a variety of reasons. At the same time there had been 471 men discharged or dismissed. Some of these had taken their discharge at the expiration of their five years of service and some had transferred to the regular Navy, so that the percentage of really bad bargains was remarkably small. In the following year, for a variety of reasons, there was an unfortunately large number of time-expired men who declined to re-engage.

At the end of the financial year 1867-8 Rear-Admiral Tarleton—he had been promoted shortly before—was required by My Lords to render a very detailed report on the Royal Naval Reserve. Nine thousand men had passed through the drill ships during that year, and commanding officers were ordered to pay particular attention to their estimate of efficiency. The admiral had to report on the relative value of the men as compared with the ratings in the regular Navy. In his estimation 1250 of the men were fully fit to undertake the duties of petty officers in the Navy and 1800 those of leading seamen. Of the balance, 4800 of the able seamen were at least of satisfactory ability; the remainder were fair. He remarked that during the year under review the behaviour of the reservists was very good and very few punishments had to be awarded. The R.N.R. was out of the teething stage.

Chapter III. *Building up the Reserve.*

THUS the Royal Naval Reserve came into existence in its two branches, but although the foundations were well and truly laid there was plenty of work ahead and plenty of discouragement. The new force had many active enemies and suffered still more from stolid indifference on the part of many who ought to have offered whole-hearted support. The next few years were a steady fight against every kind of handicap, beginning with the fact that the general public knew nothing about the R.N.R. — and cared less — because they had never seen it.

The first public appearance of the Royal Naval Reserve was in July, 1867, when a review was held at Spithead, and 1200 Royal Naval Reserve officers and men were embarked. The ships did not put to sea, however, and comparatively little attention was paid to the fact that there were Reservists in their crews; but this acknowledgment of their work made a great difference to the moral of the men, and undoubtedly helped in the splendid muster which turned up at a few days' notice two years later.

In 1869 it was planned to take the Royal Naval Reserve to sea for the first time, the original idea being that they should go for an Easter cruise. This was abandoned in favour of a fortnight beginning at Whitsun, although this meant that the Royal Naval Reservists were volunteering at considerable sacrifice to themselves, for by then the coasting season had started and there was plenty of work to be had by every trained seaman. On this account there was a good deal of doubt as to the success of the cruise, but events proved that quite a fair muster of first-class Reserve men were ready and willing to serve at sea, while the number of officers who volunteered called for a drastic selection.

It has already been mentioned that one of the earliest mistakes of the authorities in dealing with the R.N.R. men, a mistake that was forced upon them by considerations of economy, was that they were not allowed any uniform. When the R.N.R. had its first big cruise in 1869, men were ordered to embark in a decent suit of clothes, blue if possible, with black neckerchiefs and R.N.R. caps. They had to take with them a bag containing one shirt, one pair of stockings, one towel, one piece of soap and one comb, but it was announced that on boarding his ship every man would be supplied with a blue frock and trousers to wear during the cruise, and that if his conduct had been satisfactory throughout he would be allowed to keep this clothing without payment.

The Fleet that took these Reservists and coastguards to sea was certainly a miscellaneous one. The *Agincourt*, one of the famous five-masted ironclads that were regarded so highly in the 'sixties, had two R.N.R. lieutenants and 200 men, in addition to six Chief Officers and 231 men of the coastguard. While she had been in Reserve there were, of course, a number of officers, engineers, stokers, &c., always on board, and she also carried two marine officers and 75 men, with

76 Regular seamen. One of the R.N.R. lieutenants embarged was Lieutenant Allen Young, who was famous as a Polar explorer. H.M.S. *Excellent* supplied a detachment of four lieutenants and 30 seamen gunners for training the Reservists at sea. The *Duncan* had one lieutenant and 229 men, in addition to 189 coastguards; the *St. George* had no commissioned R.N.R. officers, but had 200 men and 150 coastguards. The *Trafalgar* had two lieutenants and 134 men, the *Donegal* two lieutenants and 255 men, the *Hector* one lieutenant and 127 men, the *Royal George* two lieutenants and 68 men, the *Black Prince* one lieutenant and 111 men, the *Valiant* one lieutenant and 134 men, and the *Mersey* one lieutenant and 142 men, while there was in each ship a detachment of coastguards which generally ran to about the same numbers. In all, the coastguards supplied 60 officers and 1675 men, the Royal Naval Reserve 12 lieutenants and 1700 men, and although the ships were mostly of a type that was already getting obsolete, they were at least sent away for a practical cruise.

A curious feature of the cruise was that Mr. Childers, the First Lord of the Admiralty, actually went to sea in the Flagship, Rear-Admiral Sir Astley Cooper Key striking his own flag in favour of the Admiralty foul anchor. Mr. Childers' son, a promising young officer, who was soon afterwards to lose his life in the *Captain* disaster, was one of the officers of the Fleet, while the Second in Command was Rear-Admiral Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, the "Uncle Geoff" who was later to have a great influence on the history of the Royal Naval Reserve.

Two hundred and thirty-four men of the London Division turned up, 200 of them being allowed to remain in the flagship, while the balance was drafted into other vessels of the Fleet. They were mustered in the Minories on May 10, 1869, when, with a bodyguard of wives and children, they marched down to London Bridge to be embarked in the ill-fated *Princess Alice* and taken down to the *Agincourt* at Sheerness. The training ships *Worcester* and *Fishguard* gave them a cheer as they steamed past, while the Reservists on board got so elated at the idea of their services being utilised at last that a certain amount of difficulty was anticipated. As soon as they came alongside the *Agincourt*, however, they went quietly on board, and throughout the cruise there was remarkably little trouble in the matter of discipline.

The Fleet assembled at Portland, and a number of pleasure craft from the Royal Yacht Squadron at Cowes came round to give them a send-off, for the cruise had already aroused a lot of attention in the Press. The departure was somewhat delayed, as it came on to blow a full gale from the eastward, but when this had subsided a little the Fleet got to sea, and forming two lines, with the ironclads in the starboard division and the wooden ships in the port, they went down Channel. There was still a heavy sea on, and the Reservists were immediately tested with regard to their seamanship, a test which needless to say worried none of them. As soon as the Fleet reached the Shambles it made all plain sail, and although, naturally, the evolution was not carried out in the fashion of the crack ships in the Mediterranean Fleet, it was smartly done, and there was no doubting the keenness of the Reservists. Off the Start they carried out a number of manœuvres under sail. The men were also given a spell of cutlass and rifle drill. At Sunday rounds the R.N.R. men earned excellent re-

ports for their smartness and cleanliness, although they had been criticised on the latter point when they embarked only a few days before. Afterwards each ship carried out independent training, one of the principal ideas being to make the men familiar with the heavy guns that they were now called upon to handle, guns that were entirely different from the 32-pounders that were all that they could hope for in the drill batteries and in most of the drill ships.

The gunnery school ships *Excellent* and *Cambridge* had supplied every ship with a number of first-class seamen gunners, and the routine was for a Reserve gun's crew to fall in on either side of the gun and watch the drill being carried out by the school-ship's men. After a couple of dummy runs, one reserve crew after another was put through it, and in the case of most of them it was the first time that they had ever handled the loaded gun, the harbour training of the drill ships being in the motions only. The cruise ended by the ships gathering in Tor Bay and being inspected by the First Lord and the flag officers before dispersing to their home ports.

When the cruise was over Admiral Cooper Key and the officers concerned rendered voluminous reports, reports that were reproduced largely in the Press in order to encourage the Reserve, and, at the same time, to give the general public a perfectly clear impression of what happened. Admiral Cooper Key was a very good friend of the Reservists, both then and later, and he reported that taken on the whole he had been more than satisfied with their performance. The difference in the cleanliness of the men at the beginning and the end of the cruise was particularly striking, and the only criticisms that he had to make were that the Reservists did not appear to realise the importance of obeying a naval order at the double, and that although they were very interested in their work and most conscientious in their duties, there was a slowness in their work aloft that required attention. As far as conduct went, the only ship in the Fleet that had any trouble was the *Trafalgar*, which came from Lough Swilley. She had to put one Reservist in irons for insolence to a superior, and to punish others for slackness in obeying orders. This trouble, however, was caused entirely by one man, who had been a boatswain in the Navy, had been dismissed after a court martial, and should never have been admitted into the Reserve. The coastguard officers embarked proved themselves unable to hold their position as warrant officers on board, and it was suggested that this section of the country's Reserve required a good deal of attention, although the ratings embarked were magnificent.

Admiral Key recommended most strongly that ironclads should replace the wooden vessels as drill ships of the Reserve, that the guns with which the men were trained should be of far more modern pattern, and that when embarked the Reservists should be messed with coastguards and R.N. ratings, in order to obtain better co-operation between the two services. Finally, he emphasised most strongly the fact that the Admiralty had but very imperfect information of the efficiency of the Reserve men so far as it could be gauged by periodical returns, and that R.N.R. matters should be brought more directly under Whitehall. As far as the officers were concerned, the Admiral was very pleased with the knowledge of navigation and seamanship displayed, but his opinions and criticisms on them

were not published so fully as those on the lower deck ratings.

At the end of 1869 a joint committee was appointed by the Admiralty and the Board of Trade to inquire into the working of the Royal Naval Reserve regulations, and one or two rather amusing points came out. One was that it was getting quite usual for a man to leave the Royal Navy at the end of his ten years' engagement, join the Royal Naval Reserve at once, and take his 28 days' drill at the first opportunity. He thus received four guineas pay and 30s. as a quarter's retainer. He then reentered the Navy at once, for which he could get his discharge from the Reserve, and immediately drew his back pay, so that it was quite a profitable six weeks for him. The committee also decided that a chief boatman in charge of a coastguard station and a civil doctor who was brought in to examine a man did not make a satisfactory board of entry, their efforts resulting in the entry of a number of undersirables. The committee drew attention to a curious discrepancy in the regulations, for while at the end of each five years' engagement the men were quite at liberty to reengage or not just as they thought fit, the Government was pledged never to discharge a man without his own consent except for misconduct or physical inability to serve. This meant that many undesirable recruits who were admitted under the slack regulations could not be weeded out until they chose to leave of their own free will.

Another point that was recommended for alteration by men who had had practical experience was that the regulations should require not only that a man had been to sea but that he was at sea still. The Captain of the Dundee division reported that his men included the manager of a gymnasium, a railway porter, a publican who was also the town crier at Peebles, and several other such. The same officer, who had a sense of humour as well as being a keen observer, pointed out that according to the regulations R.N.R. pensioners could be called out in war time, but they would be allowed to follow whatever occupation they pleased. He had asked one of his men how he read this clause, and immediately got the answer that he would ship as captain, but nothing lower.

This committee straightened out many matters, but there were still a number of minor irritations in the regulations until things had shaken down, as was only to be expected. The second-class reservists complained that they were compelled to drill at Harwich in the *Penelope*, which was not by any means a convenient tender for London men, while first-class men were allowed to remain in their homes in London and drill in the *President*. Many authorities considered that it was unwise to exclude fishermen so rigidly. The reason for the exclusion was partly that the Admiralty considered that their place was in the coast volunteers, which was composed very largely of the fishing population, and which, although gradually dying, was not yet dead.

In 1869 Mr. Childers, the First Lord of the Admiralty, put forward his famous scheme for discharging a large number of captains, commanders and senior lieutenants from the Service with a gratuity, in order to relieve the deplorable congestion in promotion that was then seriously affecting the efficiency of the Navy. One of the many arguments which he used to further his scheme was that a large number of these officers would take service with the big steamship companies and would form a welcome stiffening of

the Royal Naval Reserve, in addition to acting as a liaison between the Navy and Merchant Service, an argument which proved to be entirely without foundation. At the same time a suggestion was made to widen the avenue into the coastguard from the Royal Naval Reserve, but this was not proceeded with.

Although comparatively few reservists went into the coastguards, according to the regulations a reservist who had belonged to the force for 10 years and had not been called out for actual service by Royal Proclamation, or who had belonged to the force for seven years and had for two or more years of that time been called out for actual service, might, if fit in point of age, strength, character and capacity, be enrolled in the coastguards. The age was the same as that required in the case of seamen selected from the Royal Navy.

In 1870 the whole of the fighting forces of the country were examined in the light of what we were learning from the Franco-Prussian War that was then raging. As far as the Navy was concerned, the total reserve numbered 37,000, including the Coastguards, Coast Artillery, Volunteers, Naval Reservists, and pensioners, and of this number 16,000 belonged to the Royal Naval Reserve, whose nominal strength of 20,000 was to be cut down still more. The Royal Naval Reserve figured at £230,000 a year in the estimates, and it was reckoned that every reservist cost the country £12 per annum—£6 for his retainer and £6 for training expenses; but this left all overhead charges out of consideration and must be accepted with reserve. It was felt that something more might well be done to bring the numbers up to the establishment and at the same time improve the standard, and accordingly, at the end of the year, the Registrar-General paid visits to the principal seaports in the United Kingdom, just as his representatives had done at the commencement of the movement, his instructions being that he should ascertain how far, and by what means, the Royal Naval Reserve could be increased and improved.

The Suez Canal had not long been opened before many authorities were pointing out what an effect it would have on the Royal Naval Reserve, for it encouraged steamships with small crews at the expense of the old time wind-jammers, and in those days sail experience was regarded as being absolutely necessary for a reservist. Considering that the fleet did a very large part of its cruising under canvas, this is not surprising, but it was obvious that the tendency was for the sail-bred seaman to disappear altogether. At the same time, the north-country brigs which originally handled the greater part of the coasting trade were being rapidly replaced by steamers carrying very much smaller crews, while the vast improvement in the equipment of the ports led to the ships being turned round very much more quickly, so that the seamen had far less time to take their drills.

In 1872 Mr. Thomas Brassey put forward another scheme for a Naval Reserve. The 1862 Committee had suggested the abolition of the Navigating class in the Royal Navy, and although their recommendation had not been taken up by the Admiralty, Brassey thought that, if it were, the result would immediately be that the number of lieutenants would be increased and the stagnation in promotion increased in proportion. Accordingly he suggested meeting this objection by inducing officers to retire as commanders and lieutenants into

the Royal Naval Reserve for the training of the seamen and the organisation of coast defence. The officers were to receive the full pay of their rank, and were to reside at the ports at which the men under their immediate command were enrolled, and he considered that the advantages of a settled home and comparatively easy peace time duties would make the Service popular and would guarantee the success of the scheme. At the same time he suggested that the Admiralty should encourage at least a hundred half-pay lieutenants to follow their profession by entering the Merchant Service, a suggestion that would certainly not be popular with the Mercantile Marine officer and which was not carried through. The subsidising of the Mercantile training ships, the establishment of a naval term in them, and other minor points, completed the scheme, which attracted a good deal of attention at the time.

When Mr. Goschen, then First Lord of the Admiralty, went down to the *Worcester* in June, 1872, to distribute the prizes, he made the announcement that the Admiralty intended each year to select a certain number of the cadets and give them the rank of midshipmen in the Royal Naval Reserve. The *Conway*, which had shown a very keen interest in the R.N.R. from its inception, was to be included in this scheme.

The additional rank of Midshipman, Royal Naval Reserve, was approved by an Order in Council of October, 1872, which permitted the appointment to young gentlemen who had been educated in one of the training ships of the Mercantile Marine for two years, provided they were not over 18 years of age. The number was to be limited to 200, and subsistence money while at drill was to be 5s. a day. The uniform was to consist of a double-breasted monkey jacket, with the Royal Naval Reserve button on the breast and cuffs, each row of buttons to consist of nine, placed in threes. At each lapel of the collar there was to be a buttonhole of blue twist. The waistcoat was to be single-breasted, of white or blue cloth, or kerseymere, and no sword or dirk was to be allowed.

By the same Order in Council by which the rank of Midshipman was instituted, the cap badge until recently worn by the Royal Naval Reserve was established in place of the rather different one which had hitherto been the order.

There was a good deal of dissatisfaction as to the conditions in the Royal Naval Reserve in the early 'seventies, and on Apr. 3, 1873, Mr. Thomas Brassey moved a resolution in the House of Commons for the appointment of a Select Committee which would inquire into the whole circumstances of the Royal Naval Reserve. Certainly things were not by any means satisfactory. In 1856 there had been 17,000 men in the Reserve, while in 1873 there were only 12,000, and not all this reduction was due to intentional weeding out. The Naval Coast Volunteers, which were reckoned in the country's reserves as being 10,000 men, could not muster more than 600. Soon afterwards this body was abolished altogether.

The various Comptrollers of Coastguards had reported that the Royal Naval Reserve men were efficient, and from his personal experience Mr. Brassey testified that they took a deep interest in their work, but he pointed out that, generally speaking, the drill ships mounted only 32-pounder smooth bore muzzle loaders, which differed but little from those that were used at Trafalgar, and it was only on board H.M.S. *President* that six

and a half ton guns were to be found. Even then there were only two of them for the 1200 men of the London Division. The fact that the guns were never fired prevented the cost of ammunition being put forward as a reason for better guns not being provided.

In addition to better material, Mr. Brassey also suggested that better inducement should be offered for R.N.R. ratings to improve their proficiency. It was only recently that the penny-a-day allowance for trained men had been established, thus apparently putting them on a par with their opposite numbers in the Navy, but it had to be remembered that a penny a day to the naval rating meant 365 pence in the year, but the most that the R.N.R. man could hope for was two shillings and fourpence. After that they had no inducement to better themselves, and he recommended that fully-trained men should be granted a gratuity that was worth while. He pointed out the disadvantage to many men of having to find their way to the *President* in the West India Docks, and suggested that a second drill ship on the Surrey side of the river would relieve the situation, or, if this was impossible, that the men should be granted travelling expenses when they had to come any distance. He also suggested a course in H.M.S. *Excellent* for the commissioned ranks, and pointed out a number of ways in which their undoubted ability might be put to better use.

Efforts were then being made to induce the fishermen in the country to join the Reserve as second-class men, but no proper facilities were provided for their training, and he suggested that batteries or drill ships at most of the important fishing centres would make a huge difference. He then moved for the appointment of a committee, but the Government immediately pointed out that although affairs were certainly most unsatisfactory in the Royal Naval Reserve, they were already doing their best to put things right, and that they hoped that before very long a considerable movement would be made. This satisfied Mr. Brassey, and he withdrew his motion.

In 1873 the Admiralty published its intention to allow the Naval Coast Volunteers to die out, and to encourage as many men as were eligible to enter the second class of the Royal Naval Reserve. At the same time they suggested better means of promotion from the second to the first class. Revised regulations were published which fixed the age of entry for the second class at between eighteen and thirty, the men to be enrolled, drilled and paid at the same time as the Coastguard men. Instead of confining the entry to seamen in square-rigged ships, it was to be opened to all ordinary seamen and fishermen, and by this means it was hoped to give the Reserve an entirely new life. Until then it had to be admitted that the second-class reserve had been a failure, for although the scheme had been put forward in 1870 and full regulations framed for the enrolment of second-class Reservists, the conditions were so onerous that not a single man had come forward. One reason was that the district coastguard ships did not enjoy a very good reputation, and the regulations included the clause that second-class men were to carry out their month's drill on board these ships without any allowance of leave.

In 1874 the Admiralty showed more disposition to spend money on the Reserve, one of the first things they did being to provide new drill stations. This reform had been promised time and again, but

nothing had been done, and often men had to go most inconvenient distances to get in their drill. By these new regulations it was arranged that there should be 44 drill stations—31 in England and Wales, 6 in Scotland, and 7 in Ireland.

A committee comprising Liverpool shipowning interests which met in 1874 to discuss the question of merchant seamen considered the matter very largely in its relation to the Royal Naval Reserve. They came to the conclusion that training ships and/or nautical schools were absolutely necessary for educating seamen for the Mercantile Marine, and for supplying sufficient trained boys to maintain the Royal Naval Reserve at the strength recommended by the Royal Commission of 1859. They suggested that the Government should immediately establish such ships or schools in all the principal ports, the expense to be defrayed partly by the State and partly by the Merchant Service. Boys should be admitted between the ages of fourteen and sixteen, and should bind themselves to serve in the Royal Naval Reserve for such a period and on such terms as the Government might determine, to remain in the training-ship for not less than twelve or eighteen months, and to serve in a British merchant ship for a period of not less than three years. The management of these ships was to be vested in persons appointed by the Government and Merchant Service jointly, and periodically they were to be inspected by the Admiralty.

With practically no dissentient voice Liverpool shipowners adopted the suggestion, but when it came to the North East coast there were other views expressed. For one thing the shipowners objected to being compelled to contribute to the maintenance of these training-ships, and considered that it would be highly inconvenient for ships' apprentices to be called away for their Royal Naval Reserve training, while the state of affairs at sea if there were a general call-up of apprentices for service with the Navy would be intolerable. They also pointed out that they were quite satisfied with apprentices who would not be so suitable for commissions in the R.N.R., and that this being so the scheme ought not to be adopted. They appreciated the advantages of the training-ships, but considered that the Admiralty and the Board of Trade should train up their boys to the requirements of the Royal Naval Reserve only, leaving the shipping companies to teach them their part of the job when they got them on board, and thus to free them of a great expense. They also added the suggestion that a cruising brig should be attached to each of the various stations and should go to sea for a few weeks at a time with three or four officers and a complement of the senior boys, very much in the same way that the training brigs for the Navy cruised round the South Coast.

On Dec. 1, 1874, the Admiralty published an Order in Council which provided for the establishment of the office of Admiral Superintendent of Naval Reserves, with a small clerical staff, to superintend the coastguard and other reserve forces. The office was to come into force on Jan. 1, 1875, and to be held by either a Vice- or a Rear-Admiral, to have the full pay of his rank, with £200 a year for house rent and thirty shillings a day table money while afloat on duty. He was to have a Paymaster, R.N., as his secretary, on full pay, with £50 a year rent allowance, and in addition was to have a senior clerk, a junior clerk, a writer, a lithographer and a messenger.

In 1875 Sir Charles Adderley, President of the Board of Trade, introduced his Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Bill into the House of Commons as an outcome of the report of the Royal Commission on Unseaworthy Ships, 1873-4, and the report of the Liverpool Committee in the latter year. Clause 33 of this Bill amended the part of the 1854 Merchant Shipping Act which dealt with the Mercantile Marine Fund, and suggested that the Board of Trade should make grants to training ships out of this fund in respect of boys trained in the ships and qualified to serve in the Merchant Service or the Royal Naval Reserve. The Liverpool Committee immediately objected to this clause, maintaining that the proposed grant should be dependent on the boys' fitness to serve in the R.N.R., and that the Admiralty should bear its share of the cost and have a say in the management of the ships. The fact that grants were to be based entirely on results was considered bad, and it was thought to be very questionable if training ships would be established while these grants were so uncertain. They also very strongly objected to reformatory ships for the training of youngsters for the Royal Naval Reserve, maintaining that the highest character must be maintained for the Force, and they resolved to petition Parliament to withdraw Clause 33 and to refer the whole question to the Admiralty and the Board of Trade to be dealt with by them conjointly in a separate Bill. Certain resolutions were added to this Clause 33 by Mr. Brassey and other members of Parliament, but the Bill was soon withdrawn.

When Nares' *Alert* and *Discovery* sailed towards the North Pole, he selected six quartermasters for work in the ice, all of them experienced whaling men. Three of them came from Peterhead and three from Dundee, but it transpired that every one of them was a member of the Royal Naval Reserve before he joined the expedition. At about the same time the *Pandora* was sent out under Lieutenant Allen Young, R.N.R., to follow in the footsteps of M'Clintock in search of any further remains of Sir John Franklin. Lieutenant Young had commanded Smith's famous sailing ship *Marlborough,* and had been sailing master of the *Fox* under M'Clintock from 1857 to 1859. He was one of the first officers to join the R.N.R. (on Feb. 24, 1862), and had commanded the gunboat *Kwantung* in the Anglo-Chinese Navy from 1862 to 1864.

In November, 1876, Rear-Admiral Augustus Phillimore was appointed Superintendent of the Royal Naval Reserve, after having had a spell as Second in Command of the Channel Squadron. He was born in 1822 and entered the Navy at the age of 13, seeing valuable service as a youngster in the China War. He was in command of one of the old paddle sloops during the Crimea, and was very highly praised by Sir James Graham for his successful recruiting efforts during that campaign. After the war he did exceptionally well in the West Indies, where he acted on his own responsibility and prevented an attack on Porto Rico by a party of filibusters, an action which won him the high approval of the Admiralty, but which might have broken him. His final post was that of Commander-in-Chief at Devonport, and retiring in the Jubilee Year he was knighted and died just ten years later. In his way he took a keen interest in mercantile affairs, as is shown not only by his term of office in command of the R.N.R. but also by his work as Governor of the Marine Society, but he was none too sym-

pathetic with the aspirations of the Reserve for better opportunity and higher rank.

Brassey, on the other hand, had implicit faith in the R.N.R., and another suggestion which he made in 1876 was that studentships to the Royal Naval College at Greenwich should be established for Mercantile Marine officers, to be open for competition among all officers after four years' sea service either as mate or master, and to be tenable for one year. They were to be of sufficient annual value to cover the expenses of the student and to give him a sum equivalent to his ordinary professional income, and he reckoned that they would cost the Government about £120 per annum each. He suggested that five be offered in the first instance, one to be reserved for Scotland and another for Ireland, and that the number should be increased if the experiment proved successful. It was, however, not tried by the Admiralty.

In spite of the fact that the joint committee of the Admiralty and the Board of Trade had negatived the training-ship suggestion on the ground of expense, it still appealed to many people, and in the late 'seventies Admiral Sir Frederick Grey elaborated a somewhat similar scheme. He suggested that ten training ships should be established at the principal ports, each able to accommodate 300 lads, who would be entered between the ages of 15 and 16½. They were to be trained on board until the age of 18, when they were to be rated as ordinary seamen, and to be discharged into a man-of-war to serve in the Navy for one year. At the end of the year they should join the Royal Naval Reserve as second-class Reservists on an annual retainer of £2 10s., but after four years in the second class, if they could satisfy the regulations, they were to be promoted to the first class, with an annual retainer of £6. He reckoned that, allowing for wastage, 127 lads would be sent into the Navy every year, and 120 useful trained seamen would pass into the Reserve. At the end of 10 years there would be a magnificent Reserve, of whom the oldest would be only 28, and the annual expense to the Government would be comparatively small. This scheme was to be the beginning of a still larger one that in time might be made to handle 2000 boys a year instead of 120.

It was in March, 1877, that the Royal Naval Reserve took a great step forward by the appointment of the Prince of Wales, afterwards King Edward VII., to be the first Honorary Captain, R.N.R. He took a very sympathetic interest in the force, both then and after he had ascended the throne.

A couple of months later, Captain the Hon. E. F. Fremantle, C.B., C.M.G., was appointed to command H.M.S. *Lord Warden*, the coastguard ship at Queen's Ferry, the very first appointment under the new system. By this the captain of the ship was in charge of the district coastguard, the Queen's Ferry district including all stations on the East Coast of Scotland and even round to Loch Inver, besides the Orkneys and the Shetlands. In addition there were three Royal Naval Reserve drill ships, H.M.S. *Unicorn* at Dundee, H.M.S. *Clyde* at Aberdeen, and H.M.S. *Brilliant* at Inverness. The coastguard stations included batteries for drilling the R.N.R., and all these, the drill ships and other commands, had to be inspected once a year, although the *Lord Warden* herself was off her station for five months refit, an annual cruise with the Channel Fleet, and her duty as guardship in the Cowes Regatta. This meant that the programme for

the other seven months of the year was crowded, and with the small complements that these coastguard ships carried it was so difficult to maintain warship discipline that service in them soon became unpopular with the best officers and ratings.

Admiral Fremantle has left in his reminiscences some interesting contemporary impressions of the Royal Naval Reserve as he saw it in those days. As the ship was away in the summer months all inspections had to be carried out in the winter. This was advantageous in many cases, for it meant a very much bigger muster, a large proportion of the Scottish Reserves being drawn from whalers, sealers and other ships which were at sea in the summer. In the Shetlands he found a fine force of nearly 300 men, magnificent seamen, drilling in the battery in mid winter. They were all of splendid Norse breed, but they spoke little English which was apt to make things difficult, and he could not help feeling that they thought rather more of their retaining fee and pay for drills than any possibility of being called out for war service, the few pounds coming in being a great boon to them during the hard winter months. Writing some eleven years later, Admiral Sir E. H. Seymour had very grave doubts as to the value of the Reservists from the Scottish Islands in war time, for in those days the creation of a huge auxiliary fleet, such as came into existence in the early days of the Great War, and for which these Reservists were ideal, was undreamed of. One of the difficulties of inspecting the Scottish stations was that there was only a few hours of daylight, so that the inspection began and ended in the dark.

In 1878 Mr. John Burns, of the Cunard Line, proposed the formation of a reserve of ships from the fleets of the great mail companies. He did not wish to interfere in any way with the existing Royal Naval Reserve, but in addition to the ships he proposed the formation of a special reserve of men drawn entirely from the seamen in the employ of the mail companies, who should be trained in naval ships when necessary, and should form a long service personnel in the companies' services. The Admiralty were to pay an annual retainer so long as the ships were maintained at the standard they demanded for cruiser service, and, in the event of war breaking out, they were to have the right of purchasing or chartering the ships at a rate to be mutually agreed. On the other hand the companies had to undertake to facilitate the training of the men and to release them from all engagements in the event of war in order to allow them to be employed in the Navy. This was the first time that a scheme of the sort had been put forward, but with various modifications it was heard of many times during the next forty years.

In 1879 the indefatigable Brassey came out with another scheme for the Royal Naval Reserve, even more ambitious than any of his previous ideas. In his opinion the whole of the British Mercantile Marine and its personnel should be regarded as part of the Navy, every British ship which was convertible into a cruiser and every British seaman to be regarded as units of the Reserve. He acknowledged that something had been done in this direction by the authorities' action in forming an official list of all vessels fulfilling certain structural requirements which were considered necessary for converting them into cruisers, but, as he pointed out, there was absolutely no pecuniary consideration to shipowners who responded to this

appeal, whereas Burns's scheme provided for an annual subsidy, which was only fair. The truth is that there was very considerable opposition in naval circles to the formation of such a reserve, for most regular officers were unwilling to see any portion of the all too meagre naval estimates expended on ships which might never hoist the pennant, and their aim was always to make the Navy self-sufficient.

One of the greatest of the early difficulties of the Royal Naval Reserve was that the regulations did not allow men to proceed on a voyage occupying more than six months. This did more harm to recruiting than all the grumbles that were put forward with regard to drill, active service or pensions, but at the end of 1879 the Board of Trade issued a further circular stating that special leave for voyages exceeding six months would be granted much more freely on condition that the leave was for one ship and for one voyage only at a time. They also stipulated that each reservist should complete his twenty-eight days' drill for the year before leave were given, and the result of this was that the position was not improved to any great extent. There can be no doubt, in spite of the progress of the Reserve, that there was still a very deep objection in some parts of the Merchant Service to any co-operation with the Navy. This objection was, it is probable, largely a heritage from the old days of the press gang.

On November 21, 1879, H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh was appointed Superintendent Admiral of Reserves, retaining that post until November, 1882, when he was promoted to Vice-Admiral. After two years' training he had gone to sea as a midshipman in H.M.S. *Euryalus* under Captain J. W. Tarleton, who had done so much for the R.N.R. He was promoted to Rear-Admiral at the end of 1878, so that all his active service in this rank was in command of the Naval Reserves. There is no doubt that the appointment of a prince in close touch with the Court was of the very greatest service to the Reserve, which for the first time found itself generally recognised. He also became very keenly interested in both the Coastguards and the Reserves, and worked conscientiously and hard for their benefit.

In 1875 the mercantile training ships began seriously to consider the terms offered by the Admiralty for the training of boys for the Navy and the Royal Naval Reserve, a modification of the training ship scheme that had been put forward by the original Manning Committee. By 1879 it was reported that ten training ships had decided to accept the terms, the only important one standing out being the *Warspite* of the Marine Society. Under these terms the Admiralty supplied each ship with a gunnery instructor at three shillings a day, and with the necessary guns, &c., for drilling. They paid three pounds for every qualified boy volunteering for service in the Royal Naval Reserve and twenty-five for every boy joining the Navy. With one exception all the ships were commanded by retired naval officers, and they were granted a special warrant to fly the Blue Ensign with a device in the fly, while they were inspected annually by the Admiral Commanding Reserves. In 1879 it was announced that in the previous twelve months the *Indefatigable* at Liverpool had sent nineteen boys to the R.N.R. out of the 250 on board, while the *Exmouth*, in the Thames, had sent sixteen out of 587. From the point of view of the Royal Naval Reserve, however, it must be admitted that the numbers were dis-

appointing in the early years, although of course all the boys had a very good grounding which would prevent their being absolutely strange to naval matters if they enlisted hurriedly at the outbreak of war.

Detailed figures of the composition of the Royal Naval Reserve which were given in Parliament in connection with the Naval Estimates of 1880 showed that there were then 17,480 ratings in the Royal Naval Reserve, 12,061 in the first-class, 5339 in the second-class, and only 80 in the third-class of boys. At the same time there was a big force of seamen pensioners, 5890 under 50 years of age, and 5772 over 50. The figures for officers were not very encouraging, for, excluding those who were exempted from drills on account of age or other matters, there were only 66 lieutenants, 80 sub-lieutenants, and 130 midshipmen. There was, however, a considerable and consistent gain in the efficiency of the Force.

By 1880 the good work done by the *Conway* and *Worcester* in training youngsters for the Royal Naval Reserve was fully appreciated, and at the end of that year it was established that, in order to give the youngsters fuller training before they had left the ship, naval pensioners might be appointed as gunnery instructors, at a pay of 3s. a day in addition to their pension.

As already stated, the rank of midshipman was established in 1872, but in June, 1880, it was decided that many of these young officers deserved promotion to the rank of sub-lieutenant although they might not be fully qualified under the existing regulations, while some who had already passed through a course of training in the *Conway* or *Worcester* were to be eligible for promotion to the rank of sub-lieutenant after they had completed six years' service in the Reserve provided that they held a master's or first mate's ticket, that they were not in arrear in their drill, that they had received a certificate of competency and had followed the sea as their profession for the whole of the time they had been ranking as midshipmen, R.N.R. On the other hand, the names of midshipmen who had failed to obtain these qualifications for promotion at 25 years of age were to be removed automatically from the list, except in special circumstances, such as prolonged service abroad having prevented their complying with the strict letter of the regulations.

The suggestion of Mr. Burns, of the Cunard Line, to form an auxiliary cruiser force has already been mentioned. In 1880 Mr. Donald Currie, head of the Castle Line, read a paper before the Royal United Service Institution on the adaptation of ocean steamers to war purposes. He suggested that a certain number of merchant ships should be conditionally retained by means of an annual subsidy. The fact that he considered that a speed of 12 knots was quite sufficient so long as a ship could steam for at least 35 days without re-fuelling is significant in view of the features of the Castle steamers. He worked out his plan in considerable detail, and suggested that these ships should retain on board a certain number of Royal Naval Reserve ratings, with four fully qualified naval gunlayers to instruct the crew at sea. He also felt that at certain specified stations there should be established a big detachment of Royal Marine Light Infantry and Artillery with guns, deck torpedo tubes and ammunition, ready to be shipped immediately war was declared. The main purpose of these ships was to be for the protection of

commerce, and, as he very truly pointed out, it would mean that in a very short time all the principal trade routes would be patrolled with armed vessels. Like most enthusiasts on the auxiliary cruiser idea, however, he exaggerated the ability of these ships to stand up against properly designed men-of-war.

It was a long time before the authorities realised the advisability of forming an Accountant Branch of the Royal Naval Reserve, but one step in that direction was taken in May, 1882, when it was decided to recognise the duties of the Registrars and Deputy Registrars of the Royal Naval Reserve. Several of these gentlemen had qualified for the rank of Honorary Lieutenant or Honorary Sub-Lieutenant of the R.N.R., but there were others who had not, and, accordingly, it was decided at this stage to establish the ranks of Honorary Paymaster and Honorary Assistant Paymaster, the establishment to be 50 and 25 officers respectively. The qualifications for an Assistant Paymaster were five years' service as Registrar or Deputy Registrar, and a minimum age of 25, while a Paymaster had to have ten years' service, five years of it as Registrar, and to be not less than 30 years of age.

In the early 'eighties Brassey put forward a further scheme in order to encourage shipowners to take apprentices, for even in those days the system was already falling into disuse and the number shipped was steadily dropping. Brassey suggested that a number of sailing ships of approved character should be assisted by the authorities, and that the owners should be paid a bonus of £5 for every apprentice that they signed on, these youngsters to be chosen by a representative of the Admiralty and the Board of Trade. Their number was to be limited to one for every hundred tons register of the ship, and each youngster was to receive a bounty of £5 at the conclusion of his time, provided that he joined the Navy for one year. At the end of this he would transfer to the Royal Naval Reserve under Sir Frederick Grey's scheme. When this plan was not taken up with any enthusiasm, Brassey suggested that somewhat larger payments should be made to the shipowners in order to tempt them to come in, perhaps £10 and a further £3 to provide the boy's kit. Both owner and apprentice should draw an annual bonus of £1 during the four years of the indentures, after which the scheme proceeded as before.

When the Duke of Edinburgh was first appointed commander of the Reserve there were many who thought that it was merely a Court appointment which permitted him to fulfil his social programme with the minimum of trouble; but he soon proved himself to have an exceedingly keen and personal interest in the force, and the R.N.R. appreciated his efforts. At the beginning of 1882 he presented a very detailed report on his command and made a number of suggestions which were well worth consideration. One was that the Reserve Squadron should spend very much more of its time at sea, where both coastguards and reserves should have a chance of getting proper naval training. He suggested improved systems of training for both the first and second-class reserve, and saw no reason why they should not receive instruction in torpedo warfare, a type of warfare that was then attracting a good deal of attention and which M. Gabriel Charmes was beginning to exploit in and out of season on the other side of the Channel. He also laid stress on the fact that the second-class reserve did not get its full value out of the fishermen in the Orkneys, Shetlands

and Isle of Man, and pointed out how the language difficulty in the case of the former could be overcome.

In 1882, when matters were looking serious over Egypt, and when there was a possibility of England being plunged into a European war, it was shown that there were only 79 lieutenants, 78 sub-lieutenants and 121 midshipmen on the active list. This total indicated that things were far from satisfactory and caused a good deal of misgiving.

The feared European trouble was averted, but the Egyptian war that followed the bombardment of Alexandria in 1882 indirectly did a lot of good to the Reserve, for although it was not actually employed therein the operations showed the deficiencies of the regular force and again drew attention to the necessity for reserves. Also the work done by the transports commanded by R.N.R. officers was particularly good, and led to the proposal to promote a certain number of them to the rank of commander.

In November, 1882, the Duke of Edinburgh was succeeded as Admiral - Superintendent of the Reserve by Rear-Admiral Sir A. Hiley Hoskins, K.C.B., a particularly brilliant officer. He had entered the Navy in 1842, and five years later, as a midshipman in H.M.S. *President*—the same *President* that was to become R.N.R. drill ship in the West India Dock—he distinguished himself in boat attacks on the Arab slavers' stockades in the Mozambique Channel, and was specially promoted lieutenant for passing the best examination in seamanship, gunnery, &c. He served as A.D.C. in the Kaffir War, in the China War of 1857 and 1858, and in command of a steam sloop did splendid work against the slavers. One of his captures was the famous slaving clipper *Nightingale* under Captain Bowen, who was known as the "Prince of Slavers." Captain Hoskins succeeded the ill-fated Commodore Goodenough in command of the Australian Station when that officer was murdered by natives, and he was promoted to Rear-Admiral in 1879. He was Third Sea Lord under Cooper Key, and from that position he went straight into the post of Admiral-Superintendent of Reserves, so that he had already had very considerable experience of office work and organisation. He first flew his flag in H.M.S. *Penelope*, which he took on special service in Egypt during the operations which followed the Bombardment of Alexandria, and later in the *Hercules*. Promoted to Vice-Admiral in 1885, he became Second Sea Lord rather before his normal term of office was over, and was succeeded by Rear-Admiral John Baird.

In the beginning of 1883 the regulations which bore on the appointment of Honorary Sub-Lieutenants, R.N.R., were relaxed in the case of H.R.H. Prince Albert Victor of Wales, later to be the Duke of Clarence, who was appointed Honorary Sub-Lieutenant, with seniority Jan. 8, 1883. On June 26, 1886, he was promoted to the rank of Honorary Lieutenant, R.N.R., and during the career that was all too short he took a very keen interest in the force and its welfare. After that there were no royal members of the R.N.R. until after the war.

In the year 1883 the figures for the R.N.R. were 11,519 in the first class, 5549 in the second, and 115 in the third, making 17,183 in all. Recent regulations had tended to reduce the number of men accepted, but in future it was determined to maintain the force at 10,000 in the first class and 10,000

in the second and third combined, although most of the great authorities on naval matters were suggesting that the R.N.R. should be expanded still more.

While they existed, the Naval Coast Volunteers were the butt of every complaint, but in 1883 Brassey suggested that they should be revived as the Coast Defence Sea Militia. He proposed that they should be recruited entirely from among the fishermen and the longshoremen of the different centres, and that no effort should be made in the framing of the regulations to get a very high standard of deep-sea ability; the average boatman around the coast was a magnificent seaman in his way, and his particular knowledge was amply sufficient for the manning of the flotillas of gunboats on which it was then thought that the job of defending the coast would devolve. He suggested that it would only be necessary to train them in gunnery and musketry, and that the officers should be selected from suitable residents of the principal fishing ports, permanently attached to the coast defence service, so that they should have the advantage of being personally acquainted with the men whom they would lead. Had this suggestion been adopted it would certainly have been a very retrograde step, and would have discovered many of the disadvantages that are inseparable from a strictly territorial defence scheme, but instead the authorities preferred to encourage the entry of men into the second-class reserve.

Soon afterwards Brassey returned to the attack with a suggestion for numerous reforms in the commissioned ranks. He suggested that officers who had obtained a certificate of proficiency should be distinguished in the Navy List by an asterisk, and that, having won this, they should be allowed to fly the Blue Ensign in ships under their command, no matter whether they had the required percentage of R.N.R. ratings or not. Those who did not hold the certificate should be made to conform with the complement regulations. He also objected to executive rank being given to officials except as a reward for unusual zeal in the interests of the R.N.R., and he voiced a very general opinion when he maintained that honorary commissions were bestowed far too freely. He advanced many arguments for the institution of the rank of Commander, R.N.R., a very desirable reform that was not brought into being for many years afterwards, and even made the radical suggestion that in exceptional circumstances a captain's commis sion might be granted. He also suggested that R.N.R. officers should be entitled to enter the Royal Naval College at Greenwich with a reasonable hope that their attendance there would advance them professionally, and he mooted a system of scholarships for Greenwich.

At the same time Brassey suggested that R.N.R. and naval cadets should study side by side in the *Britannia* at Dartmouth. These R.N.R. cadets should be required to pay the usual fee and should have a two-year course of instruction, followed by a year in a sea-going training ship, after which, he maintained their value would be very greatly increased, both for service in the Navy and the Mercantile Marine. This suggestion, however, did not commend itself to the Admiralty in any way.

In 1883 the Admiralty put forward a scheme for the establishment of a third class in the Royal Naval Reserve, to consist of boys. The authorities were prepared to grant to the committee of any mercantile training ship a bounty of

three pounds for every boy trained on board who joined the third class of the R.N.R., which they were eligible to do as soon as they joined their first ship for sea service under certain conditions. These conditions were that the applicant must have been for at least eighteen months under training on board a stationary ship which was subject to inspection by the Admiralty, must be of good physique and mentality, able to read and write, of a minimum age of sixteen and not less than four feet one inch in height and thirty inches round the chest. If he satisfied these requirements he was entitled to an annual uniform allowance of thirty shillings and pay at the rate of sevenpence a day. Many maintained that the age was too high and that the physical standard was too severe. A boy engaging to serve as a third-class reservist had to sign an agreement to serve for four years from the age of nineteen, undergoing twenty-eight days' drill in a drill ship or battery every year. On attaining the age of nineteen the boys would be transferred to the second class, and eventually to the first, and would have considerable concessions made to them in the matter of their time for pension. It was definitely laid down, however, that these regulations should apply only to boys of the best character, and not to reformatory ships.

A Court martial which caused a good deal of trouble both in and out of Parliament at this time drew public attention to the fact that the administration of the coastguard ships was not by any means all that could be desired. The administrative as well as the instructional staff was quite inadequate, while the fact that in many cases the commanding officers were forced to live ashore was a very serious disadvantage. Naturally, the training of the reserve was adversely affected by such conditions.

In 1884 it had been established that chief officers of coastguards who trained Reservists in their batteries should be paid at the rate of £25 for every 100 men drilled for twenty-eight days. In 1891, however, it was deemed advisable to alter this, and accordingly the chief officers of coastguards were paid £25 per hundred officers or men up to 400 and £12 10s. per hundred over that figure, whether the chief officer was present or absent on duty.

So the R.N.R. had existed for a quarter of a century, and although in some ways it had grown beyond the wildest dreams of its sponsors in others it was still in its infancy. Perhaps the worst feature was that it was wasted so deplorably by the naval powers; it required a real naval scare to make them realise the immense possibilities of the Force that had been built up.

Chapter IV. The Russian Scare and its Results.

THE incident which was of greater service to the Royal Naval Reserve than anything which had occurred since its foundation was the Russian War Scare of 1885. Relations had been very strained between the two countries for several years—the feeling engendered by the Crimean War had not died down; the British Navy was certainly not forgiven for its interference at Constantinople in 1877 and 1878 and there were a score of points in dispute. It only required a spark to cause an explosion, and when the situation was at its worst the country suddenly realised that the Navy on which it relied was far from perfect. The country did not realise that the Russian Navy was infinitely worse, and a very serious naval panic set in.

During the scare it was considered necessary to commission a number of the crack liners as naval auxiliaries, and to do this certain officers of the Royal Naval Reserve were employed, although they had not been called out by Royal proclamation in accordance with the regulations, and certain other officers and men of the Merchant Service were for the time being manning the armed ships of her Majesty. These ships were commissioned all over the world, and the question of the pay of the men became a little difficult, so that in January, 1886, a new Order in Council was published which straightened out the matter, dating back to Jan. 1, 1885. By this, temporary acting commissions as officers of the Royal Naval Reserve could be granted by the Admiralty either with or without the issue of a Royal proclamation calling out the whole of the R.N.R., and the officers so commissioned were to serve either in ships temporarily taken into the naval service or in such other ships as the necessities of the moment might dictate. Such officers were to receive the rank, pay and allowances of their naval brothers, and the matter of hurt or wound compensation and pensions for widows was also established on the same basis. At the same time the Admiralty were given power, should it become necessary, temporarily to commission ships as naval auxiliaries, to engage men for service in them or for transfer to other naval ships, on such terms and pay as the Admiralty deemed expedient after consultation with the Treasury. In principle, these regulations stood in 1914, when the Reserve had to be expanded so suddenly.

As it was known that one of the first preparations of the Russians if it did come to war would be to attack the trade routes, the Union steamers *Moor* and *Mexican* were taken up as cruisers to defend the South African colonies in April, 1885. The *Moor* was then on her way out to the Cape and the *Mexican* was at Southampton. The former was ordered round to Simon's Bay as soon as she got into soundings, while the *Mexican* was sent especially out from Southampton. When the latter arrived, however, the trouble was over and she was employed as a transport to take troops from South Africa to Hongkong and to return to England with time-expired men. The *Moor* was

finished early enough, however, and she was actually commissioned as an auxiliary cruiser with six guns and a crew of 110 officers and men, the greater part of whom were Royal Naval Reservists from the Union and Castle Lines. She was then taken on a cruise up the East Coast of Africa under the orders of Rear-Admiral Sir Walter J. Hunt-Grubbe, Commander-in-Chief of the African station.

At the same time the Cunard liner *Oregon*, which then held the Atlantic "Blue Riband," was taken up for conversion to a cruiser. Over a hundred cabins were destroyed in order to provide coal protection for her engines, but by the time this was done the war scare was over and it was decided that she might as well be used as a cruiser in the forthcoming manœuvres. In the event of war she was to have flown the flag of Admiral Sir Michael Culme-Seymour, in command of a special fast squadron, but this plan was not carried out for manœuvres. She was armed with six 64-pounder muzzle loaders and four 5-in. Woolwich guns, while under her davits she carried eight steam pinnaces with dropping gear for torpedoes. Her first and second officers and all her engineer officers were retained, but the remainder of the crew was a naval one, an instance of the way opportunities were thrown away for testing the R.N.R. The stokers were mercantile, and were specially entered for the job at Liverpool, being put to live in the third-class quarters. They had not been 24 hours under naval conditions, however, when they decided to strike, and insisted on leaving the ship. The captain made them fall in on deck and confronted them with a detachment of Marines with fixed bayonets and ball cartridge, after which they decided that they would not strike and listened quietly while the Articles of War were read to them.

As soon as she was ready for sea the *Oregon* operated under the command of Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, the Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth, who had already shown very practical interest in the R.N.R. With her high speed and big coal capacity she proved herself the most satisfactory of the cruisers, and it was agreed that she had by far the best chance of catching the enemy's vedettes, but at the same time her steering gear and machinery was unprotected and she was very unhandy for evolutionary work with a squadron.

There was a good deal of dissatisfaction as to the money the Admiralty was spending on armed merchant cruisers, dissatisfaction that was indicated by a searching series of questions asked by Mr. Gourley in the House of Commons. It was not till some time afterwards that a return was issued which gave a number of the details demanded, although it omitted the very interesting items of armaments and crews. The Russian scare had certainly cost the country a good deal in auxiliary cruisers, but unfortunately the result was disappointing. A list of these ships, with very detailed cost of their equipment, as finally presented to Parliament, is not uninteresting. The National liner *America*—which had held the Atlantic blue riband, and which later became an Italian cruiser, and finally the Italian Royal yacht—was fitted as a cruiser, but did not leave Liverpool, although over £36,000 was spent on her. The doings of the *Oregon* have already been described; the total cost was practically £55,000. The Cunarder *Umbria* was fitted at Liverpool at a cost of £48,000, but did not leave the port, nor did the Guion Line's *Arizona* and *Alaska*,

which cost £28,000 and £42,000 respectively. The P. and O. Line supplied the *Rosetta* at Hongkong and the *Massilia* at Sydney, armed at a cost of £31,220 and £52,420. The British India Line supplied the *India*, which cost £29,000 to be fitted at Hongkong, to discharge her armament there, and, finally, to pay off without leaving the port. The Glen liner *Glenogle*, at Hongkong, cost £28,000. The Donald Currie *Pembroke Castle*—which finished her days as a Turkish transport and was torpedoed by a British submarine during the war—took troops out to Egypt, then went to Hongkong to be commissioned and to be disarmed, and finally returned to the Cape to bring the troops from South Africa home to England. The cost of her commission had not been ascertained at the time of the return.

The Orient Line's *Lusitania*, which was one of the ships that the company acquired from the P. S. N. Company, cost £35,000 for arming and disarming at Sydney. She came to England to be finally paid off. The cruise of the *Moor* has already been mentioned, the cost being £29,000, in addition to the normal cost of carrying troops to India, while the *Mexican* cost the Government £46,000, although she was never armed, but carried troops from the Cape to China. It is interesting to note that the White Star *Coptic*, which was in New Zealand when the alarm occurred, had to be sent across to Coquimbo, in neutral territory, to be armed from the naval depot ship there, but she never received her guns, and eventually she came home to England to be paid off. The *Britannia*, of the P. S. N. Line, cost £33,000 when she was commissioned and armed at Coquimbo, but she left her guns there when she came to England to be paid off. Finally, there was the famous flyer *Stirling Castle*, one of the fastest ships of her day. She went to Malta to receive her guns, but the orders were altered, and ultimately she was fitted as a transport and brought home troops from Egypt. The cost of her commission was £37,000.

All the wasted money in this list impressed the Admiralty with the need for the proper organisation of the auxiliary cruiser reserve, very much in the manner which Mr. Burns and Mr. Currie had suggested years before, and the revision of the North Atlantic mail contract appeared to be the most favourable opportunity of coming to an agreement with the companies. Accordingly, the Cunard and White Star Lines, among others, agreed to carry a greatly increased proportion of R.N.R. men in their crews.

When it looked as though the Royal Naval Reserve was going to be called out, the Admiralty produced a manning scheme which provided that one-third of the complement of able and ordinary seamen of ships told off for commissioning, and having over 40 seamen in all, should be filled by R.N.R. men; that 30 R.N.R. ratings were to be sent to each of the ships in the First Reserve; that the able seamen, but not the seamen gunners, of the commissioned merchant cruisers should be R.N.R. men; and that 20 R.N.R. men should be sent out to each of the auxiliary cruisers commissioned abroad in addition to their established complement. This scheme showed tolerably clearly the estimation in which the R.N.R. was held by that time.

Following Sir A. Hiley Hoskins as Admiral Superintendent of the Naval Reserve, came, in 1885, Rear-Admiral John K. Erskine Baird. He was born in 1832 and was flag-lieutenant to Admiral Dundas in the *Duke of Wellington* in the Baltic

in 1855, getting his step to commander as a "haul down" vacancy. In the late 'seventies he was A.D.C. to Queen Victoria, and after being promoted to Rear-Admiral was Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific Station with his flag in H.M.S. *Triumph*. When he came back, in 1885, he was made Admiral Superintendent of Reserves with his flag in the *Hercules*, and was promoted to Vice-Admiral before he had held the position for very long. He left it in 1888 to become the senior officer commanding the Channel Fleet, and died in 1908.

In 1885, when public attention was centred on the Royal Naval Reserve, Lord Ripon's board decided to form a reserve of mercantile firemen, men being offered a retaining fee of £5 per annum, without any liability to train and even without being made to prove that they were efficient at their work.

While the Russian War scare was on the captain of every transport and merchant ship employed in Government service invited the engine-room staff to volunteer for service in case of war, and there was not a single instance reported of the engineer officers hanging back.

In the same year the Evolutionary Squadron took to sea a number of R.N.R. officers, this apparently being the first time they had been embarked since the pioneer cruise of 1869. They were only ten in all, but Admiral Hornby had one lieutenant and two acting sub-lieutenants with him in his flagship, the *Minotaur*, and at the conclusion of the exercises paid them a high compliment for their zeal and efficiency. This permission for R.N.R. officers to go to sea for training meant a general tightening up in the regulations all round. Until then it was not considered politic to enforce strict attendance at drills, some officers being keen enough to do all that was asked of them and very much more, while others liked the distinction of the R.N.R. uniform, but did little or nothing to maintain it. In those days the appointments were made chiefly for the sake of the influence of the officers on the enrolment of the seamen, but after officers had been allowed to go to sea all this was changed.

In the naval manœuvres of 1886, when the Reserve and Channel Squadrons were engaged in a longish autumn cruise, which took them from the Irish Coast to Spain, eight officers of the Royal Naval Reserve were embarked, but the suggestion that ratings also should be carried in the ships was rejected by the Admiralty.

In June, 1886, there was a complete revision of the regulations for the commissioned ranks of the R.N.R. The establishment was increased to 920 officers, consisting of 150 lieutenants, 270 sub-lieutenants, 150 engineers, 150 assistant engineers, and 200 midshipmen. There were slight alterations in the age of first appointment, which was not to exceed 40 years in the case of lieutenants and engineers and 35 in the case of sub-lieutenants and assistant engineers, while midshipmen were to be between the ages of 16 and 18. A lieutenant who was entered direct from the merchant service was required to have commanded a first-class steamship of at least 1500 tons or a sailing ship of 1000 tons for not less than a year, to possess all the necessary certificates, including an extra master's certificate, and to be a professional seaman who intended to stick to the sea. A sub-lieutenant was required to have served as first mate in a similar ship and to hold a master's ticket. Engineers were required to have served at sea for at least three years, and assistant

engineers for at least one year. The entry of midshipmen was slightly increased by the fact that in special cases youngsters might be appointed who were midshipmen or apprentices in the Merchant Service, without going through the *Conway* or *Worcester*, but a youngster seeking appointment in this way had to serve at least one year at sea on board a first-class ship. The honorary captains were limited to ten in number, and the qualifications for appointment to the rank of honorary lieutenant made it necessary for a yachtsman to be the owner and master of a seagoing pleasure yacht of at least 75 tons instead of 50 tons. Otherwise the regulations were substantially the same as those in force before, with the very important difference that a long training in the Royal Navy was provided for. The rates of pay were also considerably modified.

Perhaps the greatest point about the 1886 regulations was that which provided for voluntary training in the Royal Navy. My Lords expressed themselves as willing to consider applications from officers who wished, in addition to their annual drill, to volunteer for temporary service in the Royal Navy, either for some special duty such as a cruise in an exercising squadron, or for a course of instruction in gunnery or torpedo work on board one of the stationary school ships. Applications would also be considered from officers who wished to volunteer to go through a naval training in navigating or other duties in the fleet for a period of twelve months. This twelve months' training, provided they obtained satisfactory certificates, entitled lieutenants to retaining fees at the rate of £25 a year, and sub-lieutenants to £20, to be paid as long as the officers remained on the active list.

At the same time the matter of pay and allowances was regularised, executive officers receiving the pay of their rank, but engineer officers receiving special pay of 12s. a day for engineers and 9s. for assistant engineers. Midshipmen under 17 years of age received 3s., and those of two years' seniority 4s.; while equipment allowances for officers called out for active service were fixed at £30 for lieutenants, £30 for sub-lieutenants and engineer officers, and £20 for midshipmen, half these allowances being granted to officers who volunteered for twelve months' training. Officers with naval navigating certificates were to receive an extra 4s. a day if lieutenants and 2s. 6d. if sub-lieutenants. Wardroom officers received 2s. a day messing expenses, and gunroom officers 1s.

As all armed merchant cruisers were almost certain to be manned principally by the Naval Reserve, there was considerable interest in 1887 when the Government came to an agreement with the P. & O. Line to hold the *Victoria*, *Britannia* and *Oceana* at their disposal for an annual subsidy of £3500, in addition to the normal mail subsidy. A fourth sister, the *Arcadia*, together with the *Valetta*, *Massilia*, *Rome*, *Carthage*, *Ballarat* and *Paramatta*, was also to be held at the disposal of the Admiralty without further subsidy. In the event of the company building other steamers which the Admiralty considered to be more suitable to their purpose they had the right to substitute them for the ships named. The agreement, which was to be terminable at twelve months' notice from either side, fixed the prices for hire or purchase in the event of war, and the ships were to be sent to sea with such fittings on board as would enable them to be prepared at the shortest notice. As these ships could maintain a steady

sixteen knots at all times and had sufficient coal to maintain this full speed for 26 days, as well as being very suitable for the carriage of troops, the agreement was generally regarded as a good one, especially as the company were placed under an obligation to arrange, as far as possible, that the European portion of their crews should be Royal Naval Reserve men, and that no obstacle should be placed in the way of their undertaking naval service in war time.

The shipping companies fully realised the difficulties of the Admiralty in getting a satisfactory list of liners that should always be ready for service, and in 1886, just before the Agreement was made with the P. and O. Company, the White Star Line offered to build two vessels by special agreement with the Admiralty, with speed and strength superior to any merchant ships afloat, and engines and boilers placed below the water line. Special attention was to be paid in their design to the necessity of mounting guns so that the usual last-moment strengthening should not be necessary. They also proposed to have these ships manned by R.N.R. men to the extent of at least half their complement. The Admiralty was to pay a subsidy as soon as the ships were ready for sea, and so the famous *Teutonic* and *Majestic* came into being.

The Cunard Company also agreed to hold the *Aurania*, *Etruria* and *Umbria* at the disposal of the Admiralty for the next five years. They were then reckoned to be the fastest ships afloat, the famous *Oregon* having been sunk. The company agreed to build in the necessary platforms and fittings for carrying guns, to take charge of the necessary gun mountings and to keep them in good order, and to maintain half of the crews as R.N.R. men. It was estimated that it would take less than a week to get these ships to sea as armed merchant cruisers, while the cost would be reasonable and agreed beforehand. On the other hand the old *Oregon*, in 1885, had taken weeks to get to sea, and the cost had been colossal.

A contract for the use of the crack Atlantic liners as cruisers having been satisfactorily concluded with the White Star and the Cunard Lines, a somewhat similar arrangement was being made with the Inman Line, when it was pointed out in Parliament that 90 per cent. of the shares were owned by American citizens. The First Lord maintained that the authorities were quite well aware of that fact, and that the contract which was being discussed was drawn and worded with full appreciation of the difference that it made, so that it contained many points which were not in those drawn up for the Cunard and White Star Lines.

In February, 1887, the question was raised in Parliament whether the Admiralty would not station a training ship at Stornoway, or, better still, have her cruising among the Highland ports, as recommended by the Crofters' Commission, in order to take full advantage of the keenness of the young fishermen of the Hebrides to serve in the second-class of the Naval Reserve. It was considered, however, that the battery at Stornoway was quite sufficient for the purpose, and that as many men as were wanted for the second-class Reserve could be obtained without incurring any further expense.

In 1887 the pay of the lower deck was tabulated, although it differed but little from the scale already in force. The first-class reserve men, able seamen, received an annual retainer of £6, and the pay of their rank as non-continuous service men in the Royal Navy, which at that

time was 1s. 4d. a day and lodging at 2d. a day, with an extra 1d. a day for men who had qualified as "trained men." The second-class reserve men, ordinary seamen, had a retainer of £2 10s. and naval pay of 1s. 1d. a day, and were in other allowances rated the same as able seamen. The third-class reserve men, or boys, received the 7d. a day that the first-class Navy boys got, subsistance allowance of 1s. 4d., and lodging allowance of 4d. a day, without an annual retainer. Firemen were entitled only to an annual retainer of £5. Men who volunteered for service in an emergency, although the Reserve might not have been called up by Royal Proclamation, were to receive the same pay, allowance and victuals as continuous service seamen, but they were not to get their clothing gratuity unless they volunteered for at least one year's service.

About the same time, a Naval Reservist was given the right, when not called out for service in the Royal Navy and provided the exigencies of the service admitted, to purchase his discharge from the Reserve on the payment of a sum of £10 for the first and second-class or £5 in the case of firemen, or on repaying the amount of retainer and cost of free clothing that he had received when such amount was less than £10 or £5 respectively. Comparatively few men took advantage of this right, the numbers for the first three years being seven in 1888, four in 1889 and six in 1890.

In 1887 the very practical suggestion was put forward that a number of drill establishments should be founded in India and the Colonies. There were always a large number of British seamen detained in the various out ports, and they were in the unfortunate position of having no occupation and no means of earning pay or filling in their time, with the natural result that they often got into mischief. If those seamen who belonged to the R.N.R. had a chance of filling in their time profitably to themselves and the Service, everybody, it was argued, would be very much better satisfied. Unfortunately the suggestion came to nothing at that time.

That something was seriously wrong with the R.N.R. in the Jubilee Year was evident from the fact that of the forty-five lieutenants on the list eight had served in that rank for over twenty years; while of the 113 sub-lieutenants, five had over twenty years in that rank to their credit, and of the 109 midshipmen three had held their rank for ten years and over.

It will be remembered that even in the very beginning of the R.N.R. officers' force one of the complaints put forward was that the R.N.R. officers were considerably older than their naval opposite numbers, and that this fact was liable to lead to considerable hardship. Nothing was done, however, until 1887, when, as R.N.R. officers were beginning to go to sea for training, it was arranged that all sub-lieutenants over a certain age should be granted the temporary rank of acting lieutenant, in order that they might mess in the ward-room, instead of in the gunroom with the midshipmen. This was a considerable concession, and was very much appreciated by the officers in question, who were apt to feel keenly the difference in age and seniority.

The naval review on the occasion of Queen Victoria's Jubilee in 1887 was to be followed by a series of exercises and manœuvres that would have the effect of testing the ships of somewhat revolutionary design that had recently been added to the service. There was, therefore, a good deal of feeling in the R.N.R.

when weeks went by without any notice being taken of their desire to take part, until finally a question in Parliament brought a somewhat grudging answer that the Admiralty would be glad to associate with these manœuvres a limited number of Naval Reserve men who might wish to volunteer for service, and that a quota would be selected from each district. It was somewhat pessimistically pointed out that there would be some difficulty in these Reserve men leaving their regular employment for the time required for the review and subsequent operations, and that there would also be a certain expense in conveying the men from their respective localities, but the Admiralty hoped that these would not prove insurmountable difficulties. In spite of this half-hearted support, there were persistent reports at the time that many of the ships were undermanned for the manœuvres.

In April, 1888, Rear-Admiral Sir George Tryon took over the post of Admiral Superintendent of Reserves, and the Reserves gained a very good friend. Born in 1832, he entered the Navy as a midshipman at the advanced age of sixteen. However, he had very good influence behind him, and he backed this by remarkably good service in the Naval Brigade in the Crimean War. He attracted the attention of Queen Victoria, who in 1858 selected him for service in the Royal yacht. This gave him his promotion to commander in 1860. In the following year he was appointed commander of the *Warrior*, the first ironclad, which was then fitting out, and while he was in her he increased his already considerable reputation. In 1867 he was transport officer at Annesley Bay during the Abyssinian War, and it was while he was carrying out this work that he began to take a very keen interest in the Mercantile Marine, and to study for himself how it could be made more useful to the Navy. The result was that when, in 1871, he was appointed private secretary to Mr. Goschen, the First Lord, he put in a good deal of spade work. More followed in 1882, when he was asked to take over the post of Secretary to the Admiralty temporarily. While he was in this position he assisted in the formation of the Naval Intelligence Committee, which eventually became the Naval Intelligence Division, and he then went out to Australia as Rear-Admiral.

It was while Tryon was out in Australia that the Russian war scare occurred, and he commissioned the P. & O. liner *Massilia* and the Orient liner *Lusitania* as auxiliary cruisers. They did not go to sea, but the R.N.R. officers on board were given a delightful time by Australian society, and the commissioning did very good work in that it aroused Australian interest in the force. When Tryon put forward a definite proposal for Australian naval defence the possibilities of a Royal Naval Reserve were not forgotten. After unsuccessfully contesting the Spalding Division of Lincolnshire for Parliament in 1887, Tryon was, as stated above, appointed Admiral Superintendent of Reserves in the following April. While holding this position he had an important command in the naval manœuvres of 1888, 1889 and 1890, and then sat as chairman to the R.N.R. Committee, whose activities will be mentioned in their proper place. At the conclusion of his time he was appointed to command the Mediterranean Fleet, and it was while he was flying his flag there that he lost his life in the collision between the *Camperdown* and *Victoria*.

In 1888 it was declared that an extra master's certificate would no longer be necessary as a qualification for appointment or for promotion in the Royal Naval Reserve, and increased discretionary power was given to the Admiralty to promote sub-lieutenants who had not undergone the twelve months' training. At the same time, honorary commissions as commander or chief engineer could in special cases be conferred on marine superintendents or superintendent engineers of the large steamship companies.

The same year it was suggested in Parliament that the Royal Naval Reserve men should be given at least a fair training in signalling, and the Admiralty gave the assurance that this would be done. So many things happened within the next twelve months, however, that it was found impossible to fulfil this promise, but in the meantime infinitely more attention had been given to the training in signalling of Royal Naval ratings, which up to then had been very poor indeed. Lord Claud Hamilton then promised to make a move in the matter, and Captain Bethell, who had raised the question, added to its importance by suggesting that the Admiralty should take definite steps to improve the standard of signalling in the Merchant Service, as it would be exceedingly useful to the Navy as well as to the shipping industry generally. This was the first suggestion of its kind, and considering the trouble that is taken to improve signalling between men-of-war and merchantmen to-day, it is distinctly interesting.

The amount paid to the Cunard and P. & O. Companies in the Estimates of 1888-9 was £222,380, and although an attempt was made to raise the question in the House of Commons, and to suggest that this was a large sum to pay for six ships, it was immediately pointed out that the payment gave rights to the Admiralty over nine others, and most people regarded it as a very good bargain in the circumstances of the day. At the same time, the Admiralty refused to go further in the matter of personnel than the agreement by which 50 per cent. of the crews of these ships were R.N.R. men. They maintained that this was amply sufficient, and that it would be impracticable to interest themselves in the naval training of the balance, as well as injurious to the interests of the Reserve.

A high tribute was paid to the standard of conduct in the Royal Naval Reserve in 1888, when a member of Parliament raised the question in the House as to whether it was the custom of the Government to take any notice of charges of misconduct made against individuals holding commissions in the Royal Naval Reserve, and whether an individual against whom such charges were made to the knowledge of the Government could still, in times of emergency, obtain the com mand of one of her Majesty's ships. Lord George Hamilton, the First Lord, replied that up to that time he was not aware of a single charge of misconduct being brought against an R.N.R. officer, but that, should it happen, the Admiralty had full power under the Regulations to dismiss from the service any officer against whom a charge derogatory to his position had been substantiated, and that this punishment would certainly debar his employment in her Majesty's Navy, either in command or in any commissioned capacity.

Another interesting point was raised when the Admiralty was asked whether it was not possible to include in the certificate of service which was granted to men of the R.N.R. who had served their full

time an endorsement of character, as reported periodically by the drill instructors. This was given to seamen coming out of the Royal Navy as a matter of course, and it was pointed out that it would be a great help to R.N.R. men in getting civil employment when they were debarred by their age from following the sea. There was some difficulty as to whether the Admiralty or the Board of Trade should do this, and nothing resulted from the proposal.

The Naval Defence Act of 1889 provided the Navy with a large number of battleships and cruisers, but, unfortunately, it was soon found that it was not possible to provide men equally quickly, with the result that the manning difficulty soon became very acute, and a large number of the newly completed ships had to be paid off into the Reserve until crews could be trained for them. In such circumstances it was hoped that considerable relief could be obtained from the Royal Naval Reserve, and it was accordingly decided to develop it as far as possible. More lieutenants and stokers were to be entered, and a far greater number of officers were to be admitted for their twelve months' training in the Navy. A far better realisation of the difficulties of the officers in the big shipping companies assisted the matter considerably. In consequence of these measures there was a slight increase in numbers in the year 1889, and things began to look more promising, but they were still far from being satisfactory. The situation is shown clearly by the authorised and actual strength of the various ranks in that year:—

	Authorised.	Serving.
Lieutenants	150	120
Sub-Lieutenants	270	120
Engineers	150	3
Asst. Engineers	150	0
Midshipmen	200	155

The reliance that would have had to be placed on the Royal Naval Reserve had Britain come into a war in 1889 is shown by the fact that of 857 R.N. lieutenants on the active list 782 were already employed in the Fleet and 38 in the coastguards, while only 37 were on half pay, sick, or in casual employment. This meant, of course, that there was no reserve of regular officers of a rank that was coming more and more into demand with the changed naval position, and it was agreed that the situation was serious. Something had indeed already been done to remedy it, for two years before an increased number of cadets had been entered in order to bring the lieutenants' list up to a thousand. These youngsters, however, would not be trained for some years, and more and more reliance would have to be placed on the R.N.R. The Reserve was beginning to come into its own.

Chapter V. The 'Nineties.

THE 'nineties began, therefore, with the R.N.R. most distinctly on the up-grade and a wave of naval interest sweeping over the country. The big liner companies, also, were taking an infinitely greater interest in their personnel and were realising that the Reserve gave them not only a sound nucleus of long-service men but also a status in the estimation of the travelling public which was very desirable to them. At the same time there were many other troubles in store for the R.N.R.

When steam colliers began to replace the little brigs which formerly had the greater part of the coasting trade there were many who shook their heads and could see trouble in the change on the ground that there were so many less men for the Naval Reserve. At the same time the ocean-going sailing ships were replaced by steamers, and it was estimated that between 1875 and 1890 the number of seamen in the Mercantile Marine had been decreased by no fewer than 20,000. This was a very serious matter indeed from the Reserve point of view, but it was the march of progress, and nothing could be done except to get a larger proportion of the men remaining into the Reserve and to give them a higher standard of training when they were enrolled.

Complaints were frequently being made against the Admiralty for the insufficient training facilities for Reserve men in the batteries, but a question asked in Parliament in May, 1890, put rather a different complexion on affairs. An Irish Member called attention to the annoyance caused by the firing of heavy guns by Naval Reservists at New Brighton, asserting that it caused great damage locally and ought to be stopped. Lord George Hamilton replied that the only piece that had been fired was a little nine-pounder muzzle-loading field gun with a maximum charge of under two pounds of powder, and that no material damage could have been caused. It is difficult to imagine which was the more deplorable, the fact that people were trying to hamper the training of the R.N.R. in this manner, or the fact that the Liverpool Reservists could only hope for a little practice with a nine-pounder pop-gun.

But at the same time a great step forward was made by the authorisation of short gunnery courses for Royal Naval Reserve officers as well as for retired officers from the Royal Navy, Royal Indian Marine and Royal Marines, should they be keen enough to wish to polish up their technical knowledge. The manner in which the R.N.R. applied for permission to take these courses showed the success of the scheme.

The question of reserve stokers came up prominently in the debate on the 1890 naval estimates, when a member pointed out that the original establishment was 1000 men, which was reduced to 600 and then raised again to 800, but that there was not nearly this number on the roll. The Admiralty view was that in the then state of the labour market, when firemen could earn very much more in the Mercantile Marine than they could in the Navy, it was not likely that the

number would be filled, in spite of the fact that they were only asking a man to put £5 a year into his pocket as a retaining fee in peace time without having any training or other duties to perform until war broke out. It was then immediately pointed out that even £5 a year was a very bad bargain for the Government, considering that they had not the slightest knowledge or guarantee of the men's efficiency as firemen. A man came up and said that he was an efficient stoker, gave his address and drew his retainer, and that ended it.

In 1890 it was realised that the regulations then in force were not attracting engineer officers into the R.N.R, although it was admitted that this was one of its most valuable branches. Accordingly the authorities set to work to see what was wrong, and they were not long in deciding that to a large extent the trouble was on the financial side. The pay of Engineers was therefore raised from 12s. a day to 17s. and 20s., and that of Assistant Engineers from 9s. to 11s., while the former received an outfit allowance of £40 and the latter one of £30, with 2s. and 1s. a day towards their mess expenses. It was not long before these concessions began to bear fruit, although the decision of the Admiralty that engineer officers in merchant ships received quite enough training in their ordinary occupation and did not require to go afloat with the Fleet, with the resultant earning of retaining fees and the like, left one big grievance. The Tryon Committee later realised this point, and strongly recommended that in consequence of the rapidly increasing difference between naval and mercantile engineering practice a limited number of engineer officers should be allowed to volunteer for service on board H.M. ships and receive a retainer in the same way as executive officers.

There was also a most gratifying improvement in the entry of first-class men, for hitherto there had been great difficulty in approaching the establishment. The very much closer link binding the Reserves to the Royal Navy was one reason for this, for under the old methods of training there had been a deplorable tendency to think that the Reserve would never be used, and that its only purpose was to provide retaining fees. Men who had entered in the early days of the Force were now beginning to draw their pensions at the age of sixty, and the hearing of instances of this gave any number of merchant seamen a new interest in the Reserve. Also the increased good will of the shipping companies had a very great effect, and this good will was in part due to the greater consideration of shipping difficulties on the part of the Admiralty authorities. A similar improvement was noted in the number of officers who applied for commissions, improved facilities for sea training with the Fleet being given as the principal cause.

In 1890 the Royal Naval Reserve Officers' Committee was formed, very largely through the efforts of Messrs. W. Caius Crutchley and W. Caborne, for the purpose of attempting to safeguard the interests of the Royal Naval Reserve officers, which at that time were felt to be rather neglected by the authorities. The committee accordingly came together to see if some concerted action could not be taken with the idea of putting the grievances and suggestions of officers before the authorities in appropriate form. In good hands the committee prospered, and by the late 'nineties it had permanent quarters in St. George's Club and held an annual dinner which did

splendid work in fostering an esprit de corps among men who very seldom had an opportunity of meeting. The P. and O. officers were very enthusiastic about these meetings, and all the great mercantile lines were represented. The subsequent gradual collapse of the movement was greatly deplored.

It was realised in the 'eighties that the arrangements made for mobilising the R.N.R. were far from perfect, and accordingly a new scheme was brought out in 1890 by which the whole Force was divided into fifteen divisions for convenience of organisation and call. By this means it was anticipated that the registrars, after consulting with the naval officers, would be able to collect all the available men in their district at a pre-determined rendezvous, when they would hand them over to the naval officer who would then be responsible for their transport from the rendezvous to the flagship or depot. The police had orders to arrest immediately any called-out men who refused to serve or who failed to appear at the rendezvous after receiving due notice. Seamen were to be sent to the flagships at Portsmouth, Devonport and Sheerness, firemen to the steam reserve ships at Portsmouth, Devonport and Chatham. Wherever possible a responsible officer or trustworthy naval petty officer, pensioner or coastguardsman was to be sent in charge of each party. Men from Scotland, the various districts, Newhaven and Limerick were to go to the Portsmouth command, from Weymouth, Holyhead and Kingstown to Devonport, and from Harwich and Hull to Sheerness.

In February, 1891, Sir George Tryon was appointed Chairman of a committee of inquiry on various questions connected with the Royal Naval Reserve, with a view to increasing the numerical strength and efficiency of the various forces. The committee consisted of eight members and a secretary, all men who knew the R.N.R. and its difficulties thoroughly and who dealt with the subject in a practical and sympathetic manner and made some very interesting suggestions. The other members were Captain E. Rice, R.N.; Captain T. F. Hammill, R.N., of the Naval Intelligence Department; Mr. Swanston, of the Board of Trade; Sir Charles Rivers Wilson, of the Treasury; Sir Allen Young, of the R.N.R.; Mr. Thomas Ismay, of the White Star Line; and Captain William C. Angove, Marine Superintendent of the P. & O.

One point on which the Tryon Committee showed its appreciation of the standpoint of the R.N.R. and also its sympathy with the ideals of the Force was the recommendation that an officer should not be given an honorary commission on leaving the active list but that a retired list for R.N.R. officers should be established on practically the same lines as the ordinary retired list of the Navy. Honorary commissions should be given only to gentlemen officially connected with the R.N.R. It also suggested the institution of the ranks of Captain and Commander on the retired list and that the honorary ranks of Paymaster and Assistant Paymaster should be confined to Registrars and Deputy-Registrars.

The Committee also drew attention to the fact that when the second-class Royal Naval Reservists were established it was intended that they should embark annually in H.M. ships, but that this scheme had never been carried out and that the *moral* of the section and its general efficiency was considerably impaired in consequence. The financial side of the question was kept carefully in mind and it was suggested that sixteen working days on board

would be quite sufficient, with a pound gratuity on disembarkation, while this sixteen days' service afloat should count as twenty-eight days' for pay. At that date the second-class reservist reckoned to put in under five hours' drill a day during his twenty-eight days' training.

The Committee condemned the regulations under which firemen were entered in the Royal Naval Reserve, pointing out that they obtained a retaining fee of £5 a year, were required to give no training, and that there was no real test as to their ability for their work. Also there was no means of testing the reliability and character of the men, and the Committee did not believe that any very large proportion of the 583 men enrolled would turn up if they were wanted. They, therefore, suggested that the force already enrolled under these regulations should be allowed to die out, and that it should be replaced by a proper reserve of firemen, raised and trained in very much the same way as the first-class seamen, the period of drill being 21 days for the first year and 14 days in subsequent years. For this it was proposed to increase the annual retainer to £6, and to grant the pay of the naval stoker, 1s. 8d. a day, with lodging allowance, uniform and a pension at the age of 60.

The Committee received and considered a return for the year 1890 of the number of men who had been dismissed, or whose quarterly retainer had been stopped, for breaking the regulations. As showing the excellent conduct of the Reserve, it may be mentioned that the dismissals were six men for misconduct while at drill, five for desertion or for leaving ships abroad, five for conviction by the civil powers, six for not reporting at the proper times or for shipping without leave, and one for another cause, a total of 23. For less serious offences 113 men were punished by the stoppage of one or two—in serious cases three, and in extreme cases four—quarters' retainer. Considering the number of men that were enrolled, and the frequent occasions on which the Royal Naval Reserve had been described as an "undisciplined horde," these figures were most gratifying, for they showed that the men were generally keen and were really a remarkably well-behaved body.

There was one question on which Admiral Tryon disagreed most emphatically with his colleagues on the Committee, and that was the matter of uniform for the Reservists. He attached great importance to dress, and was most anxious that when Royal Naval Reserve men were called out for training they should wear a uniform resembling that of the Royal Navy as closely as possible. He thought that any deviation from this would be looked upon as a badge of inferiority, and, indeed, it must be admitted that the uniform then considered sufficient for the Reservists was of rather a weird description, and not calculated to inspire any great enthusiasm. Lecturing at the United Service Institute some years afterwards, Commander Caborne told how he himself remembered seeing a man on board one of the drill ships wearing his belts and brandishing his cutlass, repelling imaginary boarders, arrayed in all the glories of a silk hat. It must be remembered that in those days a number of skippers went to the fishing grounds wearing rather ancient silk hats.

Immediately the Tryon Committee had issued its report in the spring of 1891, there was a great revival of recruiting, both officers and men feeling that at last the Reserve was appreciated at its

right value. Applications for entry as officers were so numerous that it was found necessary to establish a strict selection in order not to block the list with men who might not be the most desirable to the Force. There was also an increase in the number of engineer officers entered, but the authorities were rather disappointed by the fact that the improved conditions of pay and service had not attracted as many in the junior grades as they had hoped. At the same time there was quite a rush to enlist as first and second-class seamen R.N.R., and for the first time for over 20 years the number enrolled somewhat exceeded the numbers estimated, while the class of man was excellent.

In March, 1891, the number of executive officers was again increased, the lieutenants from 150 to 250 and the sub-lieutenants from 270 to 420, and at the same time it was specially provided that officers who chose to undertake any service or engagement that would prevent their fulfilling their engagement to serve when required should be considered to have vacated their position in the Royal Naval Reserve. Later in the year the regulations for the R.N.R. were again slightly altered, but the alterations were of little interest except that they increased the number of midshipmen and made some small amendments in the clauses affecting engineer officers.

On April 21, 1891, Rear-Admiral Robert O. Fitzroy, an officer with the reputation of being one of the strictest martinets in the service, hoisted his flag in the old *Alexandra* at Portland as Admiral Superintendent of Royal Naval Reserves. He was born in 1839, and after doing good work in China was appointed to various ships that had got slack and wanted pulling up with the strictest discipline. In 1882 he commissioned the *Orion*, which was laid up at Chatham, for service for the bombardment of Alexandria, but, unfortunately, the event had taken place about a fortnight before he arrived, and he had to be content with the command of a Naval brigade ashore. Later in the 'eighties he was Commodore in charge of the Training Squadron, and he had been promoted to the rank of Rear-Admiral in 1888. He got his step immediately after he had vacated the post of A.S.R., and died in 1896.

Ever since the Admiralty had first adopted a policy in regard to auxiliary cruisers it had been the mark of considerable criticism, but in May, 1891, questions were asked in the House which threw a good deal of light on the subject, and which silenced a good many critics. For the first time the Admiralty consented to talk about armament, although it did not supply specific details. Eight of the ships were to be armed with twelve 4.7-in. quickfirers apiece, the remaining six with four old 5-in. breech-loaders and eight 7-in. muzzle-loading guns, with a battery of machine guns in each case. On the question of cost, it was shown that the necessary strengthening and gun platforms worked out at about £400 per gun, but that experience had shown that when such ships were taken up in a hurry the work required three or four weeks and cost about £800 per gun. Guns and fittings were kept at naval depots close to the regular trade routes on which the ships ran, it being decided that this was very much more convenient than subjecting the armament to the wear and tear incidental to ordinary mercantile traffic, and also prevented them obstructing the working of the ship.

In March, 1891, in consequence of an agreement made between the

Indian and Imperial Governments for the joint manning of the Coast Defence vessels which were stationed in Indian ports, an Order in Council was published which gave precedence to officers of the Indian Marine over those of the Royal Naval Reserve, and immediately ill-feeling was created. This was to a certain extent due to a misapprehension of the circumstances of the case, but the authorities could make no move in the matter, and intimated that this order of precedence was a logical one, as the Indian Marine were thenceforward to be a part of the permanent defence forces of the Empire. At the same time, they pointed out that the possibility of the officers of the Indian Marine and Royal Naval Reserve serving together was so remote that they considered that any grievance as to relative ranks was not likely to arise in practice. However, the grievance was there—the R.I.M. not being considered as a naval body on account of the majority of its functions—and it remained a very sore point until the order of precedence was pointedly omitted in the post-war regulations.

The experiment was tried of calling for R.N.R. volunteers to serve in H.M. ships during the summer manœuvres of 1891, the first time they had embarked for 22 years, and although only a very short notice was given the reply was so enthusiastic that 469 men were embarked in various ships before the entries could be stopped, though it had been intended to embark only 300 men as a maximum, and these were in addition to the ships' full complements. The result of the experiment was most satisfactory, both as regards the conduct and efficiency of the men, and it showed that with longer notice a considerably greater number of men would volunteer, and the difficulty of manning the Naval Defence Act cruisers would disappear for the period of the exercises. At the same time many authorities who saw the men at work suggested that it would be far better if a genuine attempt were made to encourage R.N.R. men to gain efficiency by the incentive of additional pay. It was pointed out that in the Royal Navy itself numerous leading and petty officer ratings had been created as a stimulus to keenness, and it was suggested that this system might be followed more generally in the Reserve.

In the early days of the R.N.R. it was evident that the drill ships were most inadequately staffed, when it was considered that their primary purpose was to train Reservists for war. The Tryon Committee drew particular attention to this. The coastguard batteries, which were in the sole charge of the chief officers with a staff of instructors which was augmented from the gunnery ships from time to time, were the worst offenders, one shortcoming being that the staff had not sufficient status for the instruction of officers. Even on board the drill ships, although it was admitted that the instructional staff was considerably better, it still left much to be desired.

The Tryon Committee inspected the R.N.R. batteries all round the coast, and the report that they issued was illuminating. Admittedly, they only mentioned the worst of the stations, but that any should be in the condition reported was deplorable. At Galway, for instance, 503 men drilled on one ancient 42-pounder gun, but the gun shed was long past repair, and there was no drill shed available. The Treasury had sanctioned the transfer of a site from the War

Department to the Admiralty, but as no funds were provided the matter had gone no further. At Tramore, where there were 307 men on the roll, there was no drill shed, and the single 32-pounder had had to be abandoned as the shed in which it was housed was falling to pieces. Similar conditions were reported in a score of stations, while necessary replacements and repairs were carried out very slowly, and the whole Force was rapidly becoming very discouraged. Another reason for discouragement was that first-class R.N.R. men received only a cap and ribbon until they had served five years in the Force, and it was suggested at this time that they should receive a proper kit, which after all was estimated to cost only £1 11s. 2d.

By 1891 the Royal Navy was armed with modern breech-loading rifled guns and quickfirers, pieces which differed only in comparatively minor particulars from the guns carried to-day. Yet the R.N.R. drill ships and batteries had no facility for giving the Reservists training in this modern artillery. It was true that the *Eagle* in Liverpool had one 5-inch breech loader, as had also the *President* in London, the *Unicorn* in Dundee, the *Clyde* at Aberdeen, the *Briton* at Inverness, the *Trincomalee* at Southampton, and certain other ships, in addition to one or two of the batteries, but the 5-inch gun was not a modern piece, being, in fact, one of the earliest breech loaders to be fitted in the Fleet. Otherwise the ships and batteries were fitted with rifled muzzle-loaders and any ancient piece down to 32-pounder smooth bores, the only modern gun in the whole force being the single 6-in. breech-loader that was mounted in the battery at Southsea. Practically all the ships and batteries had Nordenfelts, and some of them had Gardners and Gatlings, but not a single one had the Maxim machine gun that was then coming into the Fleet. Martini-Henry rifles and Adams pistols were provided, but the rifle ranges were sometimes ten miles away and were seldom really convenient to the battery. Yet officers and men were still trying to make themselves efficient.

There was also a good deal of dissatisfaction concerning the pay granted to reservists. For instance, a petty officer in the Merchant Service was then getting from £3 5s. to £6 10s. a month, and an able seaman from £3 to £4 15s. When called up in the Navy the able seaman received 1s. 7d. a day or £2 8s. a month, while the ordinary seaman received £1 18s. a month against from £1 to £2 15s. in a merchant ship. The first-class Royal Naval reservist received a pension of £12 a year at the age of sixty, but this was not very much, and no pension at all was given to the second-class men. With regard to their kit, a reservist on being called out received £3 10s. towards his outfit, but he was very lucky to get it for less than £10. Thus it was very often months before the men got out of debt for their uniforms. Admittedly the first-class reservist received an annual retainer of £6 and the second-class one of £2 10s., but this was stopped immediately he was called out for service. The Tryon Committee pointed out that this was a very poor way of getting efficient and willing service, and suggested a free kit, a war retainer, and also that the first and second-class men should receive the same annual retainer of £6.

Admiral Tryon's remarks on the subject of uniform were taken very seriously, and although an effort was made in some quarters to side-

track them in the interests of economy with a suggestion that R.N.R. men should not wear the ordinary naval uniform, but a special one consisting of a blue jersey, cap and serge trousers, Tryon's opinion was ultimately maintained. There was certainly a great deal in the contention of men who were in a very good position to know that the R.N.R. would have felt this special uniform to be a quite undeserved slur on their status, and that their messmates in the Fleet, who regarded this as the ordinary dress of the Merchant seaman from a liner-hand to a bargee, would have thought very much less of the Reserve men had the suggestion been carried through. Happily it was not, and the uniform finally approved consisted of one blue serge jumper, two Naval pattern flannels, two collars, one black silk handkerchief, one pair of blue Tartan trousers and one cap and ribbon. It was estimated that this uniform would cost about 2s. 8d. per man more than the one previously used, but the gain was very considerable.

The naval manœuvres of 1892 consisted of an elaborate scheme off the Irish coast, but the Admiralty refused permission for R.N.R. men to volunteer for service in ships. The result showed that considerable difficulty would be experienced in war time. It was necessary to transfer several men from Portsmouth and Devonport to the Medway, and although the number did not amount to 1300, the operation took a fortnight. Also it was necessary to scrape the depots for every available man, and even so the mobilisation could only be described as partial.

With the advent of a number of British liners in the trans-Pacific trade, particularly the ships which were put on service by the Canadian Pacific Railway from Vancouver and which were most of them on the Admiralty list of subventioned cruisers, a difficulty arose which looked like causing a good deal of hardship to their crews. As the regulations stood, officers and men could not re-enrol as Reservists or receive the retaining fee due to them unless they reported themselves personally in the United Kingdom, which meant the liability of losing their job in the Pacific—although the Canadian Pacific more than met their convenience in this way—and the time and expense of returning to England. After a good deal of discussion the Admiralty decided that it was worth their while to obtain statutory authority to amend the Royal Naval Reserve Act in such a way as to obtain power to enrol and re-enrol men abroad, and to pay them the retainers earned without insisting on their coming home.

It will be remembered that as long ago as the 'fifties a suggestion was made for the formation of a branch of the Naval Reserve which was very similar to the Royal Fleet Reserve which came into existence in the early days of the present century. It was shelved on that occasion, but in 1892 it was brought up again by Admiral Field, who was Member of Parliament for Eastbourne, and who suggested that when boys entered the naval training ships they should sign an engagement that their period should include five years' service in the Royal Naval Reserve first class, on a short service pension, and that by this means the figures for the R.N.R. would be maintained and a valuable body of men kept fully trained for the Pensioners' Reserve. The Admiralty, however, were not prepared to take up the scheme, as it would seriously interfere with the re-engagement of Naval men to

complete their time for pension and also with the standing arrangement for the coastguard force. Later, when the grave deficiency in the numbers of officers and men in the Navy was occupying the attention of the House, this scheme was revised in a modified form, but it was never proceeded with.

A similar fate befel a suggestion, in 1892, that a reserve of engine-room artificers should be formed, and it was pointed out that there would be no difficulty in recruiting them from the greasers in the Merchant Service, men who were quite capable of being trained into efficient engine-room artificers to work with the Fleet.

In his very interesting book "The Inner Life of the Navy," Mr. Lionel Yexley, who, it must be remembered, was a practical seaman, wrote of the 1893 mobilisation: "Owing to much discussion as to the value of certain portions of the Royal Naval Reserve, a contingent of these, mostly Irish fishermen, was called up in 1893 and distributed among the ships for that year's cruise, and never was such a spectacle witnessed as they afforded. Entirely unused to discipline or the ways of a ship of war, they proved an unmitigated nuisance to all concerned. They could not be trusted to take a look-out; at the wheel or in the chains they were useless, and not one of them had ever seen a big gun. These men were costing the country over £15 per head per annum as a reserve for war, and belonged to a force which was costing the country large sums." It must be remembered that he was writing of the bad old days before the abolition of the batteries and before the suggestions which had been made by Tryon's committee had been carried out.

The Admiralty very carefully considered the suggestions made by Tryon's committee of 1891, and, finally, nearly two years afterwards, they adopted the proposals almost entirely. The honorary list was to be confined to civilians connected with the R.N.R., and a retired list was to be established, but this rule was not to alter the status of existing honorary officers who had not served on the active list. In order to qualify for retaining fee and higher rank officers were to undergo a satisfactory gunnery course in the *Excellent*, and proper arrangements were made for them to receive higher service training. Certain fishermen who until then had been eligible for entry into the first class were put into the second, but the difference between the two classes was reduced, and it was ordered that periodical embarkation of second-class reservists should be carried out in sea-going district ships. At the same time men were to be encouraged to volunteer for service on board, and were to be accepted to the limit of the accommodation in the ships. The rating of able seamen in the second class was introduced, with increased pay, while the committee's recommendations with regard to firemen were approved. Sundry alterations were also made in the rules for active service.

Immediately the revised regulations with regard to the enrolment of firemen were published and these men were shown that real use was going to be made of their services, there was a rush to enrol which it was found necessary to check, and finally entry was restricted to the very pick of the Mercantile Marine. From 500 the establishment was increased in steps to 1600, and a number of exceedingly useful men were enlisted in this manner. The conditions in which these firemen entered and served were that the candidate had to be a British subject, free

from all infirmity, and of good character. He had to be over 21 and under 35 years of age, and had to prove two years' service at sea, at least one year of which had been served as fireman and trimmer, fireman, or in some higher capacity in the stokehold or engine-room. All his discharges must show a V.G. assessment of character and ability, and a candidate for admission had to declare that it was his intention to follow the sea for at least five years from the time of his engagement. These men were required to drill for 21 days in the first year of their enrolment and for 14 days in every subsequent year, while volunteers were permitted to embark in H.M. ships for training periods of six months at a time. At the end of their first six months they might volunteer for a second period, but not for more. Their annual retainer was six pounds, their drill money 1s. 9d. a day, with an extra penny for qualification, while the lodging and provision allowance amounted to another 1s. 8d.

In the latter part of 1893, which was as soon as could be contrived, all Royal Naval Reserve ratings were dressed in the same uniform as that of the Royal Navy, distinguished only by the badge of the R.N.R. on the cap tally. The first-class men were granted free kit on enrolment and another on every five years' re-enrolment. Until then the second-class men had received a new suit every year, but afterwards they received one in the first and third years of their engagement. To cover the difference in value to the second-class men and to ensure that there was no hardship their annual retainer was increased at the same time from £2 10s. to £3 5s.

The 1891 Committee had, we have seen, drawn very strong attention to the deficiencies of the system of training Reservists in batteries ashore, and two years later the gunnery lieutenants of the various coastguard ships commenced the practice of visiting the R.N.R. batteries within their districts and affording both men and instructors some exceedingly useful lessons. It also gave the regular Navy a far better insight into the progress made by the men, and it was not long before far more satisfactory reports as to gunnery efficiency were received from all districts.

When the Cunard Line brought out their famous pair of flyers in 1893, arrangements were immediately made by the Admiralty to substitute these two ships for the *Umbria* and *Etruria*. For one thing they were both bigger and faster, for another they had been specially designed to meet Admiralty requirements, especially with regard to the position of their engines and boilers. Thirdly, they were twin-screw ships, while the old "Umbrias," wonderful vessels as they undoubtedly were, had the very serious disadvantage of having only a single shaft, and moreover a shaft that had to carry such a power that serious breakdowns were not unknown.

In February, 1894, it was proposed that the Admiralty should draft 900 Royal Naval Reserve men who had received training into the Regular Navy, with the right to serve for pension. The Navy at that time was very short of men, and it was suggested that this experiment should be tried before rearranging the training ship accommodation, as its advocates maintained that a very considerable saving could be effected.

The Government suggestion to take R.N.R. ratings to sea with the Fleet for six months caused a debate on the Reserve in the House of Commons such as it had not

enjoyed for many years. Commander Bethell opened the discussion on the subject of numbers and expressed the opinion that, although the Reserves in the Navy were supposed to number about 26,000, including boys, it would be very difficult to find 20,000 in war time, and only 10,000 would be available at the very beginning of the war. He re-introduced the suggestion of a new Reserve for men who had served their ten or twelve years in the Navy, and naturally this pleased Admiral Field, who followed him. Before he sat down, however, he asserted and stoutly maintained that the gunnery training which was given to R.N.R. men did not turn out nearly such efficient men as the reports would lead one to suppose, and that this question of efficiency would have to be considered more carefully.

Admiral Field drew attention to the fact that taking them all in all the R.N.R. ratings were very dissatisfied with their prospects of a pension, and he considered that the regulations should be recast. He then went on to discuss the suggestion of the Government to pay off the old Indian troopers of the *Serapis* type, and replace them with chartered passenger liners. He was most emphatically against this course, but suggested that, as the trooping service was a most unpopular and unsatisfactory one with the Navy, the best way out of the difficulty would be to maintain regular naval troopers but to man them entirely with naval reservists. Thus both firemen and seamen would be able to get a good deal of naval training, the weak point being that as they would have the manning of those troopers to themselves it would deprive their training of the essential point of fitting in well with a naval ship's company.

He was followed by Mr. Havelock Wilson, who had served in the ranks of the Royal Naval Reserve himself, and who maintained that the superintendents in the Mercantile Marine Offices were being paid so much for every man they could "entrap" into the Naval Reserve. At that time he was very bitter about the employment of Lascars and foreigners in British ships; he also strongly objected to the fact that the stokers were being paid three shillings a week more than able seamen, and demanded that both classes should be brought up to the higher rate. Sir G. Baden-Powell, Member for the Kirkdale Division of Liverpool, made an interesting suggestion for the formation of a reserve of yacht hands, as he maintained that there were something like twenty-eight thousand men in this employ who would be exceedingly useful naval reservists, the more so as pleasure sailing would naturally stop with the outbreak of war. Many other minor subjects were discussed from pensions to conditions of service, and the debate was useful for attracting public attention to the Reserve.

Rear-Admiral Edward Seymour succeeded Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Fitzroy as Admiral Superintendent of the Reserve on Apr. 25, 1894. He was a grandson of Admiral Sir Michael Seymour, 1st Bt., and a first cousin of Admiral Sir Michael Culme-Seymour, 3rd Bt. He had already had a considerable connection with the R.N.R., and as a midshipman of H.M.S. *Terrible* had seen good service in the Crimea. From there he went on to China and took part in the action of Fatshan Creek, which will always be remembered by the "Blood is thicker than water" incident. He rose rapidly, as much by his personal ability as by his undoubted gallantry. In the scare of 1885 he was

appointed to the command of the auxiliary cruiser *Oregon*, and became so interested in mercantile and auxiliary matters that he obtained the post of Captain Assistant to the Admiral Superintending the Reserves (Vice-Admiral John Baird) in December, 1887. He was promoted Rear-Admiral in July, 1889, placed on half-pay after having been Captain for 16½ years, and saw little further service until he was appointed Admiral Superintendent. He was promoted Vice-Admiral in 1895, when he was one of the youngest officers of his rank, and gave up the position in 1897 to take over the command in China, where he made his name as Commander-in-Chief during the Boxer trouble. A deep scholar with unfailing courtesy and kindness, Admiral Seymour did splendid work for the R.N.R. when he was at the helm, and ever after he took a keen interest in the service.

The recommendation that second-class Reservists should be embarked for sea training was carried into effect in February, 1894, when a number was embarked in coast-guard ships for sixteen days' training under naval conditions. As the centres of Stornoway and Lerwick, which contributed a large number of men to the second-class reserve, were very awkwardly placed with regard to floating material, H.M. ships *Superb* and *Galatea* were sent up to visit the two ports and to embark the Reservists there. This latter part of the plan, however, was not a success, largely owing to the insufficient notice given to the men and the inopportune season which was chosen. The result was that only four second-class Naval Reservists shipped on board the *Galatea* and not a single one in the *Superb*. However, the experience gained was very valuable, and it impressed on the Admiralty the necessity in dealing with the Reserve of taking very full advantage of all possible sources of information concerning the men and their peace time occupations.

In the 1894 Naval Estimates a sum was put down for the cost of giving 700 Royal Naval Reservists a six months' course of training with the Fleet, an action that should certainly have been taken many years before. No doubt at this time it was forced upon the authorities by the necessity of finding men somewhere to take the Naval Defence Act cruisers to sea, but the benefit to the Royal Naval Reserve was incalculable. The regulations provided that as far as possible the registrars should make up each detachment of fifty per cent. of first-class men and A.B.'s of the second class, twenty-five per cent. of second-class men, and twenty-five per cent. of firemen, no man over thirty-five years of age to be considered.

When first these regulations came out there was some doubt as to how they would be received. At the beginning there certainly was some hesitation by the men in accepting them, and accordingly certain modifications were made. The minimum age at which a man might serve was reduced from 19 to 18 years, not only in order to include more men, but in order to find younger men who would adapt themselves more easily to the very different life on board a man-of-war. For the same reason young Reservists were allowed to embark on their six-months' training immediately they had finished their 28 days' drill, instead of having to serve two years in the Reserve before they could embark, as was at first proposed. This enabled youngsters to be rated qualified seamen at the age of 20.

In addition to the men who were to be taken into the Fleet for six months' training, arrangements

were made to embark 500 men for the naval manœuvres. Both schemes were a decided success. Many more than 500 men volunteered for the service for manœuvres, and within a week or so of the Admiralty publishing the conditions of the six months' training over 200 men had put down their names. The improved conditions that had been granted by the authorities were beginning to bear wonderful fruit, and the old difficulty of getting the force up to its establishment had gone. At the same time the authorities still stuck to the policy of drill batteries, and a good deal of money was wasted in opening new ones. They were, however, of infinitely better pattern than anything that had gone before, especially in the matter of their guns.

The conditions under which the men embarked were a consolidation of those that had gone before them. The first-class R.N.R. men and the able seamen of the second-class received the 1s. 4d. a day, which was the pay of the non-continuous-service able seamen, while the second-class men received the 1s. 1d. a day of the ordinary seamen. Trained men received their extra penny a day, and pay commenced from the date of embarkation, not of the collection of the Reserves in the various districts. Full rations were free, and every man on embarkation was credited on the ship's ledger with a gratuity of 30s. in lieu of clothing, from which he was charged with the value of any article taken up. He also received a gratuity of £1 at the end of the service. Travelling expenses between the men's homes and their ships were paid with subsistence rates at 5s. whenever a man was absent for a night, or 2s. 6d. when he was away nine hours but not a night. Men embarked had their bedding lent to them gratuitously. These regulations became more or less standardised, except that in 1895 it was ordered that Reservists should be invited to stay on for a further six months at the expiration of their time. Men volunteering had to take with them their complete R.N.R. drill kit, and were also invited to take with them, although it was not compulsory, a suit of waterproof or oilskins for wet weather, a dark overcoat for night wear in cold weather, and an old suit of clothes for coaling work.

The manning committee which sat in 1894 under the Presidency of Sir Edward Read once again recommended that stationary training ships or schools on shore with seagoing tenders should be established at all the suitable ports around the coast. They pointed out that the nation had granted very liberal sums for the promotion of technical education in most other branches of enterprise, and that considering the importance of the Mercantile Marine to the country, it was most dangerous and illogical for the training of boys for the sea to be neglected.

There was another increase in the establishment of lieutenants and sub-lieutenants in 1894, when the number of the former was increased from 250 to 300, and the latter from 420 to 470. In 1896, when the revised regulations were published, the number of executive officers, lieutenants, sub-lieutenants and midshipmen was increased to 1500, while the engineers were fixed at 300.

Chapter VI. *The End of the Century.*

A GREAT move forward was made in 1895, when two sea-going cruisers, the *Medea* and the *Medusa*, with reduced crews, replaced hulks as drill ships for the Royal Naval Reserve at Southampton and North Shields. Admittedly they had not been particularly successful as cruisers, principally because too much had been attempted on a displacement of 2800 tons, but they were not yet ten years old, and differed in only comparatively minor details from the ships of the *Dido* class, which were still being added to the Fleet. Their acquisition immediately made a huge difference to the training possibilities of these two centres, although the move was very much in the nature of an experiment, and there were many who were doubtful as to whether the authorities could afford to maintain it.

The invitation of the Royal United Service Institute to Lieutenant Caborne in 1889 to read a paper on the Royal Naval Reserve was regarded as almost revolutionary, but so much interest was created in it that the invitation was repeated in 1895. He made a number of very interesting suggestions, for, although he was always a keen critic, he was constructive rather than destructive in all his criticisms. One of the first points he made was on the subject of examination for midshipmen. Most of these were taken from the *Worcester* and the *Conway*, and had to pass through a very stiff examination, but there were many who were taken direct from the apprentices of the Merchant Service, and in their case the educational test was not enforced. Mr. Caborne's point was that this was a mistake; there should be one educational test for the whole Force in order to avoid any unpleasant discrimination and in order to keep the standard of the Reserve at the highest possible level. He also spoke of the list of honorary officers. At that time it had been decided to abolish the old honorary lieutenants and sub-lieutenants, and the lecturer was entirely in favour of this; the fewer honorary ranks there were the more seriously would the force be taken as a fighting body. At the same time he suggested that the honorary accountant officers' commissions given to registrars and deputy registrars should be made active, for while they could not, of course, take their place on board ship, their duties in connection with the Royal Naval Reserve were very responsible and active, and deserved full acknowledgment.

In the summer of 1895 the Registrar General of Seamen was asked by the Admiralty whether there were any officers of the Royal Naval Reserve who might be considered for an honour. It was stipulated that they should be officers of the rank of lieutenant on the active list or retired from that rank. Long service in the Royal Naval Reserve, coupled with a distinguished position in the Mercantile Marine, should be particularly considered. Needless to say, there were several very keen officers who satisfied these conditions, but nothing was done in the matter for some time. Mr. Caborne got his C.B. two years later, but it

was only partially for his splendid work in the R.N.R.

In 1895 there was a grave shortage of executive officers in the Royal Navy, partly by reason of the ships built under the Naval Defence Act and partly owing to the rapidly increasing number of destroyers in the fleet. It was therefore decided to transfer 100 young officers from the Mercantile Marine to the Royal Navy in the form of a supplementary list. Immediately the suggestion was published several hundred applications were received, and from these the authorities were able to make a careful and thorough selection, ending in 90 being chosen from the Royal Naval Reserve, two from the Victorian Naval Defence Force, and eight direct from the Mercantile Marine. Of the 90 who came in from the Reserve, 68 had either completed at least twelve months' training in the Royal Navy itself or else were undergoing such training at the time that they put in their application, while 11 others had undergone gunnery and torpedo courses and had been embarked for summer manœuvres. These officers were given the ranks of lieutenant and sub-lieutenant, and full provision was made by Order in Council for their full pay, half pay and retirement. Compared with *Britannia* men they had the advantage of a shilling a day special messing allowance, but were at a very big disadvantage as regards promotion, retirement and pension. Ever since then these Supplementary List officers have been known to the Service generally as the "Hungry Hundred."

A further concession was made in 1895 to keen officers of the R.N.R. who were given permission to undergo a second year's training with the fleet if they so desired it and provided the naval authorities were willing.

In April, 1895, Lieutenant Percy Cullen, R.N.R., was appointed Commander in Charge of the Naval Gunboat Flotilla of the British Central African Protectorate which was operating on Lake Nyassa. The Protectorate took over three little gunboats from the Royal Navy, the *Pioneer*, *Dove* and *Adventure*, and manned them with R.N.R. officers, who did excellent work both in transport and surveying and also in assisting the troops of the Protectorate against Arab raiders and slave traders on shore.

The principal bone of contention in the 1896 Naval Estimates, as far as the Reserves were concerned, was the matter of Reserve Engineers. The discussion began as soon as the Reserve vote was mentioned, and it was pointed out that the enrolment of 300 engineers was entirely nullified by the "not required to drill" which appeared after the statement. Colonel Denny, whose practical experience in mercantile matters gave him a particular claim to be heard, maintained that an ordinary marine engineer was, in the proper sense of the word, no more fitted to go from a merchant vessel's engine-room into that of a man-of-war and to take charge of the engines than was a bluejacket. It was not only a matter of engineering, but also one of discipline and the command of men. Quite apart from the necessity of training, he did not think that 300 was nearly a large enough number, nor would 400 or even 500 be sufficient. He also pleaded that the reserve of stokers should be at least as large as that of seamen, for it appeared obvious to him that in the event of a war the wastage in a stokehold would be very much more than that on deck.

Sir G. Baden-Powell again raised the question of seeking recruits for

the R.N.R. among yacht hands, and also suggested a modification of the regulations that would permit the admission of men who comprised the crews of the smaller coasters and barges, mostly men of excellent character who, he considered, were magnificent seamen in their way, a way that only wanted adapting to naval requirements. The naval authorities did not agree with this. In connection with the subject of reserve engineers, it may be mentioned that the Institution of Marine Engineers had already issued a very strong representation to the Admiralty on the great desirability of R.N.R. engineers being given a chance of naval training.

A Bill to amend the laws with respect to the Royal Naval Reserves was brought in by Mr. W. E. Macartney, Secretary to the Admiralty, and Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Civil Lord, but its readings had to be postponed time and again on account of the pressure of other business. It was not an important Act, except to the individuals who were directly concerned, but it put the Pacific men already mentioned into a proper position, with the proviso that no Reservist could be enlisted or paid outside the British Islands unless he was a British subject serving in a vessel registered in the British Isles. It was suggested that a clause should be inserted in the Bill which would prevent the enlistment of Lascars, but it was decided that this was not necessary, as the Admiralty already had full powers to refuse entry to Asiatics and to anybody whom they did not consider desirable. The suggestion was therefore dropped.

The necessity of increasing the establishment in 1896 also caused considerable alterations in the regulations for entry and promotion. The age of first appointment was reduced, and under the new scale lieutenants and engineers were to be not above 35 years, sub-lieutenants and assistant engineers not above 30, and senior engineers not above 35, while the age of entry for midshipmen remained at between 16 and 18. In certain circumstances lieutenants and sub-lieutenants might be appointed direct from the Mercantile Marine, but it was laid down as a rule that wherever possible the lists of those ranks were to be maintained by the promotion of juniors. Exceptionally desirable candidates might be appointed as midshipmen up to the age of 19. At the same time it was provided that the retired rank of commander could be conferred on lieutenants of at least ten years' seniority who had performed good service while on the active list, and in very exceptional circumstances on lieutenants of under ten years' seniority. The granting of commissions as honorary paymasters or honorary assistant paymasters to officers of the Mercantile Marine offices was slightly facilitated, and the age of compulsory retirement was fixed at 45 for lieutenants and at 40 for sub-lieutenants, the age for midshipmen being 25, as before.

Even the Chambers of Commerce of the United Kingdom interested themselves in the Royal Naval Reserve, and in the latter part of 1896 they presented an influential memorial to the Premier, Lord Salisbury, urging on him the necessity of immediately dealing with the very serious question of providing an adequate Royal Naval Reserve, as they considered that even the improvements that had been made were quite inadequate.

In the late 'nineties the batteries certainly had been very considerably improved. To take that at Gourock, as an example, it mounted a modern 6-inch breech loader, a 5-inch breech loader that was not

by any means modern, and several Nordenfeldts. No firing could be carried out as it could from many batteries on the coast, but the men turned up in full uniform and were kept on naval routine while they were on duty in the battery. The firing practice was done from the torpedo gunboat *Leda*, and all ratings received the basis of a training as gunlayers. They learned to handle the guns without firing them (and unfortunately this was before the days of the spotters) and got their full quota of rifle and pistol practice, cutlass drill, skirmishing, and a good sound knowledge of the rocket apparatus. All hands had to find their lodgings ashore, the Greenock men being expected to turn up at nine in the morning, and those from Glasgow at ten. The drills ended at about a quarter to four, which gave the Glasgow men time to catch a convenient train back home. They were granted half fares, and were expected to provide their own food, a stand-easy of 75 minutes being allowed them in the middle of the day to get their dinner and to have a smoke. The instructors ranged from leading seamen to chief petty officers and naval lieutenants, and after a very short spell of work in the battery they generally appear to have fitted themselves in with the needs of the force, and to have made themselves very popular. The men were as keen as mustard to learn, and at that time their one grievance was that the advantage of advancement to the first-class was so small that they had very little incentive to improve themselves.

When these men went afloat in H.M. ships the routine depended considerably on the commanding officer. Sometimes the Reservists were messed apart from the naval men, but other commanders believed in mixing them. The latter system appears to have been the best from every point of view, and was very much preferred by the men as being cheaper and far more comfortable, for they came on board the ships almost as ignorant of naval routine as landsmen, and the bluejackets were able and willing to show them how to make themselves at home. From the point of view of the Force it was much preferable, for one of the principal purposes of training afloat was to teach the men to fit in with their naval messmates, and little enough could be done in this direction if they were messed apart. They were invariably mixed with the regular seamen for divisions, and carried out the same work with the ship's company, with special instructions for two hours in the forenoon and another two hours in the afternoon.

The officers of the Supplementary List were not long in proving their value to the country, for at the beginning of 1896 the Kaiser's famous telegram to President Kruger caused the Special Flying Squadron to be hurriedly commissioned, although only a short time before there had been insufficient officers and ratings to get these ships to sea. The Supplementary List enabled the ships to be commissioned at once, with an effect on the history of Europe that is well known.

The manœuvres of the Reserve Fleet in 1896 entailed the calling out of a large number of coastguards and Reserve men, and showed that there were a good many weaknesses in the system. The report of H.M.S. *Sans Pareil*, which carried 47 R.N.R. ratings out of a crew of 580, drew attention to the fact that they came on board with a most inadequate kit, the great majority of the ratings possessing only the clothes in which they stood. This rendered them useless for coaling, which in those days

was one of the great problems of the Navy, and almost useless in bad weather, as they had no change of clothing if they got wet. They were given their chance to show their prowess at target practice, and their gunlaying had to be admitted as bad, but as other numbers in the gun's crew they were far more satisfactory. The old complaint that Royal Naval Reservists had little or no chance of learning to heave the lead properly, a very important section of a man-of-warsman's duties which did not fall to many men in the Merchant Service, was once again insisted upon, but it was hoped that the provision of seagoing tenders would put this matter right.

A well-known officer in the coastguard service, recently deceased, used to tell a story of the days when he was afloat in one of the old battleships for these manœuvres. A Royal Naval Reservist turned up with the rank of able seaman, but a job that he was called upon to do showed that he had not the faintest conception of the duties of his rating, and that he had obviously not been to sea for the period that was necessary to qualify. The commander called him up and questioned him, whereupon the man finally confessed that it was really his father who was the Naval Reservist. However, the uniform fitted them both, and as the little barber's shop in which they had invested their savings prevented their both being away on holiday at the same time, they had hit upon the idea of taking alternate years at sea with the R.N.R. "And that," concluded the officer, "was the way we got the only really satisfactory ship's barber that I ever knew in one of the old coastguard ships."

Further improvement in the possible value of the subsidised merchant cruisers was effected in 1896, when the last of the muzzle-loading guns, which had been kept in reserve for them—a large number of 7-in. pieces—were scrapped in favour of breech loaders, and at the same time the old Nordenfeldts were reinforced and in some cases replaced by Maxim guns. There was by then ample reserve of these guns. The details of the payments made for subsidised merchant cruisers in this year were as follows:—Cunard, *Campania* and *Lucania*, £7500 each; White Star, *Teutonic*, £7285, and *Majestic*, £7396; P. & O., *Himalaya* and *Australia*, £3375 each; *Victoria* and *Arcadia*, £2438 each. The three Canadian Pacific liners that had been put on the Pacific run between Vancouver and Hongkong, the *Empress of China*, *Empress of India* and *Empress of Japan*, were held for £2437 each. In addition, but without further payment, the Cunard held for the Admiralty the *Etruria*, *Umbria* and *Aurania*; the White Star held the *Britannic*, *Germanic* and *Adriatic;* and the P. and O. the *Britannia*, *Oceana*, *Peninsular*, *Oriental*, *Valetta*, *Massilia*, *Rome*, *Carthage*, *Ballarat* and *Paramatta*.

When Vice-Admiral Domvile succeeded to the position of Admiral-Superintendent of the Naval Reserves in May, 1897, there was a change in the usual procedure, and he was promoted three months before he accepted the office, the usual thing being to appoint a man who would get his step to Vice-Admiral after he had been in office about a year. Admiral Domvile had got his opportunity in China, and made the most of it in a number of engagements with Chinese pirates, in which he did remarkably well. When the first Boer War broke out in 1881, he was in command of the screw corvette *Dido*, landed a naval brigade, and proceeded to the front to take command himself, although

most of the fighting was over before he arrived. From 1886 to 1890 he was in command of the gunnery school ship *Excellent*, in succession to "Jacky" Fisher, and when he had completed his term of command he became Vice-President of the Ordnance Committee. After his promotion to Rear-Admiral he was Director of Naval Ordnance and Torpedoes, and then had a short spell in the Mediterranean Fleet, so that he came to the Naval Reserves with a very sound knowledge of gunnery work and gunnery training, and did his best to help the R.N.R. in these important particulars. He was essentially a sound man.

As a great concession the Admiralty in 1897 allowed engineer officers of the Royal Naval Reserve to acquire some knowledge of the working of the engines and boilers in use in H.M. ships by allowing a limited number to undergo a course of instruction at the home ports. Opportunities were given them to study the construction and repair of machinery at the dockyards, and to be present at the trial of torpedo boats, destroyers and other men-of-war. A course of instruction was scheduled to last three months, during which time the officers were on the same rates as they would have been had they been called up for service in the Navy, and they also received lodging and provision allowances. What they wanted, however, was to get to sea in H.M. ships in order to receive practical instruction in their running and organisation, but this was not to come yet. Although the dockyard course was not what they wanted, the engineer officers were keen enough to come forward, and out of the 139 invitations sent to R.N.R. engineer officers all over the world 24 applications were received in a week, and in less than a month 39 had volunteered for the course, although it had only been intended to permit 18 officers to take it each year.

In the First Lord's statement which introduced the 1897 Naval Estimates it was announced that an entirely new system would be adopted for the entry and training of seamen in the Royal Naval Reserve, with the idea of getting the utmost efficiency out of the Force. For some time it had been suggested that the nominal first-class Reserve was in reality the least satisfactory, for practically all its members were engaged on long voyages and it would be exceedingly difficult to collect them hurriedly in the event of war. On the other hand the second-class reserve, who were not treated nearly so well with regard to pay, &c., were all about the coast and had shown themselves exceedingly keen on their naval duties. Therefore it was planned that instead of the first and second-class reservists two new classes would be constituted, the first to be known as "qualified seamen" and the second to be termed "seamen," men already in the old classes being entitled to remain in them and retain the same emoluments, though no more enrolments should be granted or promotions registered. Under this scheme the only men able to enter the Reserve directly as qualified seamen would be men who had been discharged from the Royal Navy after completing their first continuous service engagements; all others would be rated as seamen. They would be entered under the same conditions as to age and service, and with the same rate of pay and allowances, as the old second-class men, but they were to be called upon within their first term of enrolments to undergo a period of six months training in the Royal Navy and if they failed to carry out this

training they would not be retained in the Reserve. Upon its completion they would be advanced to the rating of qualified seamen under definite conditions of character, health and capacity. They would receive the same pay and allowances as the existing first-class Reserve, and such of them as chose to complete a subsequent period of six months' training in a man-of-war or two three-months' periods would be entitled to receive a pension of £12 a year at the age of sixty. Men over thirty-five years of age would only be accepted for the second or third period of training in exceptional circumstances. Men becoming qualified seamen from the Royal Navy would be eligible for their pension of £12 a year at sixty, without any further training.

In order to encourage men in the existing first-class Naval Reserve to undertake the naval training they were to be granted a gratuity of ten shillings a month for the time they were embarked, and this was to be paid to them as soon as they completed their course. Second-class men could be promoted to the new "qualified seaman" class in exactly the same manner and subject to the same conditions as the men in the new "seamen" class, and those who had already served six months in the Navy were to be promoted immediately. At the same time it was planned to increase the establishment to 22,000 seamen, 3000 firemen and 300 boys. The excellent reports which the Reservists had obtained both at manœuvres and during six months' training were very largely responsible for these changes. The regular service no longer laughed at the Reserve.

It will be noted that each year the Naval Estimates produced a longer debate on the Reserve vote, and if the debate tended towards somewhat severe criticism of the Government, it at least showed a healthy interest in the Reserve. In 1897 the vote was for just under a quarter of a million pounds, and immediately members of the Committee of Supply criticised the batteries. Admittedly the Government was giving them quick-firing guns instead of the old muzzle loaders, but they were not of the newest pattern and several members did not consider that they were adequate. The Government answered this by pointing out that in the event of war the newest ships would not be manned by Reservists, but by those who had been in the fleet for some years, and such ships would mount the older type of breech-loading and quick-firing gun rather than the up-to-date weapons which had caught the fancy of members.

Mr. (afterwards Sir William) Allan, M.P. for Gateshead, with a fund of practical experience behind him, argued that the Estimates should be half a million instead of a quarter, and that the number of reserve engineer officers should be 3000 instead of 300. He suggested that a torpedo-boat drawn from the reserves which were to be found in every naval base should be stationed in every seaport so that officers and men would have a real incitement to join the Reserve. The Admiralty's reply to this was that they had not the least intention of manning destroyers or even torpedo boats with Reservists and that they could not consider this suggestion. In this debate also the suggestion to form a Canadian Naval Reserve from the fishermen of the Grand Banks was made for the first time, but it was many years before it was acted upon. The Admiralty replied that the proposal opened up large Imperial questions which had yet to be considered.

So popular had the Reserve become in 1897 that it was in excess of

the number voted, while at the same time there was a gratifying increase in the enthusiasm which Irishmen were exhibiting in the Force. Accordingly it became necessary for the Admiralty to issue orders that the enrolling officers were to fill only every second vacancy occurring in the Royal Naval Reserve at Wexford, Galway, Limerick, Kinsale and Youghal. These orders were regarded by some as being another injustice to Ireland, but others saw in them a symptom of a very healthy tendency.

After a good deal of hedging, 647 seamen and 125 firemen of the Royal Naval Reserve were embarked for service during the 1897 Naval Review and the subsequent cruise. They were distributed among 45 different men-of-war, and, generally speaking, they were—especially the firemen—excellently reported upon by their commanding officers. Naturally enough, this was a great triumph for the people who had been arguing, in and out of season, for better opportunities for Reserve firemen. The conditions in which the men served were precisely the same as those of the previous manœuvres. The majority of the seamen were embarked in the ships of the coastguard fleet — the *Alexandra*, *Benbow*, *Edinburgh*, *Colossus*, *Australia*, *Galatea*, *Mersey*, *Collingwood*, *Melampus*, *Howe*, *Thunderer*, *Sans Pareil*, *Devastation* and *Inflexible*—which otherwise would have been hard pressed to find men, but in addition to this a few Reservists were sent to Chatham depot, which was always short of men on mobilisation, to be distributed among the ships in that area. All firemen were sent to Chatham. Opportunity was taken of this review and the time the men were on board to call for a special report on the ability and usefulness of each man.

The experiment of commissioning the *Medea* and *Medusa* as R.N.R. training ships had been so successful that it was decided to replace the old *President* in the West India Dock by the cruiser *Apollo*, which had been built under the Naval Defence Act. She was a ship of 3400 tons, built in 1891, capable of a speed of rather more than 19 knots, and armed with modern 6-in. and 4.7-in. quickfirers. Unfortunately, questions of draught and distance prevented this plan being carried into effect at that time. To a certain extent the torpedo gunboat *Gleaner*, working from Gravesend, supplied the deficiency. At the same time, it was announced that all except the smallest batteries had by then been given breech-loading and quick-firing guns, and that they were being supplied with modern Lee-Metford rifles, so that the musketry as well as the gunnery of the Reservists might be of practical use to the Service.

In 1897 the Navy League was attacking the authorities strongly for their neglect of the Royal Naval Reserve, and working from official returns it was shown that in London, although the men were keen enough, it was not possible to fire a single gun, and that rifle practice could only be carried out one day a week on the Plumstead Ranges. In Bristol the men were similarly handicapped, while at Leith the only gun to be fired was a little 7-pounder muzzle-loader, a useless popgun that was then rapidly disappearing from the fleet. At Aberdeen four smooth-bore 32-pounders were still being used.

It was then again suggested that the Royal Naval Reserve had an ideal field of recruiting in the lightermen and watermen of the River Thames, but it was pointed out that there were only about 5000 registered lightermen and appren-

tices, and that their ages varied from 16 to 80 years, so that the number within the limits acceptable to the R.N.R. would not be very large. These men were not required to have, and very few, indeed, had, any seafaring training before they were registered as watermen and lightermen, and their employment on the Thames certainly did not give them any seafaring experience that would be of the least use to the Reserve. It is true that a large number of men had held a meeting at Rotherhithe in the summer of 1896, and offered their services as volunteers for the defence of the Port of London should the Government extend to them the same privileges as the R.N.R. men who were regular seamen. However, the authorities did not see their way to fall in with these suggestions.

At the outbreak of the Spanish-American War both Spain and certain agents of the United States—or gentlemen who represented themselves to be such—attempted to persuade a number of R.N.R. men to accept an engagement in one or other of the two Navies. It was immediately pointed out that this engagement would be a violation of the proclamation of neutrality that had been published at the beginning of the war. Enlistment would render men so engaging themselves liable to all the penalties of the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870, and, in addition, to instant dismissal from the Royal Naval Reserve. Very special efforts were taken by the authorities to prevent any men shipping as seamen and enlisting while abroad, and it is not believed that many—if any—contrived to elude the precautions taken.

At the end of the 'nineties there was considerable feeling against the system of the Admiralty of subsidising liners. It was maintained that only the best of those on the list could contrive more than about 18 knots, whereas torpedo gunboats were being built by all the European Powers which were capable of high speed and which carried sufficient armament to do damage to a merchant cruiser. The value of coal protection was not yet fully appreciated. At the same time the Spanish-American War, with the use the American Fleet made of its four big auxiliary cruisers, caused something of a revulsion of feeling in favour of the system. It was then suggested in Australia that some of the splendid local steamers owned by the Australasian United, the Union of New Zealand, Huddart Parkers' and other coastal firms should be provided with an armament sufficient to permit them to defend themselves and Australian commerce. The difficulties of the scheme were connected with manning, and to put it into operation the Australians would have had to avail themselves of the services of the British R.N.R.

In 1898 a second supplementary list—including 50 names — was formed of R.N.R. officers to be transferred to the Regular Navy. The original Supplementary officers had been the "Hungry Hundred," and those on the new list became the "Hungry Half-Hundred."

Until 1898 it was the custom for Royal Naval Reserve men to wear jumpers with red strings, while the men in the Royal Navy wore blue strings. This appeared to be a very small matter, but it was realised that it was one of the points that kept the two forces apart, and accordingly in that year the R.N.R. uniform was altered in such a way that it was only in the matter of cap tallies that it differed from the Royal Navy. This had a considerable effect on the esprit de corps of the Reserve.

The old question of seniority came up again in the Spring of 1898 in a new form. A Member of Parliament asked the Admiralty why R.N.R. officers were not allowed the half-stripe granted to senior lieutenants of the Royal Navy. The answer was that the half-stripe could not be granted to them, as it was not given to all lieutenants on the active list, but only to those with eight years' seniority. As lieutenants R.N.R ranked with, but after, all lieutenants of the active list, the half-stripe could not possibly be granted. There the matter ended for a considerable time.

Captain Wilson, of H.M.S. *Anson*, had a very good opportunity of gauging the value of the R.N.R. men under his command, and a letter that he wrote to a personal friend in the summer of 1898 is interesting. "The Reserve men are a force of interest. I like them. Big, strong men, quiet, hardworking, and most anxious to please. I would willingly take fifty of them instead of twenty, but should like to keep them longer. We shall have to part with them just as they are getting useful. I have a very active young boatswain in charge of them and an old chief quartermaster as 'Sea Daddy,' a plan which has answered. The larger ships have so many men that I doubt if they find much work for them, but that is not so here. I don't know what the supply is like, but I shall be glad of as many more as I can get, and so I am sure would many smaller ships."

In the spring of 1898 the Canadian Navy League passed a resolution pointing out that Canadian sailors and fishermen were excellent material and were only too anxious to enlist in the R.N.R., but they were debarred from this by law, unless they were serving in vessels registered in the United Kingdom. Even the ships which ran across the Pacific had to be registered in Britain before their crews were eligible. The League was therefore of the opinion that this law should be amended in order to permit of the enrolment of the available men, especially the fishermen on the Grand Banks, and for this purpose at least two sea-going cruisers of modern type should be available, one of the Atlantic and one of the Pacific side. It was also suggested that the Government of Canada should increase its naval contribution and that the cruisers should be available for training local Canadian naval forces which should be raised under the provisions of the Colonial Defence Act of 1875.

The Admiralty considered this question thoroughly, and in the following December distributed circulars in Newfoundland, inviting the fishermen to enrol in the Royal Naval Reserve. The regulations provided for training service in warships to be performed during the autumn and winter, which would mean the minimum of interference with the regular fishing seasons on the Grand Banks. The question of a Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve came up at home about the same time, when the Premier of Newfoundland visited England.

About this time Canada, New Zealand and Malta all made offers to provide and maintain local Naval Reserves for service in the Fleet if required, but although the Government appreciated the patriotism of the offers they were generally hedged around with conditions which made their value doubtful.

In the Spring of 1899 the managers of the White Star Line suggested to the authorities that the surgeons of the ships which were subventioned as auxiliary cruisers should be given honorary commissions in the Royal Naval Reserve, to be retained only during the period

for which they held the appointment in such ships, but the Admiralty replied that the question had been dealt with in 1888, when their Lordships decided that: "As arrangements had been made for entering surgeons for temporary service when required in an emergency, it was not considered to be necessary to form a Reserve of medical officers for this purpose." The same attitude was maintained when the question was brought up again in 1904.

In 1899 the conditions under which the officers of the Supplementary List had entered the Navy came up for a good deal of discussion. The point was that the only ground on which they could be promoted to the rank of commander was that of gallantry in action, and Sir Edward Clarke criticised this proviso as creating two separate classes of lieutenants in the service, one being able to attain promotion only as a result of gallantry in action, and being passed over from time to time by their juniors simply because they had not had an opportunity of showing that gallantry. He and many others quite failed to see that there was any injustice to those officers already in the Navy by introducing the supplementary officers on equal terms.

In 1899 the Admiralty gave notice to terminate the agreement with the Cunard, White Star and P. and O. Lines, in order to be in a position to review both the conditions of the contract and the selection of the vessels to be subsidised. But they made it very plain that they had not the least intention of abandoning the scheme of subsidising likely liners. All ships on the list had permanent strengthenings under deck, and platforms on deck for each gun mounting, while the gun mountings were kept complete in the dockyards, but the Admiralty maintained that it was not desirable to publish any further details with regard to the armament. At the same time there was a good deal of criticism regarding the list, several members objecting that some of the liners retained ought not to be included, and that it would be quite easy to take a first-class modern ship across the Pacific from China or Japan to Western Canada. Sir J. Colomb, member for Great Yarmouth, maintained that in selecting the liners for this subvention scheme far too much attention had been paid to coal capacity and far too little to speed; in his opinion, the huge chain of coaling stations all round the world made the former feature of comparatively little importance. This view, however, was not universally held; in fact, the matter of the armament and speed of auxiliary cruisers was the subject of infinite discussion and uncertainty until practical war experience came in 1914.

In view of the serious reduction in the numbers of British seamen, the Mercantile Marine Fund came into operation on Apr. 1, 1899, its principal purpose being to establish a practical scheme for the sending of good lads to sea, by granting a rebate in light dues to companies whose ships carried apprentices. At first there was some slight hesitancy among shipowners, but they soon came forward, and before the scheme had been in operation for six months 44 shipowning firms had enrolled boys as probationers in the Royal Naval Reserve, the number of boys then being 184.

The exceedingly satisfactory strength of the Royal Naval Reserve was shown by an official return which gave the numbers borne on December 31, 1899, as compared with the numbers voted. Qualified seamen and first-class seamen under

the old system stood at 10,836 borne against 11,000 voted; seamen and second-class seamen under the old system at 11,696 borne, against 11,000 voted; boys at 303 borne, against 300 voted; firemen at 3306 borne, against 3500 voted; a total of 26,141 borne, against 25,800 voted.

The 1899 estimates proposed an increase of a thousand seamen. In addition to serving in a coastguard ship men were sent to the Channel, Mediterranean and North American stations, all of which reported well of them, but the question of uniform again cropped up, and it was decided finally to increase the allowance for clothing in order to enable the men to keep up a smarter appearance and to encourage them to take a pride in themselves. At the same time it was decided to stop the entry of boys in the Reserve.

The old trouble about the arming of the R.N.R. batteries and drill ships was still evident in the discussion on the 1899 estimates. Lord Charles Beresford pointed out to the House that the modern quick-firing guns to which the Admiralty had referred with considerable pride were only 6-pounders, and that although 5 and 6-in. guns were mounted in some of the batteries they were not quickfirers. Seven of the batteries had nothing better than muzzle loaders, and two had no range, with the result that they were unable to get any firing practice. Admiral Field mentioned that he had recently been on board one of the R.N.R. drill ships and found that she had been provided with a 6-in. gun, but that it was dismounted on deck. He asked why it had not been mounted, and was told that it would cost £150. Both officers were assured by the Admiralty, however, that a genuine effort was being made to supply the batteries with modern quick-firing guns of greater calibre, and that this was being done as soon as the armament makers could supply the guns necessary both for the batteries and the Fleet.

In the same debate there was a very strong move towards economy, and naturally the question of the Reserves came up again prominently. It was pointed out by Sir E. Gourley, the member for Sunderland, that in ten years the permanent strength of the Navy had been increased by something like 40,000 men, but that in that time the Reserve had been increased by only 7000. Yet more men were wanted, and it appeared obvious that at least a large proportion of these men would have to come from the Reserve. He saw no reason why seventy or eighty thousand men could not be drawn from the mercantile and fishing population, provided they were given sufficient inducement. One of their grievances was that they had to wait until the age of sixty for their pension, whereas the naval men had it at fifty-five. His scheme for increasing the Reserve to such huge proportions, however, did not receive any very general approval, either in or out of the House.

It is to Bristol that belongs the honour of enlisting the first Royal Naval Reserve rating, but the old training hulk *Daedalus* was still doing duty in 1899, and there were many complaints that she was grossly inadequate for the purpose. Accordingly, the torpedo gunboat *Antelope* was commissioned in May, 1899, with her headquarters at Portishead, for the purpose of training officers and men of the Royal Naval Reserve.

Chapter VII. The Twentieth Century.

THE twentieth century began with the Royal Naval Reserve properly organised, though not altogether free from the faults that had impaired its efficiency from the very beginning. The Navy was still being increased and the German menace was becoming conspicuous. The next few years showed a steady improvement in efficiency and in the status of the Force. During the 14 years preceding the outbreak of war the history of the Reserve is very largely a matter of minor improvements, new sections, and a general tightening-up that led to the magnificent record of the Force during the war.

It is curious to note how the authorities in 1900 pointed out that they were relying more and more upon the fishermen for the Royal Naval Reserve, for these men were always within reach, and they had proved themselves even more amenable to discipline and keener on their duties than had the deep-sea sailormen. Yet in the early days of the Reserve these men were excluded altogether, as it was maintained by the powers that they were incapable of being taught their naval duties. During the discussion on the 1900 Naval Estimates Sir Samuel Hoare raised the question as to whether more use could not be made of the fishing population, for, in his opinion, the longshore fishermen were being absolutely wasted, and could be made quite as useful as the men who worked on the Dogger and at longer distances. He suggested that they could also be employed in the place of the coastguards, who would be called out for active service, but no action was taken.

A definite move towards the foundation of a Royal Naval Reserve in Newfoundland was made in 1900, and as an experiment an initial contingent of 50 young fishermen was enrolled and went through six months' cruise in H.M.S. *Charybdis* in the West Indies. This experiment appeared to be a full success, and 40 out of the 50 were advanced to the rating of qualified seamen at the end of their cruise. It was therefore decided to send H.M.S. *Calypso* to St. John's to be permanently stationed there as a training ship for the Newfoundland R.N.R., and special arrangements were to be made to let the fishermen get their four weeks' training in the winter, the Newfoundland Government carrying out such alterations as were necessary, but the question of paying for them later became a thorny one. The *Calypso* was fitted out at Devonport to accommodate 300 men, and, with her engines removed, she was to be moored at Marquise in Placentia Bay, a big open space opposite her berth being taken as a drill ground. Unfortunately, there were very considerable delays in her fitting out, and 200 men who had enlisted in anticipation of her early arrival were disappointed.

Further trouble was caused by the sudden announcement that as the question of maintenance had not been fully thrashed out beforehand the Colonies should bear the whole cost of the Reserve, and not the

Imperial Government. It was pointed out that Australia paid her own Reservists and also contributed towards the cost of maintaining the Imperial Squadron in Australian waters, and it was suggested that Newfoundland should do the same. At that time the Duke of York, now King George V., was visiting Newfoundland, and he immediately caused inquiries to be made with the idea of getting the matter hastened. As a result another 50 men were embarked in the *Charybdis*, and things began to move. Unfortunately, they moved but slowly, but in the late summer of 1903 it was announced that the strength at that date was 46 men from the 1900 contingent, 45 from the 1901, 76 from 1902, and well over 100 from the few weeks that had elapsed after the *Charybdis* returned north from her cruise.

In March, 1900, the Naval Reserve (Mobilisation) Bill was presented to Parliament to amend the Royal Naval Reserve Act of 1859 in relation to the calling out of volunteers for actual service. Under the old Act the right of calling out the Royal Naval Reserve was vested in the Sovereign, but before this right might be exercised the occasion had to be communicated to Parliament if it were sitting, or to be declared in Council if Parliament were not sitting. The purpose of the new Bill was not to delegate this power to the Admiralty in the same way as the right to call out the Army Reserve had been delegated to the War Office in 1882, but to give the Admiralty the power, once the Sovereign had issued the edict that the Naval Reserve should be called out, of calling up such numbers as it considered necessary for the purposes of the moment, and so avoiding a general dislocation of trade. There was a good deal of discussion and opposition over what appeared to be a very simple Bill, but eventually it passed both Houses and received the Royal Assent.

The Naval Reserve Bill of 1900 might more aptly be described as the Fleet Reserve Bill, for its object was to attract to a new Reserve men of twelve years' service who hitherto had not been induced to join the R.N.R. in spite of all the plans put forward by enthusiasts. It also provided for a reorganisation of the existing Seamen Pensioner Reserve. The new Force was to be entirely apart from the Royal Naval Reserve, the retainer was to be 6d. per day, and it was hoped to get 15,000 men by this means. It also provided for an original enlistment of five years, with re-enlistment in five-year terms. There was a certain amount of Parliamentary dissatisfaction at the numbers to be raised being left indefinite, but there was no real opposition, and the Bill passed.

In the discussion on the 1900 Naval Estimates Mr. J. Havelock Wilson, the seamen's leader, put forward a suggestion for a volunteer reserve of time-expired reservists. He pointed out that many seamen left the R.N.R. after doing five or ten years service, and he believed that such men would be quite willing to join a secondary Volunteer Reserve to be employed on coast defence duty only in time of war. The Admiralty did not take any action on the scheme, possibly because the authorities were convinced that in time of war there would be no difficulty in finding innumerable volunteers from time-expired R.N.R. men, not only for coast defence duty, but for any work on which the Admiralty thought fit to send them. If this was their opinion it was certainly more than justified during the late war.

Rear-Admiral Sir Gerard H. Noel succeeded to the post of Admiral Superintendent of Naval Reserves in May, 1900, after having done very well in the Ashantee War and having won the Gold Medal of the Royal United Service Institute for the essay on naval tactics which was afterwards published and very widely read under the title of "Gun, Ram, and Torpedo." As a captain he was Director of Naval Intelligence and Junior Naval Lord, while his service as A.D.C. to Queen Victoria gave him very considerable prestige when he was appointed A.S.R. In 1902 he also had command of the Home Fleet, and when he had vacated the office of Admiral Superintendent of Reserves he became a member of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the supply of food and raw materials in war time, a position in which he found that his experience of mercantile matters gained as A.S.R. was exceedingly useful.

In May, 1900, my Lords of the Admiralty decided that the position given to Registrars in the Royal Naval Reserve was not commensurate with the services that they performed to the force, and also that the granting of honorary rank was very apt to convey a wrong impression. Accordingly it was decided that the regulations should be amended, and that the Registrars ashore should be granted R.N.R. rank in the Accountant Branch. Commissions as Staff Paymasters were to be granted to Paymasters, R.N.R., of not less than 30 years of age, who were stationed at the chief ports of the United Kingdom and who had served at least ten years as Registrars or Assistant Registrars. Commissions as Paymaster were to be granted to Registrars and Assistant Registrars of not less than 30 years of age who had ten years' combined service as Registrar, Assistant Registrar and Deputy Registrar, and to Assistant Paymasters, R.N.R., who were considered to be especially deserving of advancement, providing that they had served as Registrar or Assistant Registrar, or had attained 12 years seniority as Assistant Paymasters. It was also provided that commissions as Assistant Paymasters could be granted to Registrars, Assistant Registrars and Deputy Registrars of not less than 25 years of age, who had five years' service as such.

When an officer resigned his position as Registrar he was automatically placed on the retired list of the Royal Naval Reserve, and Honorary Paymasters and Assistant Paymasters were automatically transferred to the regular list. It was acknowledged that these gentlemen had done very valuable service to the Reserve, and that they certainly deserved the acknowledgment, but at the same time it was regarded as a drawback that the effect of the new regime was to reduce the establishment for general service men.

In 1901 the arrangements for embarking R.N.R. ratings on their six months' training were perfected and the ships which were to be available for the service were enumerated. The Coastguard Fleet and the numbers of men allowed for each, were as follow: *Galatea* (50), *Severn* (34), *Australia* (50), *Revenge* (80), *Resolution* (100), *Benbow* (70), *Anson* (60), *Melampus* (20), *Collingwood* (60), and *Camperdown* (70), while, if required after the coastguard ships had been filled up, there was the *Empress of India* (50). Arrangements were made by which the surplus from some districts could be sent to others. The *Collingwood* and *Melampus* received all the men from Ireland up to their complement, but if there were some further volunteers

they were to be sent to the *Empress of India* at Queenstown. Not more than 150 men were to be taken from the Stornoway district, and these men were to be divided between the *Benbow* and *Camperdown*. The *Benbow* was to receive her men in the Clyde, where she was guardship, but the *Camperdown* was to proceed to Stornoway at the end of each quarter to exchange Reservists. In March the ships met for the spring cruise, which lasted three weeks, in July for manœuvres, and in October for the autumn cruise. This permitted a number of Reservists to get extra training, although, of course, the ships were mostly run for the benefit of the Coastguards.

In 1902 Sir William Laird Clowes, the naval historian, published a biting criticism of the manner in which the Naval Reserve men were trained in the *President*, which was still in position in the West India Docks. Of course, no firing could be carried out there, but measures had been taken in this matter for some years. At the same time the men were trained to handle the guns, and the battery was miscellaneous. There was a three-pounder Hotchkiss quick-firer of reasonably modern type on the upper deck, with a four-barrelled Nordenfeldt of 1-in. calibre, which had been obsolete in the Navy for years, a 4-in. breech-loader of an old type, and a still older 5-in. On the gun deck there were four 7-in. muzzle-loaders, which had long disappeared from everything except the most antique ships in the fleet. In a drill shed adjoining there was a 6-in. breech-loader of very old pattern, and a nine-pounder muzzle-loading field gun. The *President* was criticised in other directions as well, one of the allegations being that it was not difficult to bribe the petty officer instructors for good reports. The story is told that the captain of the ship, a particularly keen R.N. officer, was, at a dinner, seated next to a cheery young R.N.R. sub-lieutenant, who, without the haziest idea of his neighbour's identity, proceeded to entertain the company with a diverting account of just how they worked things in the *President*. Many reforms dated from that dinner-party.

The rank of honorary paymaster, R.N.R., had been established for many years, and latterly registrars had been put on the Active List, but it was decided in March, 1902, that it was very necessary to have a reliable reserve of accountant officers, and regulations were therefore drawn up which permitted the entry of a limited number of temporary assistant paymasters, between 20 and 30 years of age, who in civil life were clerks in banks and other big business firms. In time of peace these temporary assistant paymasters were to undergo a course of training for a minimum period of fourteen days and a maximum period of one month in any one year, this training to be carried out in the naval depôts or on board port-guard or coastguard ships. While they were in training they were to receive 5s. a day pay, with victualling and quarters, or allowances totalling 5s. in lieu. In time of war they would serve in her Majesty's Fleet under the regulations tentatively laid down in 1894, and in such circumstances would take priority over any untrained temporary assistant paymasters who were entered for the emergency.

In presenting the Estimates for 1902 the First Lord reviewed the situation concerning the Royal Naval Reserve. As regards commissioned executive officers, the establishment of 1500 was complete, comprising 482 lieutenants, 494 sub-lieutenants and 524 midshipmen. In addition, there were 378 qualified

applicants awaiting admission. The establishment of 400 engineers was also complete—70 senior engineers, 179 engineers and 151 assistant engineers. On the engineer list there were 55 qualified candidates awaiting admission. As regards seamen, there had been a gradual falling off since 1901. This was entirely due to the new conditions of enrolment and training which came into force on July 1, 1901, and which were clearing out a certain number of the old men before they gave any sign of the advantages which were confidently hoped of them. The 1901 alteration in the rules of the training of firemen, whereby they need not serve in sea-going ships after their first period of five years, was bearing fruit in a steadily increased number drilling aboard.

In the discussion on the Estimates attention was also drawn to the lamentable shortage in engine-room Reserves. Not only were the Reserves short, but the Royal Navy itself was deficient in stokers, engine-room artificers and engineer officers, while the tests which were imposed on would-be volunteers were far more in the nature of gauge-making than engineering and turned down a large number of promising youngsters. At the same time, there was a big percentage of desertion among stokers, partly because they were bitterly disappointed at not being put directly under the engineer officers.

In this same debate Sir John Colomb, the Member for Great Yarmouth, moved to reduce the vote for the subvention of various merchant cruisers. £63,000 was the sum down for this purpose, and he maintained that this was simply so much money wasted. Mr. Arnold-Forster replied, and told the House that the Admiralty had not the least intention of giving up its principle of subsidising the crack liners in the country for service as cruisers when desired; that the cost was only about 1 per cent. of the cost of keeping up a single first-class cruiser; and that, although it was natural that some of the subsidised cruisers which normally ran on the New York service would show a considerable decrease in speed when put on to the South African run for transport work, he could not agree that this meant that they would be useless as cruisers. In any circumstances it was worth noting that the German Navy was following the British lead in this matter very closely. Mr. Gibson Bowles could generally be trusted in these debates to bring out some startling suggestion, and in this case he solemnly proposed that the proper way for the Admiralty to make use of the merchant service and of its men was to re-introduce privateering and to grant commissions for the destruction of enemy commerce to likely ships and their crews. The motion to withdraw the subsidy of £31,000 paid to the White Star Line was negatived.

When Pierpont Morgan formed his famous International Mercantile Marine combination, and began by purchasing the White Star Line, there was naturally a good deal of questioning as to what the position of these ships would be with regard to their subvention, and whether the White Star had any right to sell. It will be remembered that a somewhat similar question was raised when it was discovered that the shares in the Inman Line, whose crack ships were subventioned by the Admiralty as cruisers, were almost entirely in the hands of Americans. In the case of the White Star Line, although the agreement with the Admiralty prohibited the company from selling its steamers without the permission of the authorities, there was nothing to prohibit a sale of its

shares, which was what had happened. Therefore, the auxiliary cruiser agreement with the Admiralty still held good, although the authorities had taken precautions to insure that none of the steamers passed away from the British flag and that nothing was done by the combine which was detrimental to the interests of the Navy.

In July, 1902, when the House of Commons was kept tolerably busy answering questions on the transport of troops during the South African War, a question was raised by several members who had shown particular interest in the Mercantile Marine as to whether a war medal for the South African War would be granted to the officers and ratings of the Mercantile Marine who had been employed by the Transport Department, and whether, if this award was considered, the authorities would not drop the precedent set in the Egyptian War of 1882, when only the masters of the transports were decorated, and extend the award to all officers and men who were concerned in the transport of troops. The authorities very properly took the view that this would be cheapening the decoration for those who had gone through the campaign afloat, but the discussion led to the establishment of a special transport medal later on.

In 1902 a new committee was formed to inquire into the Royal Naval Reserve and kindred matters, the terms of reference being comprehensive. The committee was to inquire how far the present system in force for the provision of reserves was satisfactory or capable of extensions as to officers of all branches, seamen, stokers, marines, sick board staff, and other ratings; how far a naval volunteer movement, as apart from the professional seamen, might be used to contribute towards the manning required for the war fleet; to report to what extent and in what manner Colonial naval reserves might contribute towards the manning requirements of the war fleet, bearing in mind that on the outbreak of war the men in reserve would be in the Colonies, and that, as matters were then arranged, the ships in reserve which they would have to man would, with some few exceptions, all be in home ports; and to give their opinion as to the training required from the reserves of various classes, under what conditions it should be given, what staff of instructors and equipment should be provided, and how the cost should be borne. Such terms of reference gave a very wide scope to the inquiry and produced the following year a most interesting report.

At the outset the report showed how serious was the situation. In 1859 the Royal Commissioners who laid the foundation of the Royal Naval Reserve demanded a total efficient reserve of 38,000 men, while the personnel of the Regular Navy consisted of 73,104. The committee found that, at the time of this inquiry, the actual service personnel was 122,500 and rapidly increasing, while in Reserve there were 4200 men in the coastguard, 12,500 pensioners, 2650 men in all branches of the Royal Fleet Reserve, 3900 R.N.R. firemen and 20,400 R.N.R. seamen, of whom rather more than half had been fully trained. This meant a total reserve of 34,000 men, and the efficiency of some of the pensioners was open to doubt owing to their age. It was obviously a very serious situation, and one to be rectified. How to rectify it was not an easy question, for since 1859 the requirements of the Navy had outgrown the power of the Mercantile Marine to supply them. The former had increased, while the number of British seamen

employed in the latter had decreased, so that in 1901 it was anticipated that there were only 44,290 petty officers and sailors serving in British ships who were British subjects (and not Lascars), with 23,500 firemen. On the other hand, the old idea of supplying a steady stream of boys through training ships not yet in existence, while obviously desirable, was made impracticable by the cost. At the same time the Committee considered that the Admiralty should give all private training-ship schemes every encouragement.

The Committee considered that mercantile officers should not be accepted for the R.N.R. without a special recommendation of their fitness from the Marine Superintendent or Superintending Engineer of the company with which they were serving, as it was still felt that commissions had been granted to certain officers who were not quite suitable for their position. It was also suggested that the honorary commissions granted to the marine superintendents of the chief lines should be continued, if only as a mark of appreciation for the help that they were able to give to the R.N.R., help which most of them gave very willingly. The Committee did not consider that the establishment at that date—480 lieutenants, 500 sub-lieutenants and 520 midshipmen—was sufficient, but at the same time insisted on the paramount importance of selecting the right men for commissioned rank. It was strongly urged that the rank of commander should be established in order to give greater encouragement, and, with the same end in view, it was maintained that a lieutenant R.N.R. should be appointed Executive Officer of the drill ships in London, Liverpool and Bristol.

Attention was also called to the fact that very frequently good service in the Navy actually retarded promotion in the Royal Naval Reserve, and the committee recommended very strongly that this state of affairs should be rendered impossible. They further suggested that various proposals that had been put forward for improving the training of Royal Naval Reserve officers should be carefully considered by the Admiralty, as the evidence of many witnesses showed that the course of training needed much revision with a view to making it more useful and interesting. They suggested that the active rank of Chief Engineer R.N.R. should be instituted and conferred at the discretion of the Admiralty on a limited number of R.N.R. engineer officers who were in charge of the engines of the more important liners. The intention of this suggestion was to employ them in that rank should these ships be taken up by the Admiralty in time of war. They also suggested the improvement of the terms of promotion and retirement, and again insisted on the necessity of better training facilities.

Another recommendation of the R.N.R. committee caused a good deal of interest. In view of the proposals to increase the Royal Naval Reserve and to establish the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, and in view of the fact that the Home Fleet was then very much more at sea than formerly, the committee considered it to be desirable that an officer of flag rank should be constantly employed under the Admiral Superintendent of Naval Reserves, and that he should be responsible to him for the efficiency of the Reserve Forces. This suggestion was not immediately accepted, but it led to some interesting changes in the regulations.

Very delicate ground on which the committee had to work was the question of coloured firemen. They heard numerous arguments for and against the employment of Lascars and Kroomen as stokers, but considered that the details of any plan for a reserve of coloured stokers should be discussed with the governors and the commanders-in-chief of the various naval stations. The committee considered that these coloured subjects of the King offered a reserve of stokers that should not be neglected, and that even Chinese firemen might be found in Hongkong and Singapore who could be made useful.

While the committee agreed with the urgent necessity of providing an adequate reserve of signalmen, they found themselves unable to provide such a reserve, more particularly because the requisite standard of efficiency necessitated constant practice. A lapse of a year or two was quite sufficient to spoil all the work that was put in, and, with the inducements offered at that time, it was useless to expect men to volunteer the essential work. The committee therefore strongly recommended that further inducements should be offered to men of all ratings to obtain a thorough knowledge of signalling, and to keep this up in peace time. For this reason it was proposed to establish for all men the non-substantive rating of trained signalman, under very similar conditions to the existing rating of trained man, with the exception that requalification would have to be annual. It was suggested, too, that the training of Royal Marine signalmen might be encouraged by an increase in the number of prizes offered. Given all possible assistance from the regular services, it was realised, however, that the Royal Naval Reserve would have to be called upon to provide a number of men in war time.

At the beginning of 1903 it was realised that the Navy was in serious straits for officers, owing to so many torpedo-boat destroyers being added to the Fleet, and, accordingly, it was decided to increase the establishment for commissioned executive officers of the R.N.R. from 1500 to 1550, an increase which, in the opinion of many authorities, was not nearly adequate for the needs of the time. The Admiralty carefully considered these criticisms, and in the following year again increased the number to 1600.

Officers in the R.N.R. had frequently felt the grievance of being off pay between appointments, for the period was frequently so short that they were unable to find a ship, and were therefore very considerably out of pocket. In February, 1903, this matter was rectified, for the Admiralty ordered that where the interval between appointments did not last longer than 42 days the officers were to receive pay and allowances as though they were actually serving, and were to be borne on the books of one of her Majesty's ships accordingly.

In May, 1903, there was an innovation, for the office of Admiral Commanding Coastguards and Reserves was given to a Vice-Admiral, Ernest Rice, on the eve of promotion. Admiral Rice was born in 1840, and had done good work in the Baltic in 1854 and 1855. When he was promoted to commander's rank he turned his attention to gunnery matters and distinguished himself both then and later when, as Rear-Admiral, he was Vice-President of the Select Committee on Ordnance. He was Naval Attaché in Paris during the period of the somewhat delicate negotiations which preceded the bombardment of Alex-

andria, and had made full arrangements for the joint occupation of Egypt with the French Minister of Marine, before France decided to take no further part. Captain Rice was then ordered out to Egypt, and he distinguished himself at the battle of Tel-el-Kebir. He held the office of A.S.R. for only a little under two years. A well-deserved knighthood was bestowed on him in 1914, and he still takes the keenest interest in naval progress.

The Navy had long availed itself of the services of engineer officers R.N.R., but on July 9, 1903, an Order in Council was published which established the rank of Warrant Engineer, R.N.R. The annual retainer, which was to cease at the age of fifty, was £15 a year, and the pension, which was to commence at the age of sixty or at such earlier date as the Admiralty might determine from special circumstances, was also to be £15. The outfit allowance, when an officer was called up for training, was £10—payable not more than once in five years—but when he was called out for active service with the Fleet in time of emergency the allowance was to be £25. The pay under training or in service was to be 8s. 6d. a day, and the allowances in lieu of lodging and subsistence if he were required to live on shore were not to exceed 6s. a day.

By an Order in Council of August, 1894, authority was provided for any artificers needed to be entered into the Navy at current wages, but in 1903 there was still no arrangement for enrolment in the Reserve. It was therefore suggested that a reserve of 1500 engine-room artificers should be formed. It was also pointed out that the reserve of stokers existing at that time was altogether inadequate, and that the source from which it was drawn was not capable of very much expansion. It was therefore suggested that the R.N.R. firemen should be increased to 6000 in number, the maximum that they regarded as possible, and that landsmen, especially gas and electric light stokers, should be enrolled in a special class of Royal Naval Reserves. As regards electricians, the rating had only recently been introduced into the Navy, and under existing conditions there would be no reserve for over twenty years, when a few pensioners would come on to the list. In such circumstances, the committee considered that a number could be drawn from the proposed Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, but they did not regard the merchant service as a promising source of supply.

Before long there was instituted the special class of firemen R.N.R., who were to be drawn from the stokers in the gas and electric-light factories and other big works. These men, especially those in the two classes of industry specified, were in the habit of earning their living on shore during the winter and going to sea during the summer, with a good deal of slack time between seasons. The Royal Naval Reserve authorities saw their chance to secure firemen who had a very excellent opportunity of taking their training. An annual retainer was payable to these men on the satisfactory completion of a term of three months' training on board ship, while six months' further service afloat, with fourteen days' drill annually in other years, would entitle them to a life pension at the end of their term of service. A major-general of marines was very largely responsible for this scheme, and canvassed the country to gain recruits. Some districts welcomed him warmly and did everything that they could, but others, notably Cardiff and Southampton, would

not hear of the scheme at all, and refused to give any help. At the same time, it was gratifying to notice that the reputation of the R.N.R. was very high at that time, and that the speaker received a very respectful hearing from workmen, who asked questions that proved their interest.

In July, 1903, King Edward VII. was pleased to approve of the establishment of a special medal to be awarded by the Admiralty in accordance with strictly defined rules to the officers of the Mercantile Marine serving in troop transports in recognition of the extreme efficiency with which the trooping service was performed during the South African and China Wars. It was the King's intention that this medal should be awarded whenever a war medal was granted to the troops engaged in the operations, but not otherwise. Its issue was to be limited to the masters of transports, the three officers next in rank to the master, and the first, second and third engineers, to medical officers in a position of responsibility and to a limited number of pursers whose position and services were especially deserving.

With the withdrawal of the coastguard ships and their duties in 1903, it was decided to attach one sea-going drill ship to each new coastguard district. These ships had a reduced complement sufficient to enable them to proceed from port to port, the balance to be made up by coastguards mobilised for their periodical drills and R.N.R. seamen and firemen embarked for training. The ships appointed were as follows: *Andromache* (Harwich), *Apollo* (Southampton), *Spartan* (Holyhead), *Sappho* (Queensferry), *Melampus* (Kingstown), and *Aeolus* (Queenstown). These ships were small cruisers, built under the Naval Defence Act, which were already being surpassed by the cruising vessels built on the Continent, but with their 6-in. and 4.7 quickfirers and triple-expansion engines they were excellent vessels for drill ships, and were not so big that the Reservists had to wait long periods before sufficient men could be collected to get them to sea. As far as possible the ships were to receive the R.N.R. men on training, and the balance were to go into the ships of the Home Fleet. The *Aeolus* had the torpedo gunboat *Skipjack* as tender, the *Sappho* in the Firth of Forth had the *Leda* and *Speedwell*, the *Spartan* had the *Circe*, the *Apollo* had the *Hebe* and *Spanker*, and the *Andromache*, at Harwich, had the *Alarm* and *Onyx*. In addition to these sea-going tenders each ship had two or three coastguard cruisers and gunboats attached. There were also still a number of harbour drill-ships in commission, the *Briton* at Inverness, the *Clyde* at Aberdeen, the *Daedalus* at Bristol, the *Durham* at Leith, the *Eagle* at Liverpool, the *President* in the West India Docks, the *Satellite* at North Shields, and the *Unicorn* at Dundee.

The Australian naval agreement was ratified by the Commonwealth Senate in August, 1903. It provided for a Colonial contribution of £200,000 annually towards the Imperial Navy for ten years, and was terminable at two years' notice after the eighth year. The naval force on the Australian station was to be a minimum of one first-class, two second-class and four third-class cruisers, with four sloops. As far as the R.N.R. was concerned, the important part was that the agreement provided that an Australian branch should be formed, consisting of 25 officers and 700 men, and that four of the ships already mentioned were to be manned by Australians and New Zealanders.

Chapter VIII.

The Period of Reform.

THE year 1904 was the great year for naval reform, and although Fisher himself did not take very much interest in R.N.R. affairs—nor in any other problems of personnel, for that matter—the force shared in the general progress. That it had made wonderful progress since its formation nobody can deny, but it is also true that, had it been fully mobilised in the early days of the century, its appearance and utility would have been very different from the showing that it made in 1914.

It had long been a grievance in the R.N.R., ever since the beginning of the force in fact, that officers could not rise above the rank of lieutenant. This cause of complaint was removed when, on Mar. 7, 1904, an Admiralty Order in Council was published which created the rank of commander. The number of officers so promoted was limited to 50. As regards pay, allowances, and share in prize money, they were to rank with their opposite numbers in the Royal Navy; their equipment allowance was to be £50, as in the case of a retired commander, R.N. When not employed in the Fleet they were to receive the same annual training fee as lieutenants, £25 a year. The age of compulsory retirement was to be 50 in the case of officers who had been commissioned as lieutenants after Feb. 8, 1896, and 55 in the case of those commissioned before that date.

Honorary commissions had been granted to accountant officers since 1893, and in certain circumstances in the executive and engineer branches. In 1904 power was given to grant honorary commissions in the R.N.R. as commander, lieutenant, or chief engineer to such gentlemen as had, in the opinion of the Admiralty, rendered such exceptional service in promoting the interests of the Reserve as to merit recognition by the award of an honorary commission. These commissions, however, were principally given during the war, and it must not be thought that it was a return to the bad old days when there were as many honorary as regular commissions.

By an Order in Council of Mar. 7, 1904, the Accountant Branch of the Royal Naval Reserve was established on a permanent basis. Provision had been made in the summer of 1894 for the entry of temporary assistant paymasters in time of war, and ever since then it had been argued that a sound naval training was necessary for them to be really useful. Permission granted for a lucky few to serve in the fleet in mufti had produced gratifying results. It was laid down that the new branch should consist of a maximum of 200 Assistant Paymasters, to rank with but after their opposite numbers in the regular Navy. They were to be entered as Acting Assistant Paymasters, principally from gentlemen employed in banks or in accountants' and insurance offices who would undertake to undergo training in evening classes and to go afloat up to a limit of one month a year. When under training their pay was to be 10s. a day with reasonable travelling expenses, but when called up for service they were to receive an equipment allow-

ance of £30, 10s. a day pay, and the advantages of the general regulations as to charge pay. Compensation for injuries, widows' pensions and the like were to be under the regulation and on the scales applicable to Assistant Paymasters, R.N., of six years' seniority. After the age of thirty-five voluntary retirement was to be permitted at the discretion of the Admiralty, but officers who were physically unfit before they had completed ten years' service might be called upon to resign their commissions, while the compulsory age of retirement was to be forty. Officers placed on the retired list were to be granted a step in rank at the discretion of the Admiralty, but there was no provision for higher rank while on the active list.

In 1904 the Admiralty decided that the age of compulsory retirement for senior engineers, engineers and assistant engineers, R.N.R., should be forty-five in the future (instead of fifty-five), but that engineer officers in the Reserve should be granted a step in rank on their retirement at their Lordships' discretion. The order came at a time when the engineers throughout the Fleet were beginning to get very much better treatment and consideration, and was a very welcome one.

The old ironclad *Orion* was commissioned at Malta on July 1, 1904, as the depot ship for the Malta Reserve, for which enrolment had commenced a few days earlier. In two months 64 seamen and 118 firemen were enrolled, and of this number 74 men—41 seamen and 33 firemen—completed their first month's training at Malta and were embarked in H.M. ships for five months' training at sea.

At the same time the Australian R.N.R. was improved by the commissioning of three further drill ships, the *Phoebe*, *Mildura* and *Katoomba*. These three ships all belonged to the same class, cruisers built in 1889 and 1890 with a displacement of 2575 tons and a maximum speed of 19 knots. They were armed with eight 4.7's and a number of smaller guns, in addition to four 14-inch torpedo tubes. The *Phoebe* was built for the Imperial Navy, but the other two were specially constructed for the protection of Australian trade. They were not by any means new or up-to-date, but at the same time they were still modern enough to give the Reservists exceedingly useful training, and replaced some of the obsolete gunboats at various points. Unfortunately, it later proved that these ships were very near the end of their lives. In their design the constructors had tried to do too much on a small displacement, with the result that at sea they racked themselves to pieces, and on this account they only fulfilled their functions for a very short time.

During 1904 there was a suggestion to increase very considerably the numbers in the Royal Naval Reserve, but the Admiralty held that it was not really necessary to increase them beyond the establishment of 29,500, as the membership of the Royal Fleet Reserve was going up steadily and it was felt that the five years these men had spent in the Navy was a great asset. At the same time recruiting for the R.N.R. was satisfactory.

Admiral Rice was succeeded in the position of A.C.R. on Feb. 24, 1905, by Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald F. H. Henderson, who remained an unusually long period in the office. Admiral Henderson had had a number of interesting commands, one of the last being H.M.S. *Mars* in the Dockyard Reserve at Portsmouth during the very severe shortage of personnel in the 'nineties. This was

one of the first things that drew his very keen interest towards the Merchant Service, an interest which he has maintained ever since. During his period in command, which lasted until the last day of 1909, he had a great personal part in the success of the Reserve. After his retirement he went out to Australia at the invitation of that Government, and drew up a masterly report on the establishment of the Commonwealth Navy.

At the end of 1905 the Government issued a return showing the number of officers and men in the various Colonial naval reserves, and it must be admitted that the result was disappointing. In the Australasian Reserve, including New Zealand, there were 5 officers and 293 men. Newfoundland provided no officers but 560 men from the Grand Banks fishing grounds and Malta 366 men. When the subject of Colonial naval reserves was first mooted it was hoped to get a very much bigger force than 5 officers and 1200 men.

All the efforts of the Admiralty to make good the shortage of junior officers having proved insufficient, a further supplementary list was created in 1905, but being on precisely the same lines as its predecessors it calls for no special comment.

By the beginning of 1906 there had been numerous complaints that the existing system of drills and training for executive officers in the R.N.R. was quite inadequate for the needs of the force, and, accordingly, in February an Order in Council was published which established an entirely new system. In each of the first three years of their service officers were to undergo 28 days' training, and subsequently they were to undergo 28 days' training every alternate year or, if they preferred it or if it suited their employers better, 14 days every year until a test certificate was obtained. Officers who obtained this certificate were only to be required to do 14 days' training every alternate year, so long as they succeeded in requalifying, but should they fail they were to go back to the ordinary routine for officers of over three years' service. In exceptional circumstances an officer who had a test certificate was permitted to attempt to requalify in seven days, and concessions were made to the officers with regard to making good any arrears of training.

At the same time it was agreed that officers who lived in H.M. ships when undergoing training were to be allowed naval victualling and to receive messing allowance at 2s. a day for lieutenants and 1s. a day for gunroom officers, with an additional shilling to the latter if they were forced to join the ward-room mess by the exigencies of the service. The pay at this time was still ten shillings a day for lieutenants and five shillings for acting or confirmed sub-lieutenants. For midshipmen it was four shillings when the lad was over seventeen and had two years' seniority; three shillings for the remainder.

At the same time came into force an entirely new system of training for the R.N.R., practically abolishing the batteries and harbour drill ships. It was now thought that this system was no longer adapted to the requirements of the service, principally because the greater part of the drill had been devoted to gunnery, and this was a duty that was becoming less and less likely to devolve upon Royal Naval Reserve men in time of war. It was also felt that it was only the comparatively limited number of men who embarked for nine months' training who acquired a really sufficient knowledge of the general routine of a man-of-war. In 1906 the collection

of a big fleet of ships in reserve in home waters with nucleus crews permitted them to accommodate a large number of R.N.R. men, and although they only went to sea for cruises about once every three months, the general routine in harbour was very much the same as it was at sea, so that R.N.R. men on board could get quite familiar with the internal economy of a man-of-war. It was therefore decided that after this date only the drill ships at London, Aberdeen, Bristol and Liverpool and the batteries at Penzance, Yarmouth, Wick, Stornoway, Lerwick, Upper Cove and Rosslare should remain.

Under the new system men were expected to embark for three months in their first year of service and afterwards for one month in every alternate year. The special sea-going drill ships were withdrawn and most of them went to the scrappers or the Subsidiary Service List, while it was provided that the remaining drill ships and batteries should not be retained for more than five years in any circumstances. There was one point in favour of the batteries to which too little attention was drawn. In them a young officer, and particularly a midshipman, had fine opportunities of learning to command men, for he would frequently find himself handling a squad of a hundred or more. This advantage did not hold in the drill ships, where there were frequently as many officers as there were ratings.

The new regulations laid down slightly stricter qualifications of entry, making it quite clear that no applicant would be accepted for enrolment in the R.N.R. unless he were a British subject, able to speak and understand the English language, educated at least enough to sign his name, and free from physical defects, and was in health, character and every other respect fully eligible. Coloured men, natives of India and mulattoes were specifically debarred from entry, regularising a question that had been often raised in the House. The ages of entry were not under eighteen and not over twenty-five years of age for both seamen and stokers, while the general standard of height was 5 ft. 4 in. and girth 32 in. round the chest. In cases of specially desirable men, however, they might be taken as short as 5 ft. 3 in., but in no circumstances were they to be accepted under 32 in. chest measurement.

A man desiring to be entered as a seaman had to prove that he had been to sea for at least two years, either in foreign-going, coasting or fishing craft, and also that during this time his conduct had been generally satisfactory, that he knew enough about seamanship to be able to box the compass, steer, heave the lead, tell the marks and pull a good oar, that he had served at sea within six months of making application, and that he was willing to declare his intention of following the sea for at least five years after enlistment. In the case of an apprentice who had completed his indentures no further proof of service was required, and time served in a mercantile training ship—reformatories always excepted—counted as half-time at sea. Applicants for enrolment as stokers had to prove two years' service in a stokehold or engine-room at a rating not lower than that of fireman-and-trimmer, and otherwise satisfy much the same requirements as for seamen. The period of enlistment was for five years on the first and any subsequent enrolment. Before they embarked in the regular ships all new entrants had to go to a naval depot for fourteen days' preliminary drill and to be kitted up,

while if any man failed to obtain confirmation of his rating within a year of his provisional enlistment he was struck off the list automatically.

At the same time a new classification was introduced. Men were entered provisionally either as seamen or as stokers, and were not confirmed until they had undergone their three months' training in H.M. ships, after which they were rated seamen or stokers respectively. A limited number of such men, not exceeding two per cent. of each class, would be eligible for promotion to the ranks of leading seaman and leading stoker under certain conditions. The first of these was that the promotions should be confined to men who were in their second or subsequent period of enrolment and who were specially recommended for advancement on the completion of their biennial training. All candidates for promotion had to be of "Very Good" character and had to pass an examination. They also had to satisfy their superiors that they were capable of taking charge of men. The pay of leading seamen and leading stokers was to be 1s. 6d. and 2s. per day—the former with a penny a day extra for the qualification of "trained man" and the latter including this—against the 1s. 4d. and 1s. 9d. of the seamen and stokers.

Engine-room artificers were to be allowed to undergo three months' training on board H.M. ships during the first three years of each term of enrolment, such service either to be continuous or in periods of not less than one month's duration. As far as practicable they would be allowed to select their own time for this training, provided that at least one month was in the first year of each term of enrolment. They were granted free railway passes to and from the port of embarkation, the annual retainer for E.R.A.'s being £10 a year.

Reservists embarked for their three months' training were to be under instruction every forenoon and afternoon except when the general work of the ship employed all the ship's company, and if the hours per week under instruction were less than 12 the captain had to give his reasons in writing to his superiors to ensure that the men were not robbed of any opportunity of learning. In the first week they were to go through a thorough training as to their general duties on deck and below, ship's routine and the like. They were to attend all general drills, commission drills and watch evolutions, and to form part of a physical drill class daily. The technical instruction consisted of the items of seamanship in which the Navy differed from the Merchant Service, signals in the international code with encouragement to volunteer for more advanced signal duties, gun drill with all pieces from the 3-pounder to the 6-incher inclusive—this drill being intended not to make the men good shots but to accustom them to the firing of guns in their vicinity and to make them useful members of the gun's crew—field training and squad drill, with a certain amount of musketry. The stokers had to take physical drill, boat-pulling and musketry, as well as their ordinary stoker's work. In the various trainings that the men took subsequently they were not to have any firing practice, physical drill was only to be carried out by men who were in their first or second period of enrolment, and every opportunity was to be given them to work for promotion and specialist training.

Provisional seamen or provisional stokers on embarking on their three months' training received a gratuity

of £1 a month, paid in advance, and £2 on completing the three months providing that they had gained satisfactory reports from their superiors. The annual retainer was £6 for the seamen and stokers as before, but £8 for the leading rates, paid at the Mercantile Marine offices in four quarterly instalments and not to be stopped while the man was undergoing training in the Navy.

R.N.R. ratings who had entered before Oct. 1, 1906, were still eligible for the pension of £12 a year on attaining the age limit, but ratings entering on or after that date were, subject to the discretion of the Admiralty, entitled to a gratuity of £50 in lieu of pension after completing 20 years' service. This gratuity carried with it a relief from all liability to active service, but payment was not to be made in the case of men under 40 years until they had reached that age, such men receiving a Deferred Gratuity Certificate and being still liable to be called out until they had attained the age of 40 and had been given their gratuities. The only men who were eligible for pension were men who were wounded or injured on service or at drill, when they would get the same pension as a regular Navy man in similar circumstances, or if they were killed or drowned on service or at drill the widow and children would receive the equivalent naval pension.

Every measure of reform, however, is bound to bring some hardships in its train, and in the improved training system of the Royal Naval Reserve there was certainly great hardship to local chief officers of coastguards, who had formerly received remuneration for drilling Reserve men. When the batteries were closed, in December, 1905, it was decided to give them one year's allowance—based on the average of the last five years' payments—for the first year after the drill ceased, and one-third of that sum for each subsequent year of service.

In consequence of the naval agreement entered into in 1903 between the British Government and the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, it obviously became necessary to formulate special financial regulations for the Australasian branch, for money and rates of pay were so much higher. It was not until Oct. 22, 1906, however, that an Admiralty Order in Council was issued, which provided for improved equipment allowances for officers of the Australasian Reserve who might be called out for active service in the Royal Navy. This was to be £50 in the case of lieutenants and £40 in the case of sub-lieutenants. When appointed for their twelve months' training these officers were to receive half the above equipment allowances, but no further payment on that account was to be made unless an officer who had received his first half was called out for actual service, in which case he would receive the remaining moiety of the allowance. Sub-lieutenants appointed acting lieutenants, or promoted to lieutenant while serving, were to be entitled to the higher scale, but payments were so regulated that it was ensured that the maximum allowance receivable by an officer during his career would not exceed £50 in the case of lieutenants or £40 in the case of sub-lieutenants.

At the same time special allowances were to be paid to the crews of the ships mentioned in the agreement, in addition to the ordinary Imperial rates of pay for continuous service men and the Imperial allowances for badges and specialist qualifications. Boys and all ratings under eighteen years of age were to receive 1s. a day, ordinary seamen and domestics 2s., and

all other ratings, including petty officers, 3s. These men were to be credited on entry with a combined clothing and bedding gratuity of £6, which was to be raised to a sum not exceeding £10 in such cases as the Admiralty considered an increased gratuity desirable. Travelling expenses were also allowed on the increased scale that was necessary under Australian conditions.

It had long been felt that promotion in the Royal Naval Reserve from the rank of midshipman was unduly slow, and that this rank was in many cases not in the least commensurate with the position held by the officer in the Merchant Service. The Admiralty had been considering this matter for some time, and in 1907 greatly eased the situation by ordering that midshipmen would be eligible for appointment as acting sub-lieutenants R.N.R., provided that they had three years' seniority as midshipmen and were not less than twenty-one years of age, that they possessed a first mate's certificate of competency and that they had performed the requisite amount of training and were possessed of a test certificate in gunnery. Midshipmen and acting sub-lieutenants who had undergone their twelve months' training in the fleet with a qualifying certificate and a "Very Good" certificate for conduct would be eligible for promotion to sub-lieutenant, provided they had seen five years' service in the R.N.R. and had a first mate's certificate of competency. Midshipmen and acting sub-lieutenants who had not undergone their twelve months' training were eligible for promotion to sub-lieutenant after six years' service, providing they had their master's ticket and a test certificate in gunnery. At the same time acting sub-lieutenants who had failed to qualify for confirmation at thirty years of age were automatically removed from the list. This regulation eased the situation very considerably.

The increased attention that was being paid to signalling in the Merchant Service and Navy had its result in February, 1907, in the establishment of short courses of instruction in signalling for R.N.R. officers at the various home ports. To begin with it was on a small scale, only two courses in each year being provided and each course being limited to ten officers, but it soon increased appreciably.

For the year 1908 there was a drop of nearly 3000 in the number of seaman ratings, principally owing to the older men in the fourth, fifth and sixth period of enrolment retiring, and seamen and second-class men who had failed to qualify for the rating of "Seaman" under the new conditions being discharged on completion of their period of enrolment. At the same time there was the normal wastage of engine-room artificers, with the result that recruiting, that had been suspended since December, 1904, was reopened at the end of 1907, the sixty men required to fill the vacancies being obtained within six weeks.

In August, 1908, a decoration was established for the purpose of rewarding long and meritorious services of officers of proved capacity in the Territorial Force, and, based on this example, the Royal Naval Reserve Officers' Decoration and the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve Officers' Decoration were established in February, 1909. They consisted of the Royal cipher and crown in gold, surrounded by a silver rope tied with a sailor's knot, and it was provided that the Institution of the Order should take effect as from January 1, 1908. The Admiralty was empowered to recommend to the King any executive or

engineer officer of the Royal Naval Reserve who had completed at least fifteen years' service. But certain cases arose in which officers were debarred from completing the necessary service owing to the change in the regulation as to the age of retirement made subsequent to their entry into the Royal Naval Reserve, and in 1910 a special exception was made to the fifteen-year requirement in their case, but in every instance, of course, the recommendation was entirely at the discretion of the Admiralty. This decoration is still very highly valued in the Reserve, but there is very bitter feeling that it is placed eighty-third in the table of precedence.

In an Admiralty letter dated January 11, 1909, the Naval Long Service and Good Conduct Medal, generally irreverently referred to as the "Fifteen Years' Undetected Crime," was extended to the men of the Royal Naval Reserve, and it was later conceded that this medal should be retrospective to men living who satisfied the conditions of the award, whether they were then serving in the R.N.R. or not. The medal demanded 15 years' service with good conduct, but mobilised service was allowed to count double, and many questioned the wisdom of this clause. The medal, was, however, immensely popular in the force.

The promotion of sub-lieutenants to the rank of lieutenant was facilitated by an Order in Council published in October, 1909. This Order replaced Article 98 in the Royal Naval Reserve Officers' Regulations of 1905, and by it sub-lieutenants could be promoted who had satisfactorily performed short courses in gunnery and torpedo and their twelve months' naval training, provided they had two years' seniority as confirmed sub-lieutenants and possessed a captain's ticket. On the other hand, sub-lieutenants who had not been able to perform their twelve months' naval training were eligible for promotion provided that they had three years' seniority, had satisfactory reports after three periods of training that should not aggregate less than 56 days, that they should possess a master's ticket, and that they should have been one year in command of a British ocean-going ship of not less than 1500 tons or of a British sailing ship of not less than 1000 tons, or alternatively have been first mate of a British ocean-going vessel of not less than 3000 tons. In common with other regulations of the time, this order showed the increasing co-operation between the Navy and Merchant Service over the Royal Naval Reserve.

Quite a new proposal was made at the end of the year, when the authorities suggested that Royal Naval Reserve officers should thenceforward serve in torpedo craft as well as in big ships. Undoubtedly it was a very wise move, for it was high time that R.N.R. officers were familiarised with the handling of torpedo craft, which was a very special art in itself. The demand for good men for this purpose was increasing rapidly as the British destroyer flotillas and those of the Colonies were being augmented. To begin with they were appointed second-in-command, the position usually occupied by a sub-lieutenant, and it was not for a long time afterwards that they were appointed to commands. During the shortage of personnel in the early days of the war, however, this step was taken in the case of a number of old 27 and 30 knot ships in the patrol flotillas, and proved an immediate success.

Chapter IX.

The Finishing Touches.

THE previous half decade having seen a general reform in the Royal Naval Reserve, it was the four and a half years that immediately preceded the war which saw its final tempering into a fighting weapon. Loose strings were gathered together, branches and functions of the Reserve, which had been but vaguely formed or suggested, were put into concrete form, new avenues of advancement were opened, and better incentives to keenness provided. At this period of its history the Reserve was particularly fortunate in the men who were in charge of its organisation, and the sympathy with which its aspirations were regarded in naval circles.

Admiral Henderson was succeeded as A.C.R. by Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick S. Inglefield, who had distinguished himself during the Egyptian campaign of 1882 as a lieutenant in the *Minotaur*, and later in the *Condor*, which Beresford had commanded at the bombardment of Alexandria. He was no stranger to Admiralty work, for he had been Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence and Junior Sea Lord, as well as A.D.C. to the King before he was promoted to flag rank. During the relief work after the Messina earthquake he rendered magnificently humane services, for which he was decorated by the Italian Government. Finally promoted Admiral in 1914, he was President of the Motor Boat Committee at the Admiralty, which undertook the difficult work of organising the Motor Boat Reserve for patrol work when war broke out.

On Jan. 1, 1910, the total number enrolled in the Reserve was over 20,000, divided as follows:—

Executive officers	1,389
Commissioned engineer officers	240
Warrant engineers	102
Engine-room artificers	577
Seamen ratings	12,961
Stoker ratings	5,579

Of the executive officers, 523 had already done their twelve months' training in the fleet, and were in receipt of the full training fees, while 66 more were undergoing training at that date.

As the officers of the R.N.R. proved their value, the commanding officers of His Majesty's ships in which they were serving took the opportunity to give them temporary acting appointments in rank higher than they held in the Reserve, on occasion even higher than those for which they were eligible under the regulations. Each of these cases had to go up to the Treasury for approval, with inevitable delay and heart-burning, but in February, 1910, the Admiralty received power to grant higher acting rank at its discretion, subject only to the standing rules of the Treasury, and this order was pre-dated as from July 1, 1909. At the same time similar discretionary power was granted in the case of the Australasian branch, and the scheme was found to work perfectly.

The conditions of the R.N.R. had been getting steadily less onerous and more considerate to the convenience of the officers and their employers, in sharp distinction to the hard-and-fast rules that had been laid down in the 'fifties. In October,

1910, officers were for the first time permitted to perform a year's training in advance at the same time as they took their annual drill, a concession which made a great difference to the convenience of officers on service abroad and tended to the general contentment of the force.

In 1910 the Admiralty decided that subsistence money advanced to R.N.R. men en route to or from training should be replaced by a system of meal orders, which system was brought into operation, and after a period of examination adopted.

The outstanding event in the history of the R.N.R. in 1910 was the foundation of the Trawler Division of the Royal Naval Reserve. Although it did not actually come into existence until that year, its real beginning was in 1907, when Admiral Lord Charles Beresford was in command of the Channel Fleet. The Navy in general was very much inclined to regard mines lightly, but Beresford saw their possibilities, and he had often discussed the question of how best to clear a channel before the Battle Fleet, either when relations were strained or immediately after the outbreak of war. The Russians and the Japanese had experimented with picket boats and launches, but it must be admitted that they had not been very successful in their operations. In the course of a "hurrah cruise" the Channel Fleet visited Grimsby, and Beresford was much impressed by the possibility of using the fishermen and their craft for mine-sweeping purposes. He at once put the suggestion before the Admiralty, who, after some consideration, consented to experiments, and a naval officer was sent to Grimsby to charter two trawlers, the *Andes* and *Algoma*. They reached Portland in February, 1908, and for eight days they were experimenting with dummy minefields under the direction of Captain Frederick Doveton Sturdee, who died a short time ago, as Admiral of the Fleet.

These experiments were so strikingly successful that the idea of a Trawler Reserve took strong hold, and the Mining Committee of 1908 went into the matter very thoroughly and designed suitable gear for their work, adapting the ordinary fishing gear and otter board as much as they possibly could in order that the men might not find themselves handling strange weapons. Soon afterwards the purchase of six trawlers for instructional purposes was approved, and experiments were carried out with mine-sweeping gear, which soon proved that the old method of destroying a minefield by laying a counterfield and blowing all of them up together was obsolete and useless. In the summer time these trawlers were to visit the fishing ports to give naval instruction to the men of the Trawler Reserve that it was intended to form.

The rank of skipper was established in the Trawler Section of the R.N.R. by the Order in Council of the 13th October, 1910, when the foundation of the force that proved so invaluable in the war was laid. The qualifications for an entrant were that he must be not less than 25 or more than 45 years of age, that he must have commanded a British steam trawler for at least two years and have served at sea in that capacity within six months of his application, that he must possess a Board of Trade certificate as skipper, and that he must satisfactorily complete the qualifying period of training laid down in the regulations. The period of engagement was to be for five years and re-engagements were to be allowed for further periods of five years up

to twenty years in all. Candidates were required to undergo eight days' probationary training in one of H.M.'s trawlers before they were granted the Admiralty warrant, and were then required to go through four days' training in the third, fifth, ninth, thirteenth, fifteenth and nineteenth years of their engagement, and eight days in the seventh, eleventh and seventeenth. The retainer was to be £10 a year in time of peace, paid on completion of the prescribed training, and a maximum retaining fee of £15 a year when called out by proclamation or on service, this latter being subject to a minimum of £5. After each four-day period of training a gratuity of 30s. was to be paid, and after each eight days £3, while the pay while embarked was to be 9s. a day, inclusive of everything, except when the skipper was called out for service in the Fleet, when the victualling was to be at naval rates. The uniform gratuity was to be £6, and after 20 years' service, including such time as might have been served as second-hand or deckhand in the Royal Naval Reserve, a discharge gratuity of £60 could be obtained. Altogether the terms were regarded as being generous and satisfactory, but the conditions were rather too onerous, and it was some time before the service became really popular. In 1911, however, it was ordered that the training should be increased, the new period being 12 days before confirmation and 12 and six days where formerly eight and four had been sufficient.

Nearly two years afterwards further regulations were published, permitting the promotion of second-hands in the Trawler Section to the rank of skipper. A man was eligible for advancement provided he had commanded a British steam trawler for at least two years and had a Board of Trade ticket, and provided he could pass the necessary R.N.R. tests. Several concessions were also made in respect of the training period, time as second-hand counting towards time as skipper.

The regulations referring to the entry of trawler ratings into the R.N.R. did not err on the side of laxity. The qualifications were the same as for those of the regular R.N.R., except that the limits of age of entry were fixed as not under eighteen nor over thirty years, although these were afterwards altered. The ratings were second hands, enginemen, deckhands and trimmers. To be rated second hand a man had to prove that he had served in a British steam trawler for at least two years and possessed a Board of Trade certificate as second hand. A deck hand had to prove that he had served in a British steam trawler for at least two years with general satisfactory conduct, that he could box the compass, steer, heave the lead, tell the marks and pull a good oar. Otherwise his qualifications had to be the same as that of a seaman in the regular Reserve. The enginemen had to have been in charge of the engines of a trawler for at least one year with satisfactory certificates, and the trimmers were required to have served in the stokehold or engine-room of a trawler for at least one year. The enlistment was for five years with not more than three similar re-enlistments.

It was provided in the regulations that for the first ten years of their service men must be generally employed in steam trawlers, for the third five years they must be generally employed either in trawlers or tugs, ferry steamers, on dock duties, or pilotage, but for the fourth five years they might be employed on shore provided the require-

ments of the regulations had been satisfied during the previous periods. Men had to get special leave if they wanted to serve in any merchant ship on a voyage taking them away from their port of enrolment for more than six weeks, and no men in the trawler section could be given permission to sail under a foreign flag. If a man did not present himself before a registrar at least once in every six months he was liable to have his retainer stopped or even to be discharged from the Reserve.

The annual retainers of the trawler section were £8 for second hands and enginemen, and £4 for deck hands and trimmers, paid in four quarterly instalments, with a special proviso that they should go to the men themselves and not to any agent. No retainer, of course, could be drawn in any circumstances unless the training had been carried out in the manner stated in the regulations, while in time of war men were to lose these retainers, but were to be paid a special war retainer in lieu. After war service they were to be granted an additional allowance of one month's pay on discharge after twelve months and an addition of twopence a day to their pay if retained over three years, as in the case of other R.N.R. ratings. It was specially mentioned that the war retainer of £1 a month, with a minimum of £5 on discharge, was to be regarded as strictly the private property of the man and was not to be subject to any mulct or deprivation, excepting only in cases of desertion.

The uniform of the trawler section was not that of the regular Royal Naval Reserve. They were provided with a cap and cap tally marked R.N.R., a jersey with "R.N.R." over a "T" in red worsted, and a pair of serge trousers. Second hands had a red crown over the "R.N.R./T." on the jersey. Enginemen had a peak cap, with no badge, a blue serge suit and a suit of overalls with "R.N.R./T." in red. At the same time each man was credited with a clothing allowance—sevenpence a month in the case of enginemen and threepence in the case of the others—as an inducement for him to take care of his kit and to help him to keep it in good order.

The idea of the Trawler Reserve at Hull was quite a tolerable success immediately. It was understood that the men volunteering were to man the half-dozen trawlers which the Government had recently purchased, the idea of the reserve expanding in the way it did being inconceivable. The old torpedo gunboat *Jason*, which was in charge of the trawlers, visited Hull immediately the lists opened and made daily trips down the Humber with Reservists for practice. The first warrant for the Trawler Section went to skipper William Oliver, of Hull.

At the time the Trawler Reserve was founded, an agreement was made between the Admiralty and a number of trawler owners for material to be available in case of need. The trawler owners were by no means averse to this arrangement, for they quite realised that theirs was certain to be the industry hit first by the declaration of war. They were willing enough to come to an agreement without any subsidy, to hand over their vessels to the Admiralty immediately war broke out, on an agreed hire of 12 per cent. per annum of the value of the trawler at that date, as determined by their agreed method. It was only making assurance double sure on the part of the Admiralty, for they had the right to pre-empt the ships in any circumstances, but it saved a lot of

argument as to the price to be paid. At the same time a number of retired naval officers were selected to take charge of trawler bases and divisions at various points. Naval petty officers were also told off to each trawler for disciplinary and signalling purposes. When war broke out 82 trawlers had been placed on this list.

In June, 1911, a conference was held at Grimsby between representatives of the Admiralty and the local trawler owners to discuss means for retrieving the comparative failure of the force in that port. The quota under the original plan was 300 men, but only 84 had enrolled, and generally speaking the scheme was not popular with the fishermen. With regard to the skippers, the Admiralty agreed to raise the age limit from thirty-five to forty, and to delete the original clause requiring certain naval service. The owners themselves were quite willing to help, and the majority agreed to ensure continuity of employment when men were called up for training. Fear of losing their jobs had been one of the principal considerations which held men back.

With the passing of successive regulations, direct contradictions were sometimes embodied which were liable to impose hardships on the officers. Attention was drawn to a case in point in 1911, when one outstanding matter was put right. In 1893 it was provided that the higher retainer of £25 payable to officers of the rank of lieutenant or over would not be given to officers who had served for their twelve months' training in the rank of midshipman or sub-lieutenant R.N.R. until they had, subsequently, passed a satisfactory qualifying course on board one of the gunnery ships. Later it was enacted that every officer should undergo the gunnery course before he took the twelve months' training. Thus, many found themselves forced to do the training twice. This was corrected by an order that the first gunnery course should be accepted as sufficient. Soon afterwards all the numerous Orders in Council and regulations existing were consolidated into a revised code of regulations for the Royal Naval Reserve.

In consequence of one or two isolated cases which, it was felt, reflected on the reputation of the Royal Naval Reserve, an order was published in May, 1911, giving the Admiralty the right of withholding the payment of training fees to any officer should his conduct both in H.M. ships, and while in civil employment be regarded as unsatisfactory.

The Royal Naval Reserve Act of 1863 empowered the Admiralty to enrol officers in the Royal Naval Reserve temporarily in time of emergency, but these powers were cancelled by an Order in Council in 1869, when it was considered that they were no longer necessary. By 1912, however, the German menace proved them to be very necessary indeed, and accordingly a further Order in Council was issued, which gave the Admiralty the power of granting temporary acting commissions in the R.N.R. to appropriate people not belonging to the Reserve who volunteered for service, either with or without the issue of a Royal Proclamation calling out the R.N.R. These temporary acting officers were to be entitled to rank, pay and allowances of the permanent service and were to be treated in all respects as if they were enrolled in the R.N.R. in the ordinary way.

When the rank of Warrant Engineer had been established it was provided that Warrant Officers who had served twenty years in the Reserve before attaining the age of fifty, might be granted a pension

of £15 a year for life, commencing at the age of sixty, or a proportionate pension in certain circumstances. In February, 1912, the Warrant Officer was given the option of exchanging this pension for a gratuity of £60, provided he had entered before a certain date. A number of Warrant Officers took advantage of this concession in order to set themselves up in little businesses instead of being merely the recipients of a small pension.

At the end of 1912 the suggestion that Brassey made well back in the nineteenth century was approved, and courses of strategy, international law, naval prize law, and such subjects were finally instituted for executive officers of the Royal Naval Reserve. This concession was much appreciated by the Reserve, for it showed that their efforts were being appreciated more and more, and at the same time the wisdom of the step was shown at the beginning of the war, when the suitability of the Royal Naval Reserve for blockading duties made an elementary knowledge of international law of the very greatest importance. Facilities also were offered to both officers and men for improving their training in signals, a suggestion that had been made many years before, and officers were allowed to attend short courses at the Naval War College.

In December, 1912, it was announced that the protected cruiser *Pioneer*, a little vessel of 2200 tons with a maximum speed of 20 knots, armed with eight 4-inch guns, was to be presented outright to the Australian Navy, although she and her sister, the *Pyramus*, had acted as drill ships to the Naval Reserve there for some time. The *Pioneer* was to replace the old *Paluma*, a little 360-ton gunboat built on the Tyne in 1884, as sea-going tender to the gunnery school at Williamstown, Victoria. The *Paluma* mounted one ancient 8-inch gun, an equally old-fashioned 6-incher and two 1.5-inch Nordenfeldts. Her only modern pieces that were really useful for training were two Maxim guns. Her sister was the *Gayundah*, which, with the *Protector* (also built at Elswick in 1884), was employed entirely for the training of the Royal Naval Reserve, and both were quite useless for the purpose.

It was not until December, 1912, that orders were issued by the Admiralty which permitted R.N.R. accountant officers to go to sea for service during the annual manœuvres or on special occasions, in addition to their ordinary training laid down in the regulations. This order was a very welcome one to the accountant branch, which had been fighting its way up into a fine state of efficiency in spite of rather discouraging regulations.

In 1912 the Admiralty appointed a committee to consider the question as to the necessity or advisability of arming merchant ships, and to the surprise of many this committee decided that it would be a sound and feasible scheme. Accordingly Rear-Admiral H. H. Campbell was ordered to carry out the necessary arrangements, the proviso being that all the guns should be mounted aft, so that they could only be used to assist in a vessel's escape, thus precluding any suggestion that they were mounted for aggressive purposes. Officers of the Royal Naval Reserve at Liverpool, London and Southampton were in charge of the actual arrangements and the training of the men who were to act as gunners. The Admiralty offered to any company accepting the scheme an indemnity against any loss or expense that they might incur through their ships being detained

or handicapped in time of peace on account of their armament.

Sir Owen Philipps, now Lord Kylsant, gave the lead with the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, and the liner *Aragon* was the first ship to be armed, in April, 1913. The standard armament was two 4.7-inch guns. Quite a number of ships, especially those engaged on the food services, were similarly armed, but there was much discussion as to whether the move was advisable or not, until a mixture of accident and ignorance gave the subject a great fillip. The North German Lloyd liner *Kaiser Wilhelm II.* was in collision and taken into Southampton for repairs, when the workmen discovered that her decks had been strengthened to mount guns. The publication of this fact caused many more British ships to be armed. Actually there was no secrecy about the matter. The *Kaiser Wilhelm II.* always had been on the German Reserve List for use as a cruiser if necessary, and her decks were strengthened to carry guns just as British ships had been strengthened ever since the 'eighties. Mr. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, backed the scheme very strongly, as did also Lord Charles Beresford. Before war broke out 39 British liners had been given two 4.7-inch guns apiece, but no ammunition.

It was agreed that R.N.R. ratings and officers who were put in command of guns should not be called out with the regular force, and at the same time the training and maintenance of the armament was left entirely to the discretion of the officers commanding. The authorities rightly considered that twelve months' training in the Navy was ample preparation for this duty, and were not, moreover, particularly anxious to take over very much responsibility with regard to the defensive arming of merchant ships. They encouraged it from the beginning, but they still regarded the ratings in charge as being essentially the servants of the various companies and not of the Navy. However, in March, 1914, they ordered that officers of the Royal Naval Reserve who were detailed to take charge of guns on such ships for a minimum period of three months in a year should be regarded as having complied with the conditions governing the payment of training fees in so far as they related to the performance of annual or biennial training for that year. It was a move that was made solely for the purpose of encouraging the arming of merchantmen, but war broke out so soon afterwards that it could not have its full effect.

The old regulations maintained that candidates for appointment as probationary sub-lieutenant R.N.R. must have served for not less than five years at sea, while holding a Board of Trade certificate, but in March, 1913, this period was cut down to three and a half years, and at the same time a minimum age limit of 21 years was established, both for officers entering directly as probationary sub-lieutenants and also for midshipmen and acting sub-lieutenants to be promoted to confirmed rank. This was a very good move in peace time, but in the turmoil of war it had to be altered again, and in January, 1915, it was decided to abolish the seniority qualification which had formerly to be satisfied before a young officer could be promoted to the rank of acting sub-lieutenant and sub-lieutenant.

In March, 1913, a further supplementary list was made by the entry of Royal Naval Reserve officers as lieutenants and sub-lieutenants in the Royal Navy, the number to be limited to a hundred. It was laid

down in the regulations that candidates for the transfer must be officers of the Royal Naval Reserve who had completed their twelve months' training or were undergoing it at the time of their application. Those who entered the Navy as sub-lieutenants were to be eligible for promotion to the rank of lieutenant after one year's service in the R.N., or on the date on which they would have become eligible for that rank in the R.N.R., but they could be appointed as acting lieutenants at any time after entry. Officers who had not yet got their master's ticket were only to be promoted on passing an examination to be held by the Board of Trade. As regards promotion, lieutenants on the supplementary list were to be eligible to promotion to the rank of commander on the active list only in exceptional cases and at the discretion of the Admiralty, but they might be granted the retired rank of commander in ordinary circumstances. Officers were to be retired at the age of 45, but voluntary retirement was to be allowed from the age of 40 onwards. Under the schedule of full pay sub-lieutenants received five shillings a day and messing allowance of a shilling a day, and lieutenants ten shillings a day on promotion, with an increase of a shilling a day for every two years' seniority after four. The half-pay was to be 3s. 6d. a day for sub-lieutenants, and for lieutenants it varied from five shillings to nine shillings, according to his service. This service was to include commissioned time in the Royal Naval Reserve and as sub-lieutenant R.N. If the officer were entitled to a gratuity or retired pay it was to be in the shape of a gratuity of six calendar months' full pay for each complete year of service, if he had less than ten years' full-pay service, including that of the R.N.R. If he had ten years' full service or over the retired pay varied from £150 to £200 per annum. The sub-lieutenant's retiring gratuity was to be two calendar months' full pay for each complete year of full-pay service.

In June, 1913, it was decided to increase the maximum age of entry of Skippers R.N.R. (Trawler Section) from 40 years, to which it had been raised in 1911, to 45, at which age masters of trawlers considered that they were still young men, and were certainly still capable of carrying out their duties. These older skippers were, however, entered for one quinquennial period only.

The A.C.R. who had the honour of launching his command into the final test of active service was Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur Farquhar, who took over the position on the 1st January, 1914. He was the eldest son of a distinguished admiral, born in 1855, and had already made a name for himself in the Navy when he was selected to command H.M.S. *Renown* when she carried the Duke and Duchess of Connaught to Egypt and India for the Delhi Durbar. In command of the Portsmouth Division of the Home Fleet, he had come into personal contact with the R.N.R., so that his appointment was regarded as a very happy one, although he only held it until 1915.

In 1914 the New Zealand Minister of Defence came to England to discuss the main problems of naval defence. This resulted in the Dominion undertaking considerable responsibilities, with the assistance of the Government. The cruiser *Philomel*, sister ship to the "P" class cruisers that had been presented to the Australian Navy, was taken over as a sea-going training ship for both the regular defence force and the New Zealand Royal

Naval Reserve, which it was proposed to constitute quite apart from the Australasian Force.

In 1914 it was decided to enter a limited number of probationary midshipmen R.N.R. and to train them in the Navy with a view to providing officers in the Merchant Service competent to take charge of the defensive armament of merchant ships. This course was to last a year and took place immediately the youngsters were entered.

It will be noticed that the regulations show an increased appreciation of the value of catching the R.N.R. officer young, and initiating him into Service ways as a midshipman. In October, 1913, the regulations were modified with regard to the entry and service of midshipmen of the Royal Naval Reserve to help them to undergo twelve months' training in H.M. ships while holding that rank. It was therefore decided that probationary or confirmed midshipmen R.N.R. might be appointed to this twelve months' training afloat without the conditions as to age on entry and the preliminary gunnery and torpedo courses which were laid down in the regulations. In July, 1914, a further order was issued as to the promotion of midshipmen who had undergone their twelve months' training. By this they could be promoted to acting sub-lieutenant on completion of service, their apprenticeship in the Mercantile Marine, and the attainment of the age of 21. The qualifications for promotion to sub-lieutenant R.N.R. were the completion of satisfactory gunnery and torpedo courses as acting sub-lieutenants and the possession of a second mate's ticket, while lieutenants R.N.R. were required to have two years' seniority, six months' further satisfactory service in the R.N., and a Board of Trade master's certificate.

In July, 1914, a modification of the regulations governing the payment of training fees was introduced. This provided that 70 per cent. of the training fee of £20 a year should be paid on promotion to the rank of sub-lieutenant R.N.R., and the full training fee of £20 a year on completion of six months' further satisfactory service and the attainment of a master's ticket. On promotion to lieutenant the training fee should be £25 a year, but the payment of all training fees was to cease at the age of 35, irrespective of the rank held by the officer at that time.

Shortly before the war, and some four months after the rank of lieutenant-commander had been substituted in the Royal Navy for the cumbersome title of "Lieutenants of Over Eight Years' Seniority," a similar rank was established in the Royal Naval Reserve. Promotion was automatic on the attainment of eight years' seniority, but it was hedged around with regulations and was not altogether satisfactory. Lieutenant-commanders R.N.R., whatever their seniority might be, were in all matters of command and in all details relating to the duties of the Fleet, and to the discipline and interior economy of H.M. ships, to be held subject to the authority of any officer of the Royal Navy, not below the rank of lieutenant, who might be in charge of the executive duties of the ship or in charge of any other service or duty, whatever the seniority of such officer might be. This was considered to be a step backwards to the state of affairs that had caused so much discontent when the Royal Naval Reserve was first founded, but, on the other hand, the Admiralty had strong reasons for inserting the clause and insisted on maintaining it. At the same time the grant of the rank of lieutenant-commander did not mean any increase in pay or allowances while

the Sovereign had made a proclamation, to call up the Reserves as they were wanted. The first few months of the war showed the wisdom of this measure. When the war had been in progress for six weeks, only five commanders were on naval duty out of the 42 on the active list, and only 45 lieutenant-commanders out of 144. In the lieutenants' and sub-lieutenants' ranks the proportion was higher, and, of course, all the temporary men were immediately embarked as soon as they were fit for their work.

It had early been foretold that the Reserve would mean very considerable embarrassment to the companies in war time, and the experience of the Cunard Line showed that this was true. Of the 163 navigating officers in the employ of the company, no fewer than 139 were officers of the Reserve, for the management has always done all that it possibly could to encourage them to join up. The difficulties when these men were called up on the outbreak of war may be imagined, but they were very considerably lessened by the attitude of the authorities, who took the company's point of view wherever it was possible and called the officers out in such a way that commerce was interfered with as little as the circumstances permitted. This showed the advantage of the provisions in the 1900 Act which permitted the Admiralty to call out officers and ratings only as required.

An appreciation of the work done by the various registrars was contained in a letter which was sent by Mr. C. H. Jones, the Registrar-General, to his subordinates:—"... With reference (he wrote) to the mobilisation of the Royal Naval Reserve now in progress, the Admiral Commanding has requested me to convey to you his warm appreciation of the results so far obtained. To have dispatched to the Depots so large a number of men in such a short space of time (50 per cent. of the strength within 48 hours of the Order to Mobilise), in the circumstances obtaining at the moment, points (he says) to an efficient organisation, and a zealous and intelligent co-operation reflecting the greatest credit on all concerned."

The fact that the mobilisation had proceeded without a hitch, until a pause had to be called because the Navy could not for the moment absorb all the men that were proceeding to the depots in a steady stream, was in itself sufficient tribute to the men who had built up the organisation.

Towards the end of August, 1914, an order was promulgated from the Admiralty to the effect that the use of the blue ensign by merchant vessels was prohibited from Monday, Aug. 24, and no vessel was to be allowed to fly the blue ensign from that day named except under special Admiralty warrant issued subsequently to that date. All outstanding warrants were thereby cancelled.

The existence of a rigid establishment as regards R.N.R. officers was certainly desirable in time of peace, but war had not been in progress many days before it was found very necessary to enrol a large number of new officers, a greater number than had ever been contemplated, in or out of the regulations. Power was given the Admiralty to increase the number of R.N.R. officers according to its discretion, without any regard for the establishment, but provision was made that no lists should remain increased beyond the definite establishment after the war was over.

Immediately war broke out a number of retired flag officers, ranging from comparatively junior Rear-Admirals to full Admirals, who were well advanced in years, volunteered for service. Unfortunately,

the number of flag commands was limited, and most of these officers were given temporary commissions as Commanders in the Royal Naval Reserve, the list including such names as Admiral Sir Alfred Wyndham Paget, Admiral John Marx, Admiral Charles Barlow, Rear-Admiral Herbert Purey Cust, and Vice-Admiral James Startin. Most of them were given the command of armed yachts in charge of patrol divisions, but they gradually drifted into posts in which their special knowledge was more fully employed. At the same time temporary commissions as lieutenant were given to officers like Lord Tredegar, who commanded his own yacht, the *Liberty*, on hospital work; the veteran Earl of Dunraven, who also had command of a hospital yacht, and others; and later a commission as commander was granted to the Duke of Sutherland, who commanded his yacht, the famous *Catania*.

The attitude of the lower deck towards the retired admirals who had taken R.N.R. rank was sometimes amusing, as is recorded by Captain E. R. G. R. Evans in his book on the Dover Patrol. A certain very busy naval officer was informed by his Royal Marine orderly that there was an R.N.R. commander to see him, but replied that he was so busy that he could see nobody. "Well, I think you ought to see this one," he replied. "He's one of them there disrated admirals."

There is a good deal of feeling over the matter of the pay of those gallant flag officers who returned from the retired list to take any active job that was offered to them, generally in a subordinate capacity. In no case did they receive the pay of the rank in which they were serving, nor were they treated in the same way as other retired officers who had their pensions suspended but were given the full pay of their rank with a 25 per cent. addition to compensate them for not being allowed to count this further war service as time for the augmentation of their pension. These flag officers were granted their pension plus 25 per cent. for the time they were on service, and few will deny that they earned every penny of it. Their treatment was criticised by those who appreciated the patriotism of their action, but it is worth noting that from these officers themselves not a single complaint was heard. By an Order in Council of May, 1915, things were put into better shape.

The special rank of Commodore second class in the Royal Naval Reserve was established by Order in Council in April, 1915, for the special benefit of Sir Richard Henry Williams-Bulkeley, Bart., who, as Honorary Captain of the R.N.R. was in command of the naval depot at the Crystal Palace, a depot that was increasing in importance almost daily. In order to maintain his position the special rank was granted to him with consolidated pay at the rate of £1000 per annum. There were no others for some time.

The number of Commanders R.N.R. had been fixed at fifty in 1904, but experience of the war suggested an Order in Council in January, 1916, which provided for an additional ten officers who should be promoted for gallantry in the presence of the enemy or for especially good service during hostilities. In May, 1917, this additional number was increased to twenty.

As soon as war broke out good use was found for the energies of all the R.N.R. accountant officers, particularly in connection with the commissioning of ammunition carriers, colliers, and Royal Fleet auxiliaries of all kinds which were required in the shortest possible

time. There was much to be done, and practically all the senior officers on the list were employed in doing it. With their knowledge of naval routine they found that the business of "kitting up" and instructing all hands in naval matters fell to their lot.

The value of the accountant officers was soon shown. As soon as their work in commissioning ammunition carriers and Royal Fleet auxiliaries was done they were found plenty of jobs in running various naval establishments ashore. The average R.N.R. accountant officer already had very considerable business experience, and this gave him administrative ability. They were also employed as secretaries to flag officers on unfamiliar duties, as it was soon seen that the business training of the R.N.R. made them very much better qualified to cope with such questions than the man who had spent most of his life in the confines of the service. They were also employed in coding and cypher duties until they were relieved by certain temporary R.N.V.R. officers specially trained for this class of work. Another function in which the R.N.R. accountant officer found himself particularly useful was in dealing with the questions that were regularly cropping up regarding civilian rights. Needless to say, many of these rights had a very shadowy foundation and were put forward to make the biggest sum possible out of the Admiralty. On the other hand, it was very easy for a well-meaning officer to land himself in an appalling legal entanglement through taking things too much for granted.

From the year 1913 to a period well into the war the status of the accountant officer was steadily improving. In August, 1913, assistant paymasters R.N.R. were made eligible for the award of the R.N.R. Officers' Decoration, provided they had completed fifteen years' commissioned service, and soon afterwards, when the establishment of accountant officers R.N. was increased, it was decided to invite assistant paymasters R.N.R. to volunteer for one year's service afloat, with pay of ten shillings a day, equipment allowance of fifteen pounds, and a twenty-five pound bonus on termination of appointment, conditional on good conduct and service. The matter of the accountant officer's pay had long been a very sore point, for it had been made absolutely inelastic, and nothing could be more depressing to keenness. In December, 1916, it was decided to establish a progressive table of pay, although the rank remained the same. Under eight years' seniority an officer received ten shillings a day, and for the next two years eleven shillings. He was then advanced to twelve shillings for two years, and finally, after he had twelve years' seniority, he was entitled to thirteen shillings a day.

This did not, however, settle a question of promotion which arose in May, 1917, when several accountant officers had distinguished themselves during the war and had taken on such important duties that it was found absolutely necessary to give them higher rank. Accordingly it was provided that Assistant Paymasters should be eligible for the rank of Paymaster R.N.R. when they had accrued twelve years' seniority in the lower rank. They were to be paid fifteen shillings a day on promotion, with an increase of a shilling a day after one year and a total of seventeen shillings after three years. The age of compulsory retirement was fixed at forty-five. It was still felt, however, that there was very considerable hardship in the long period that had to be put in as assistant paymaster, a period

which not only involved hardship on the individual, but wasted excellent material for his Majesty's service. Accordingly, in June, 1917, new regulations were published which provided that Assistant Paymasters could be promoted to the rank of Paymaster on attaining four years' seniority, and that the existing rank of Paymaster was to be altered to that of Staff Paymaster. Officers were to be eligible for promotion to this rank—always at the discretion of the Admiralty—on attaining eight years' seniority as Paymaster. Thus were the accountant officers proved in the crucible of war, and thus they won the recognition for which they had been fighting so long.

During the war there was some agitation against the appointment of accountant officers R.N.R. to seagoing ships, the argument of the objectors being that it would be fairer to promote chief writers to commissioned rank to do the work. The Admiralty, however, stuck to its guns and refused to consider the suggestion, pointing out that patriotic officers had come forward from civil life, particularly well equipped for the work that they were called upon to do, and that taking advantage of their offer and permitting them to do it involved far less hardship than would be caused if a large number of lower deck ratings were promoted to commissioned rank, only to find that the Navy could not absorb them after the war. During the discussion on this point, the Admiralty announced in January, 1918, that it had granted 782 temporary commissions as Assistant Paymaster R.N.R., exclusive of commissions granted to the pursers of ships taken over as fleet auxiliaries, &c.

Experience in taking up the various auxiliary cruisers in the early stages of the war proved that pursers could make very valuable R.N.R. accountant officers, and it has since been suggested that a regular system should be established for training them in time of peace to do such work. One of the many things that they could do most usefully would be the stripping of armed merchant cruisers, a work that went on right merrily as soon as they were commissioned at the outbreak of war, and on which it was estimated that at least eight million pounds was wasted inside a month. The pursers, of course, know all about the fittings of their own ships, and they also know how best to deal with the companies' ratings who are taken on for naval purposes. A good many pursers were appointed, and the good work they did should ensure due consideration being given to this point in the near future, although very few remain on the active list.

In the early days of the war it was customary to send the ships of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron down to Liverpool to bunker and revictual, but it was soon discovered that not only was this taking them far out of their way, but it was also putting them to a very grave risk of attack from submarines, for the Germans knew of the arrangement perfectly well and several times sent U-boats specially to lie in wait for the ships. Accordingly, it was decided to make a bunkering station on the west coast of Shetland Island, and Swarbacks Minn was the site selected, Rear-Admiral W. B. Fawckner being brought out of the retired list to take command. The station was opened in September, 1915, complete with boom and a patrol of trawlers. The authorities provided the Admiral, but they did not provide the staff, and a R.N.R. accountant officer had to do the duties of executive officer, secretary, stores officer, censor, and any other jobs that came along.

Needless to say, the special circumstances of the war played havoc with the set regulations of the Royal Naval Reserve, so that there were many cases in which officers suffered for their service. Steps were taken to rectify this, however, and in August, 1915, an order was published which dispensed with the necessity of their performing short courses in gunnery and torpedo during the war in order to qualify for the receipt of training fees—not paid on active service—and for promotion. At the same time this exemption was provisional on the officer obtaining a satisfactory report from his superiors.

By the old regulation it was enacted that an officer must possess a master's ticket and have certain certificates of service before he could receive the lower rating of naval navigating allowance of 2s. 6d. per day. It was found during the war that the exigencies of service led to the employment on navigating duties, particularly in connection with the auxiliary Patrol service, of many R.N.R. officers who had no opportunity of qualifying under the old regulation, and who therefore suffered considerable hardship. Accordingly, in June, 1915, it was ordered that such officers who were in possession of a deep sea master's certificate should receive the allowance of 3s. a day, and that officers in possession of only a mate's or second mate's certificate should also be paid an allowance of 2s. a day—a concession which was very much appreciated.

As soon as war broke out every midshipman in the service was required to do a full man's work, and they rose to the occasion grandly. At the same time it was realised that their training must not be altogether neglected, and an elaborate system was worked out for R.N. midshipmen. During the war it was announced that Reservists should undergo the same course, at the discretion of their commanding officers, but that there was no necessity to instruct them in engineering.

In 1915 it was decided to encourage the transfer of midshipmen R.N.R. to the Royal Navy, which had been permitted for some time past with very satisfactory results. The first step was an increase in pay to the uniform rate of 4s. 6d. per day to midshipmen R.N.R. transferred to the Royal Navy, this rate to be payable until they reached the rank of sub-lieutenant or were appointed for sub-lieutenant's duties. In September, 1917, pay was increased to 5s. a day, and at the same time the pay of midshipmen remaining in the R.N.R. was increased.

From January 1, 1915, lieutenants and sub-lieutenants R.N.R. benefited by the increased rates of pay to the same extent as their brothers in the R.N., the pay of the sub-lieutenant being increased from 5s. to 7s. 6d. and that of a lieutenant on promotion from 10s. a day to 11s., and after four years from 11s. to 12s.

On July 17, 1917, a Royal Proclamation was issued which gave the Admiralty authority to retain the Reserves in actual service for a period of five years, if their services were required for so long, but it was explained that there was no intention of using this power to extend the services of the men beyond the period covered by the former expression of "the duration of the war."

In the beginning of 1917 another concession was made to the spirit of the R.N.R. by permitting men for the period of hostilities to qualify for good conduct badges in precisely the same way as ordinary active service ratings in the Navy. Only service while called out was to be allowed to count as time for this award, and the Reservist was

not permitted to count any time in the mercantile marine. This concession by the Admiralty was very greatly appreciated.

Right down to November, 1915, the various ranks of engineer officers in the R.N.R. had been named in the old-fashioned style — Chief Engineer, Senior Engineer, Engineer and Assistant Engineer — although the rank of their opposite numbers in the Royal Navy had been altered for some time. Accordingly, at that date it was decided to bring the two forces into line, and the titles were therefore changed to Engineer Commander, Lieutenant Commander, Lieutenant and Sub-Lieutenant, a very sensible change that might well have been made some considerable time before in the interests of smooth working.

In the early summer of 1918 there was a revision of pay of the engineers carried in minesweepers under Agreement T.124 Z. In seagoing ships the Chief Engineer drew £28 a month, the Second Engineer £17, and the Third £14. In port minesweepers carrying three engineers the rates were £20, £16 10s. and £14 respectively, but where only two were carried the senior received only £19 a month instead of £20. In addition, there was a victualling allowance of 3s. 6d. a day.

The services of the R.N.R. engine room ratings during the war were acknowledged step by step, first by the creation of new ranks which permitted better advancement, and secondly by increased facilities for attaining temporary commissioned rank. In July, 1916, the rank of Chief Warrant Engineer, R.N.R., was established, the numbers not to exceed 20 per cent. of the total number of chief warrant engineers and warrant engineers combined. Promotion to rank was to be limited to warrant engineers R.N.R. who served as such for at least one year in H.M. ships. The annual retainer and discharge gratuity or pension were not altered, but the pay when called up for service in the Fleet or under training was to be that of the corresponding rank in the R.N. (11s. 6d. a day), warrant officers to rank with but after chief artificer engineers in the R.N. In May, 1917, the rank of chief engine-room artificer R.N.R. was established, ranking with, but after, the rating of Chief E.R.A. second class in the R.N., with pay at the rate of 6s. 4d. a day—a possibility of promotion that added very considerably to the keenness of the branch. In October, 1916, facilities were given for warrant engineers and engine-room artificers R.N.R. to attain temporary commissioned rank. They were to be promoted to temporary engineer sub-lieutenants at a pay of 11s. a day, and after a year's service and full recommendation were further to be advanced to temporary engineer-lieutenant at 14s., together with messing allowance of 2s. a day. Later, chief warrant engineers were given the same chances of promotion as their juniors.

In the summer of 1917 efforts were made in Parliament to persuade the authorities to grant chief warrant engineers R.N.R. the right to pass direct to engineer - lieutenant R.N.R., and so to place them on an equality in this respect with the chief artificer engineers of the Royal Navy. The Admiralty, however, could not see their way to do this at that time, for, as it was pointed out, the rank had been in existence for one year only, whereas the rank in the Royal Navy had been introduced as long ago as 1903. It was, however, stated that when sufficient experience had been gained of the capabilities of the officers holding

the rank of chief warrant engineer R.N.R., a proposal for their promotion direct to engineer-lieutenant would be considered. But at the same time the Admiralty was willing to accelerate their promotion to engineer-lieutenant, as was shown in the regulations which came out immediately afterwards.

After a good deal of discussion it was decided in July, 1917, to promote a strictly limited number of chief warrant engineers, warrant engineers and engine-room artificers R.N.R. to temporary commissioned rank. Only those who held first-class Board of Trade certificates, or were qualified to sit for one, were eligible, and the regulations laid down made it by no means easy to pass. The officers selected could be promoted to temporary engineer-sub-lieutenant, and after a year at sea could get their second ring. Finally, special facilities were given to chief warrant engineers to pass directly to their second ring in the manner that had previously been refused. All such officers, whether one or two "ringers," messed in the ward-room and were paid 11s. and 14s. a day respectively, together with a messing allowance of 2s. and the appropriate outfit gratuity.

On New Year's Day, 1916, the Admiralty ordered that those warrant telegraphists who were not in receipt of Mercantile Marine rates of pay should receive £12 a year war retaining fee, and should be paid 5s. or 6s. per day, according to the circumstances. Until then the regulations with regard to these warrant officers had been more than a little obscure.

During the war, when tonnage began to get short, and when the ravages of the German submarine were imposing severe hardships on the country, the salvage service became a very important one, and its rise and work is practically all due to the Royal Naval Reserve. The Liverpool Salvage Association's steamers *Ranger* and *Linton* (ex *Linnet*) were taken over after the war had been in progress only a few weeks, and with them Captain Frederick Young offered his services as Naval Salvage Adviser to the Admiralty. His assistants were a retired naval officer, Commander Dathan, Commanders Kay, Gracey and Borissow, R.N.R., and a number of other R.N.R. officers, in addition to civilian experts. At first the two salvage steamers were under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, but it soon became obvious that the section would grow out of such an administration. Among the first jobs of the section was to place the various blockships in position—the battleship *Hood* in the Hole-in-the-Wall at Portland, and merchant ships at Dover, Sunderland, Holm Sound and other points.

As time went on and more ships were sunk the salvage section was greatly expanded. All sorts of mercantile salvage steamers and steamers that could be converted into salvage vessels were dragged in, as well as the men-of-war *Racer*, *Reindeer*, *Mariner*, *Thrush* and *Melita*, all of which were manned entirely by mercantile ratings, either from the Royal Naval Reserve or under T.124 articles. The principal officers were given commissions as commander R.N.R., while their assistants were lieutenants R.N.R. or R.N.V.R. Not only were they used for assisting torpedoed merchantmen and men-of-war, but they did exceedingly useful work on German submarines, either helping to bring them in entire or else rendering full and accurate reports to the Admiralty. Captain Young was later given the rank of commodore R.N.R., and at the end of the war he was

knighted. Both he and the remnants of his section were kept very busy for some time afterwards clearing the Belgian harbours of the block ships that had been sunk there in 1918.

Temporary officers entered into the R.N.R. for special purposes, and not included in the General List, were known as Temporary (A) Officers, but they soon proved themselves to be well worthy of their uniform in a score of different spheres. Of course it was not possible to exercise the same strict scrutiny of character and previous record in their case as had been the practice in the regular R.N.R. officers, but there were remarkably few black sheep in the flock, and many temporary officers attained the highest distinction.

In August, 1918, the regulations for temporary R.N.R. officers were considerably tightened, it being definitely laid down that a temporary commission would not be granted to an officer who possessed a second mate's certificate only or who had no Board of Trade certificate. In the case of transports, when crews were signed on under the T.124 Agreement, the grant of temporary commissions to executive officers was to be restricted to the master and chief officer only, as had generally been the case previously. It was also provided that officers who were granted temporary R.N.R. commissions on their ships being taken up as transports would be discharged and that their pay would cease at the expiration of the notice given under the agreement, but that they would be permitted to retain their commissions for a period of 28 days after the discharge, at the end of which the commissions had to be sent back to the Admiralty to be cancelled.

It was not until some days after the Armistice that regulations were laid down for the promotion of sub-lieutenants and engineer sub-lieutenants who were serving under the T.124 Agreement in its various forms. It was then maintained that, subject to certain conditions, they would be eligible for automatic promotion to their second stripe, irrespective of the appointments they held at the time. These conditions were that they should be specially recommended by their commanding officers, have attained a minimum age of 32 years, have held a master's or first-class engineer's ticket for not less than four years, and served for not less than three years in the R.N.R. This automatic promotion, however, did not carry with it any increase of pay, this being decided by the class of vessel in which the officer was serving and the work that he was doing. Later still came an order which defined the status of mercantile marine officers serving under the various T. 124 Agreements without holding commissions. It was generally felt that this status might have been defined long before, when the war was in progress and when the question was of far greater importance.

When war broke out a number of mercantile marine ratings were entered under what was known as "Ships' Agreement T. 124," and by this they were liable only for service on board the ship for which they were engaged. In August, 1916, however, the Admiralty decided that this was hampering the commissioning of merchant ships badly, and accordingly they issued a weekly order which provided that a Mercantile Marine reserve should be established of the principal ratings which were required to fill vacancies on board the commissioned fleet auxiliaries. These men were signed on as necessary by the mercantile marine superintendents, and the

form to which they agreed was known as T. 124 X. Under this they agreed to serve in any commissioned vessel, and not, as in the original form, in one particular vessel only. This put further work on the registrars, for they had the duty of recording the movements and services of all mercantile ratings, whose discharges were re-graded as service certificates and were retained by the commanding officers of ships just as they would be retained by the captains of merchantmen in peace time. By this same Admiralty weekly order, the rates of pay were standardised. Two other forms had been in use, the T. 124 B. and the T. 124 Y., both being principally used by the crews of commissioned yachts.

In the early summer of 1916 it was found that a number of mercantile ratings discharged from the T. 124 agreement were not receiving adequate medical treatment, very largely on account of their own ignorance of the strict regulations. This hardship was wiped out by better arrangements for reception in the naval hospitals, and also for a more exact method of computing the injury which a man had sustained as compared with his normal earning capacity. By this means it was possible to give the men the best treatment, both in the naval centres and in their own homes, although it is to be feared that the attainment of this was accompanied by a good deal of grumbling on the part of the men that they were tied up with red tape, and a large number robbed themselves of benefits to which they were entitled rather than bother to obtain them.

It was not until September, 1918, that proper regulations were passed for the uniforms of the officers and men of the commissioned fleet auxiliaries on a mercantile agreement. Executive or engineer officers granted temporary commissions in the R.N.R. wore the uniform of their rank, £20 being granted in the case of armed merchant cruisers, minelayers, seaplane carriers, fleet sweepers or armed boarding steamers, and £10 for other craft, such as paddle minesweepers, kite balloon ships and commissioned tugs, with an extra £5 in each case when it became necessary for the officer to buy tropical kit. On the other hand, deck and engineer officers who were not granted temporary commissions were authorised to wear a uniform similar in cut and pattern to that of the Royal Navy, but having no crown over the anchors on the buttons, and bearing badges of rank on the right shoulder strap only. It was felt, however, that it was some hardship that it was specially laid down that in no circumstances could a further grant be entertained.

On March 31, 1920, the engagement of all men in the Mercantile Marine Reserve in its various branches was terminated, the men being granted the King's certificate of discharge but no "hurts" certificate. The experiment of forming such a reserve had been most successful, and, although in the beginning mistakes were made, the various branches of the T.124 men pulled their full weight and did splendid service.

The rank of Chief Skipper R.N.R. in the Trawler Section was founded on October 3, 1916, as a commissioned warrant rank which would provide a step for the skippers R.N.R. who had done such magnificent work in command of trawlers in the Auxiliary Patrol, work that could not be too highly commended. The rank carried with it the pay of 12s. a day, but otherwise they were to be eligible to receive all the allowances, gratuities, &c., paid to skippers, and, on the

other hand, they were to be under the order which provided for forfeiture of pay, for a period not exceeding thirty days, by sentence of Court Martial or Disciplinary Court.

The drifters engaged on boom defence were first of all manned by crews engaged on a civilian basis, but in 1917 arrangements were made to transfer them to the Navy under a special form of agreement which tightened up discipline. The mates of these craft drew 6s. 1d. a day, or 7s. 3d. if they were stationed in the Orkneys or Shetlands, where the conditions of service were very much harder. The engineers drew 7s. 4d., or 8s. 6d. in the north, while the remainder of the crew drew 4s. 10d., or 6s. in the north. In addition to this they had a daily allowance of 1s. 5d. for food, and when they were required to wear uniform they received periodical gratuities to cover the cost. Their families were not entitled to a separation allowance.

On Sept. 1, 1918, the drifter ratings who had been engaged on the special form were transferred to form T.124 Z., which brought them under the Naval Discipline Act, and stiffened up the organisation considerably. Under this agreement, skippers received £17 10s. a month, and engineers £15, unless they were already being paid at a higher rate, in which case they retained the advantage. The change was very carefully made to preclude any loss of privilege, and was really in the interest of the men as well as of the Admiralty. The ratings were to be paid monthly, but weekly advances could be granted, and generally were. At the same time, it was made quite clear that the men were not entitled to any special pay that might be authorised by the Admiralty for the fleet in general from time to time.

It will be well understood that the skippers of drifters had an even harder time than those of trawlers, and in 1918 an economical uniform was designed for them which carried a single stripe of half-inch gold lace on the shoulder straps, where it was not nearly so liable to become frayed and to wear out as on the cuffs. At the same time, the Admiralty agreed to pay £10 towards the cost of their uniforms, a concession that was very gratifying to men who were not accustomed to worry very much about the clothes in which they put to sea, but who were as keen as anybody on maintaining the dignity of their position in the R.N.R.

The work that the men of the trawler patrol were doing drew attention to their pay, which was 1s. a day for boys without a war retainer, and for the higher ratings 3s. 6d. a day for deck hands, trimmers and trimmer cooks, 4s. a day for leading hands and leading trimmers, and 6s. a day for second hands and engine men. All these ratings received a war retainer of £1 a month, on entry, and a provision allowance of 1s. 5d. a day. The boys not only received no war retainer, but did not get the gratuity of 30 days' pay on discharge which was granted to the men if they could prove that they had completed twelve months' service unbroken by desertion. The families of the men in the trawler patrol got a separation allowance similar to that in the Navy.

Before the war had been in progress long the Trawler Section had expanded in a manner that nobody could have prophesied, and in November, 1914, the additional rating of signal boy R.N.R. was established, with pay at the rate of 1s. a day.

From its very beginning the Nigerian Marine had been closely associated with R.N.R. matters,

and when war broke out practically all the commissioned ranks, including the Director and the Deputy Director, were R.N.R. officers. The Admiralty had agreed that in normal circumstances they were to be retained on the active list as long as they performed their training and other Reserve duties, and the majority of them were so keen that they were most particular to carry out their training as soon as they got home on leave. Considering how much leave means to the man who has done continuous service in the tropics, this keenness is highly commendable. The Admiralty agreed not to call these officers out for service, but early in the war they were in action in the Cameroons campaign, when several distinguished themselves.

The question of the position of Trinity pilots who are also R.N.R. officers has always been a thorny one. In 1900 it came to a head by a midshipman being requested to resign when he joined the Bengal Pilotage Service, but two years later a well-known Gravesend pilot was informed that his duties were not held to be inconsistent with those of the Royal Naval Reserve provided that they did not interfere with his Reserve obligations. In 1908 the Admiralty reconsidered this decision and announced that all pilots should be removed from the active list after they had been pilots for four years, but after the war it was decided that each case should be judged on its merits, having especial regard to the particular duties that the pilots were likely to be called upon to perform. It was found in war that the pilots on home service were available before most other R.N.R. officers, but those on distant stations were, of course, very difficult to recall. The crux of the matter is really personal keenness, and several pilots are particularly enthusiastic on their R.N.R. duties, undertaking their training at very considerable pecuniary loss to themselves.

It will be remembered that when additional officers were put on to the Supplementary List in 1913 certain restrictions were placed on their chances of promotion, but some of them did so well during the war that on Aug. 20, 1915, an order was issued which permitted the transfer of officers from the Supplementary to the General List of the Royal Navy in the event of their having performed specially meritorious service during the war, or having specially distinguished themselves in action, and that officers so transferred should be allowed to count their service on the Supplementary List. It was a minor triumph for the R.N.R., but in the magnificent work that they were doing it passed almost unnoticed.

Chapter XI. *The Reserve in Big Ships.*

THE first function of the Reserve, before the auxiliary patrol was very much thought of, was to man the older men-of-war, with the mobilised coast-guards and a few Regular ratings, and the auxiliary cruisers with the specially entered mercantile ratings and a still smaller sprinkling of naval men. Soon the Auxiliary Patrol assumed an importance never dreamed of by its most sanguine supporters, and the work of the Reserve naturally fell into the simple classification of big or small ships. It is difficult to say in which they did best.

When war broke out the Seventh and Eighth Battle Squadrons of the Grand Fleet consisted of the five ships of the *Canopus* and the nine ships of the *Majestic* type, for which there were no crews in the naval barracks. On board they had no more than a skeleton force of officers and care-and-maintenance parties, and it was the first business of the Royal Naval Reserve to man these ships. They were got away remarkably rapidly, four ships of the *Majestic* type being ready to proceed to the Humber on guardship duties before war actually broke out. These ships were afterwards distributed very widely for the defence of important points, the strengthening of weak cruiser squadrons, and detached operations. The *Canopus* herself was proceeding towards Cradock when the disaster of Coronel occurred, later going round to the Falklands in time for the battle and having the honour of securing the first hit on the German ships—with a practice projectile. Finally, quite a large proportion of these ships, still with their Reserve crews, drifted towards the Dardanelles, where their old-fashioned guns did exceedingly good work bombarding, but where they offered a very tempting mark to enemy submarines. The casualties among Reservists in these ships were heavy, but certain officers who survived made exceedingly efficient beach-masters, their peace-time practice in handling cargo standing them in good stead.

One of the most difficult jobs of the mobilisation was getting the battleship *Triumph* to sea from Hong Kong. She had been laid up there with a very light crew on board, the idea apparently being that she would have plenty of time to find men if war broke out. But the storm clouds gathered so suddenly that when war was actually declared there were only the men from the laid-up gunboats which had patrolled the Yangtse and other rivers to supply her. These were not nearly sufficient, and when an appeal was made to native seamen in Hong Kong not one of them came forward. A number of Royal Naval Reserve men were collected, and these, with the gunboat men, formed the backbone of the crew, the balance being made up by two officers, 100 men, and six signalmen from the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry. So she went to sea, and so she did very well against the German positions at Tsingtau.

The name of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron will always be associated with the Royal Naval Reserve, for from the beginning of its career it

was very closely identified with it. According to the pre-war plan of action, it was composed of six cruisers of the *Edgar* type, ships of 7000 odd tons, with a maximum speed of twenty knots, armed with two 9.2 and ten 6-inch guns. The flagship was the *Crescent*, which differed slightly from the others and which mounted one 9.2 and twelve 6-inch guns, and with her were the *Edgar*, *Endymion*, *Theseus*, *Hawke* and *Grafton*. Most of these ships had been acting as tenders to the various gunnery schools for some time before the war, and none of them were very highly regarded as cruisers, but they were put under Rear Admiral Dudley de Chair, and were told off to maintain the Northern Patrol with orders to intercept German trade northabout. Their patrolling ground was principally between the Shetlands and the west coast of Norway, and it was essentially a rough weather station, to which these old cruisers were but ill adapted. They were tied up for lack of men to begin with, and it was some days before they could reach their station owing to the unavoidable difficulty of digesting all the Royal Naval Reserve ratings at the depots and sending them to their appointed ships. Presently they got to work, but they were never really satisfactory, and when the *Hawke* was torpedoed with very considerable loss of life the others were given a slightly different station, which revealed their lack of coal capacity in a very serious light. Accordingly, as early as October, 1914, Admiral de Chair suggested that they should be replaced by armed merchant cruisers which would have very much better coal capacity and altogether be more suitable for their work, but it was not until one or two of these ships showed an alarming tendency to turn turtle that his request was seriously considered by the Admiralty. For the greater part of the war the Tenth Cruiser Squadron consisted entirely of armed liners, manned almost entirely by R.N.R. and Mercantile officers and ratings, and the work that they did cannot be praised too highly.

Another cruiser squadron that was manned almost entirely by R.N.R. and coastguard ratings was the Seventh Cruiser Squadron, which was put under the command of Rear-Admiral Campbell as a sort of "maid of all work." The squadron consisted of the *Bacchante*, flagship, and her sisters the *Aboukir*, *Euryalus*, *Sutlej*, and *Cressy*, a magnificently homogeneous squadron of 12,000-ton, 21-knot armoured cruisers that had often been described as the best bargain that the Navy had. They were not new, and cruiser design had advanced very rapidly since their day, but for their proper work they were good sea boats, well armed and reasonably well protected, while they could stow 1600 tons of coal apiece and could keep the sea for long periods. The trouble was that they were never allowed to undertake their proper work, but were always called away from this job to that. First of all they were intended to protect the Belgian coast, to prevent the blockade of the Scheldt, to check any descent on the east coast of England, and to cover the Channel crossing. Then they were required to support Tyrwhitt from Harwich and to give a backing to the British forces in the Battle of Heligoland Bight. Later they were split up, but when they were given the chance they still continued to do exceedingly useful work and to put in a large proportion of sea time. Then the tragedy of the "Cressies" occurred and these ships were withdrawn

from the North Sea to act as escorts between the United Kingdom and Gibraltar, a work for which they were very much better fitted.

These old armoured cruisers of the *Cressy* type had proved time and again that they were not really suitable by construction for close co-operation with the destroyer flotillas, and it was planned to relieve them on the dangerous North Sea Patrol as soon as the new cruisers of the *Arethusa* type were completed. The large proportion of R.N.R. ratings in their crews made them particularly suitable for deep-sea work, and it was being realised more and more that there was plenty of deep-sea work for them to do as soon as they could be spared from the North Sea. However, they were used while they were available, and at the end of September, 1914, they were sent out to patrol round the Maas Lightship in order to prevent any German forces slipping down towards the Channel and interfering with the transport of troops. Rear-Admiral Christian had his flag in the *Bacchante*, which was due to put into port to coal, but when he tried to transfer to one of the ships that were going out the sea was so heavy that it was quite impossible for boat work and accordingly the force had to proceed under the command of Captain Drummond of the *Aboukir*. The sea which these ships rode quite comfortably was amply sufficient to keep the destroyers and new cruisers chained in port, so that they had to do their patrol work without a screen of small craft or else run the risk of the transports being cut up. Needless to say they chose the former and carried on with their job in the narrow passage left between the German minefield and the Dutch coast, trusting to luck that they would not be attacked.

At the earliest opportunity the Admiralty sent out a cruiser force to co-operate with them, but it came too late. The ships were steaming in line abreast at only ten knots, and were not taking zigzagging precautions against submarines, a practice which did not come into general use until considerably later. The German submarine *U. 9*, under Kapitan-Lieutenant Otto Weddingen, caught sight of them and immediately attacked. The first ship to be torpedoed was the *Aboukir*, and at first the explosion was thought to be due to a mine. Her consorts were warned to keep away, but when she was seen to be sinking rapidly the *Hogue* and *Cressy* closed in to render assistance. The *Hogue* was promptly torpedoed twice while she was practically motionless in the water, and almost immediately afterwards the *Cressy* received a torpedo amidships. Her boats had been called away to rescue survivors of the other ships, so that her men were absolutely helpless, and it was some time before a Dutch ship came to her assistance, other vessels in the neighbourhood having been kept away by the fear of mines. As a result of this help rather more than 800 men were saved, but nearly 1400 were lost. Nearly all the victims were R.N.R. ratings, and the disaster was a big blow to the Force.

As soon as war was inevitable preparations were taken to commission the merchant ships that were considered necessary to complete the cruiser forces. In port there were the Cunard *Aquitania* and *Caronia*, the P. & O. *Macedonia* and *Marmora*, and the Union-Castle *Armadale Castle*, while on their way home were the White Star *Oceanic* and the Cunard *Lusitania* and *Mauretania*. In the Mediterranean was the *Osiris*, of the P. & O. Line, which had been specially built in 1898

to run the express service between Brindisi and Port Said. It was not long before the *Lusitania* and *Mauretania* were paid off, for in spite of the high hopes of the Admiralty officials that they would form the ideal merchant cruisers it proved far too difficult to keep them supplied with coal. Early in August the *Aquitania* had a serious collision, and the Admiralty decided to return her to her owners, and soon afterwards to replace these big and expensive ships by vessels of smaller tonnage. Accordingly the Admiralty called up the *Carmania*, *Kinfauns Castle*, *Alsatian*, *Otranto*, *Mantua* and *Victorian*, with the two transport-cruisers of the Indian Marine, the *Dufferin* and the *Hardinge*, which were really nothing more than armed liners. In these ships the crews were practically entirely composed of the Royal Naval Reserve and mercantile ratings specially entered into the service, the captain and certain of the officers only belonging to the regular service.

The wardroom of the big auxiliary cruisers that were commissioned at the outbreak of war was bound to be a problem, but, generally speaking, it was quite satisfactorily arranged. Let us take the *Alsatian* as a useful ship at the head of the list. Her captain was a distinguished naval officer, while the ordinary captain of the ship was Commander R.N.R. In addition she had a naval lieutenant-commander as first lieutenant, and eight R.N.R. lieutenants as watch-keepers. All her engineers were Reservists—one chief engineer, one senior engineer, and eleven engineers. The doctors were naval—a retired fleet surgeon and a temporary "two-ring" surgeon. She had two assistant paymasters R.N.R., a naval gunner in charge of the stores, and later two R.N.R. midshipmen. This scheme was carried out practically right through the list of auxiliary cruisers, and, generally speaking, it worked well. Occasionally, however, the wrong man was appointed to command, for it will be well understood that as he was put over the officer who had handled the ship in all conditions, the relations called for a good deal of tact. An armed boarding steamer like the *Tara* had a retired naval officer in command, under the title of "Naval Officer Commander," with a mercantile master who had the rank of Lieutenant R.N.R. All the other officers were Reservists—one engineer and four assistant engineers, three sub-lieutenants, and an assistant paymaster. A large number of the commissions given were temporary, but the officers worked very hard to fall into their duties.

One of the first of the Cunard liners to be equipped as a cruiser was the *Carmania*. As soon as she arrived alongside the Prince's stage at Liverpool, she was boarded by the naval captain and first lieutenant who had been appointed—Captain Noel Grant and Lieutenant-Commander E. Lockyer. Captain J. C. Barr remained as navigator, with the temporary rank of Commander R.N.R., a large proportion of the mercantile crew being specially enrolled in the R.N.R. for a period of six months. The balance was made up with Royal Naval and Royal Naval Reserve ratings from shore. When she had disembarked her passengers and got rid of their luggage, the ship was taken into the docks, and the work of conversion began with her repainting in Navy grey. Sandbags, rope mantlets, coal and occasionally steel plates were fixed where protection was urgently needed. All the wooden bulkheads and everything inflammable in the

passenger accommodation were unshipped and landed. Special fittings were put in to permit the immediate flooding of such holds as were used for magazines, and eight ancient 4.7 guns were mounted in the positions already prepared. Rangefinders and searchlights were also placed in position, while most of her boats were landed as being too inflammable for naval purposes. The naval ratings came from Portsmouth in charge of Lieutenant-Commander O'Neil. The seamen were divided between R.N.R. and Royal Fleet Reserve ratings, most of the former being Scottish fishermen, while there was a strong Royal Marine detachment. All the work was completed inside a week, and she was ready for service.

To begin with, she was employed on the North Atlantic blockade service, carrying out what gunnery practice she could in the open sea. It was proved that, within the limitations of her ancient guns, the R.N.R. and Marine ratings were magnificently efficient, while the task of getting her into Bermuda proved their seamanship. She was then sent down to join Cradock, who was then in the Caribbean. After a spell of this work she was detached to search the island of Trinidad, and sure enough discovered a large liner anchored under its lee. She was a big two-funnelled vessel, and it was most difficult to identify her, for she did not agree with the description of any known ship of her size. A warning shot across her bows by the *Carmania* produced two shells from the enemy, who immediately began to make excellent practice. To begin with, the range was as much as the *Carmania's* old guns could manage, but by manœuvring she contrived to get in a full broadside, and, reducing the range, made excellent practice. Unfortunately, a shell from the enemy, who later proved to be the three-funnelled *Cap Trafalgar* with one of her funnels jettisoned, shot away the gun control and immediately several hits were recorded on the *Carmania's* bridge. At the same time the enemy made every effort to get within machine-gun range. This would have been disastrous for the *Carmania's* ammunition parties, so the British ship increased the range. Firing independently, the *Carmania's* gunners were making good practice, but she herself was seriously on fire in many places, and the water pipes having been shot away, very little could be done with hand buckets. Her bridge caught fire and had to be abandoned, but she maintained a steady fire as her guns came to bear, and finally had the satisfaction of seeing the *Cap Trafalgar*, riddled along the waterline, heel over and commence to sink. The crew of the *Carmania* then had all they could do to overcome the fire. The German raider *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was then seen on the horizon, but, not realising that the British ship would have been an easy prey in her damaged condition, she made off at full speed. The *Carmania* was navigated with the greatest difficulty, patched up in South American waters and then fully repaired at Gibraltar. Captain Barr was made Companion of the Bath, and the first conspicuous success to be secured by the Royal Naval Reserve created great enthusiasm right through the Force.

The Royal Mail Steam Packet Company's *Alcantara* was another well-known auxiliary cruiser, commissioned in the early days of the war and doing useful work in the Tenth Cruiser Squadron. In February, 1916, she and her sister, the *Andes*, were on patrol off the Norwegian coast, when she received warning that a German raider was trying to put to sea. The *Alcantara*

later came up with a steamer wearing Norwegian colours and bearing the name *Rena*, and as orders had been received to search a ship of that name the signal "Stop" was made, and the *Alcantara* made ready to lower a boat. Nothing made her suspect that this was indeed the raider that she was in search of, and she approached within a thousand yards, when suddenly the hinged plates covering the raider's guns fell down and she fired a broadside at almost point-blank range. A good deal of damage was done before the *Alcantara* could reply, but she soon got into action, and the first shell from her after 6-in. gun destroyed one of her enemy's guns with its entire crew. The *Alcantara* immediately attempted to open the range, but her steering gear had been shot away and one engine-room was disabled, so that valuable time was wasted before the hand gear could be got into action. Meanwhile, the enemy had two 5.9 and four 4.1-in. guns bearing, while a two-pounder pompom on her bridge was doing terrible execution. Finally the British ship contrived to increase the distance to 12,000 yards —out of range of the enemy's torpedoes. By this time both ships were in a very bad way, burning furiously and with heavy casualties, but the enemy ship, which turned out to be the raider *Greif*, rolled over and sank before the *Alcantara* could again come into range. Meanwhile, the *Alcantara* herself was sinking, and her survivors had a narrow escape. The *Alcantara* had 68 of her men killed, while the *Greif* had 118 killed and 113 wounded, out of a crew of 375. Once again it was proved how terribly vulnerable auxiliary cruisers were.

In the East Indies the auxiliary cruisers proved themselves particularly useful in running down the German raiders, especially the *Emden*. We were deplorably short of cruisers in those waters, so that the clipper-stemmed Canadian Pacific liner *Empress of Japan*, and her newer sisters, *Empress of Asia* and *Empress of Russia*, together with the famous old P. & O. liner *Himalaya*, made exceedingly useful cruisers. The trouble was that it was very difficult to man them, for in time of peace they carried mostly native seamen; but this was eventually overcome. Finally they put to sea manned principally by Royal Naval Reserve men, recruited from all the ships within reach, the balance of the crew being made up from French ratings from the Yangtse gunboats, soldiers from the Royal Garrison Artillery, and Pathan sepoys for use as signalmen. Surely such a curious crew had never before put to sea, but they did their work magnificently.

In addition to the main auxiliary cruiser squadrons, excellent work was done by these vessels in distant seas while German raiders were still at large. Later their number was reduced, partly because their quarries were all accounted for and partly because they were urgently needed in the growing shortage of tonnage. Then a number of them were used as transports as well as cruisers, and later still in convoys, making use of their guns and also stowing as much cargo as possible. Some of the smaller ships were among the most successful for their cruiser work, but in all of them the Reservists earned a very high reputation, both those who had undergone their training in peace time and those who were entered under T.124 agreements. To begin with, there was a good deal of trouble in their shaking down into naval routine, especially among the firemen, but this was soon overcome, and the difference made in the men by naval discipline, which they

accepted wholeheartedly, was remarkable.

As soon as war broke out it was found that the old cruisers which had been earmarked and partially converted as aircraft carriers were quite inadequate for the purpose, and the first ships which were taken up to supply deficiencies were the fast cross-Channel packets, which could operate with the Fleet with reasonable success. It was soon proved that in order to make up the leeway caused by coming up into the wind to fly off her machines an aircraft carrier should have at least two or three knots greater speed than the ships with which she was operating, and these little Channel packets were excellent for this purpose. The disadvantage was that with their big hangars astern they were exceedingly difficult to manage, especially with a strong wind on the beam. However, a number of them were taken up within a week of the outbreak of war, their peace-time crews being asked to serve on air patrol. Although many of these men were round about sixty years of age and had spent a large part of their life on the ordinary Channel packet service, there was scarcely one who did not volunteer. The captains were granted temporary commissions as Lieutenants or Lieutenant-Commanders R.N.R., and the first mates as sub-lieutenants, the chief engineers being made "two-ring" engineers. Each captain received a letter from the Admiralty stating that he was wholly responsible for the navigation of the ship under the command of a lieutenant R.N., often his inferior in rank. However, the R.N.R. officers put up with the injustice with grand loyalty, and there was very little trouble on this ground. The men signed T.124 agreements, but it was soon found that many of them were too old for their work, although they were as keen as mustard, and they were gradually replaced by regular R.N.R. ratings who had gone through their training in peace time. As a special concession some of the captains were allowed to keep three of their old men as quartermasters, and a few regular naval ratings were drafted in for special duty. Ships of this type operated with Tyrwhitt's cruisers in the famous Cuxhaven raid and their part of the fight reflected the greatest credit both on their officers and crews. The manner in which the *Empress* winged the Zeppelin *L. 6* is an epic of the sea.

At the same time the famous Cunard liner *Campania*, which had been retained by the Admiralty as an auxiliary cruiser when she came out in the early 'nineties, and had always had a large proportion of her reservists among her crew, was taken up by the Admiralty as an aircraft carrier to work with the Grand Fleet. She had ample size, and her speed of 22 knots would have appeared to be plenty for her work, but as soon as she got her machines into operation she was always lagging behind the Fleet and had the greatest difficulty in keeping touch. The Cunard Line had sold her just before war broke out, and the scrappers had commenced to take out the passenger fittings, so that there was comparatively little to be done before she got to sea. She underwent many alterations, however, and before she was sunk in collision, a day or two before the Armistice, she had aptly been described as "one of the horrors of war."

Just as ships like the *Hermes* were quite inadequate for the carriage of aircraft, so the old Naval Defence Act cruisers which had acted as R.N.R. drill ships in the early days of the century were quite inade-

quate for the work of minelaying at the pace the Germans soon set. They carried a hundred mines apiece, and at their best they could do 14 knots, so that both speed and capacity were inadequate. Accordingly a number of fast merchant ships were taken up with a large proportion of their ratings, and the Minelaying Squadron came into existence, consisting of the flagship *Princess Margaret*, which is still attached to the Atlantic Fleet, and her sister, the luckless *Princess Irene*. These ships had just been completed for the Canadian Pacific, had a speed of 24 knots, and a capacity of 560 mines apiece. The *Paris* was taken up from the London, Brighton & South Coast Railway, with a speed of 25 knots, and a capacity of 120 mines. The *Biarritz* came from the Dover-Calais service; her speed was slightly less, but she carried 200 mines, and it was on one of hers that the famous German cruiser *Breslau* came to grief. These ships were fast enough for their purpose, but unfortunately the supply was short, so that the number had to be made up with the 19-knot *Angora* and *Wahine*, carrying 300 and 250 mines respectively, and the 17-knot Orient liner *Orvieto*, which carried 500 mines, but which was not suitable for this work in any other way, and which was grossly wasted in this capacity.

Mine-laying being such a specialised work, the majority of the executive officers were from the regular Navy, but a few permanent R.N.R. executive and accountant officers did good work in them, and there was also a large number of Reservist ratings. The engine-room complements were entirely mercantile and temporary R.N.R. ratings, under the T. 124 agreement. Naturally, these engine-room ratings had no experience of naval discipline and routine, and, although they were doing their best, there was bound to be a certain amount of wasted effort. Accordingly, a regular stoker petty officer was appointed to each ship for a few months. The experiment was an immediate success; the men intended to learn and the petty officers appointed were excellent men for their work. Eventually they were withdrawn, and all hands were very sorry to see them go.

The ambition of every R.N.R. lieutenant in the early days of the war was the command of one of the smaller destroyers or torpedo boats, but for a long time this was refused. A number of sub-lieutenants were appointed as second in command of these torpedo craft, but to begin with the Reserve was carefully kept out of command. Then a concession was made in the case of the little torpedo boats which were built in the 'eighties and which were long past any pretence of usefulness. A few R.N.R. lieutenants were permitted to command these little ships, but the more modern ones, even the 130-ton ships which had been built in the 'nineties, were put under the command of naval warrant officers. Then one or two R.N.R. officers contrived to be appointed to some of the 200-ton boats in the summer of 1915, and generally speaking they did so well in them that it became quite usual to appoint an R.N.R. lieutenant to the command of a destroyer on patrol work, work in which they were almost uniformly successful.

In the early days R.N.R. officers were not encouraged to volunteer for submarine service, but lieutenants R.N.R. were later found exceedingly useful as navigating officers. At first the experiment of carrying them was regarded with considerable disfavour in certain naval circles, but the officers

who were grudgingly given the billets did so well in them that they were soon accepted, and later it was fully acknowledged that the R.N.R. officer, with his magnificent seamanship and knowledge of navigation all over the world in all sorts of curious circumstances, was the finest navigating officer for a submarine. At the end of the war these appointments were quite general, and were admitted to have justified themselves very fully.

The growing audacity of the German minelayers, both in truth and in legend, forced the Admiralty to commission minesweepers that would be bigger than trawlers and fast enough to sweep a passage before the battle fleets without making their progress so slow that they were a favourable mark for submarines. The various cross-Channel steamers which the railway companies maintained were ideal for this service, and therefore the Great Western Railway Channel Islands steamers *Reindeer*, *Roebuck*, *Lynx* and *Gazelle*, the Great Eastern Railway's *Clacton* and *Newmarket*, and the South Eastern's *Folkestone* and *Hythe* were commissioned. Some of them were commanded by R.N. officers, but most of them by R.N.R. officers, and all of them had by far the greater part of their crews drawn from the Reserve.

The war had not been in progress many months when it was obvious that, in spite of the wonderful shipping resources of the country, they were not equal to the strain that was imposed on them by the course of events. Merchant ships of all sorts had been commissioned, but they were not sufficient, and, accordingly, in December, 1914, the Admiralty decided to build an experimental batch of twelve single-screw ships for mine-sweeping, patrol and escort purposes. The Department of Naval Construction must be given full credit for having the designs of these ships sufficiently advanced to enable them to be run off very quickly, and to be built in many yards that were not accustomed to naval work. The result was the huge class of sloop generally known by the name of the "Herbaceous Border," on account of them all being christened after flowers of some sort. These ships found their way into allied navies as well as our own, and before the end of the war a large number were built and doing splendid work. As far as possible mercantile practice was followed instead of naval, so that, with very fine lines, which enabled them to get a good speed, they had Scotch boilers and single-screw machinery. At first it was intended to arm them with two 12-pounder quickfirers a-piece, but experience soon proved that although she did not court gunfire a submarine could often withstand a weapon of this calibre without any very ill effect, so that in most of them the armament was increased to 4-in. or 4.7-in. guns. The speed of construction was made a great point, with the result that the first three dozen were completed at an average of 25 weeks a-piece, and proved excellent sea boats, fast enough for their purpose and able to stand an extraordinary amount of knocking about.

The destruction of a number of submarines goes to the credit of these ships. Being principally employed on duties concerned with the Merchant Service, they were most of them put under the command of a naval lieutenant-commander, with a Royal Naval Reserve lieutenant as second-in-command and navigator, and generally a Royal Naval Reserve sub-lieutenant as well. Having proved their worth, they were followed by

a number of 15-knot paddle minesweepers, whose draught was kept under seven feet, but although these did good work there was always a danger of their sucking up mines under their paddles, and eventually a 16-knot twin-screw minesweeper was designed which performed practically all that was required of it. By the time these vessels came into the Fleet the Royal Naval Reserve was becoming better appreciated—it must not be forgotten also that the officers were getting very much more naval practice—with the result that instead of being appointed as navigators and sub-lieutenants a large number of R.N.R. officers were appointed to commands.

The equipment of the fleet messengers in those days was a very difficult matter, and Captain Gwatkin-Williams speaks of commissioning the railway steamer *Hibernia* as H.M.S. *Tara*. Originally it had been intended to let these ships fly the Red Ensign, but from the danger of untoward incidents with the enemy it was decided that they should fly the White. The *Tara* received three very old 6-pounder Hotchkiss guns which had once belonged to H.M.S. *Howe*, pieces nearly thirty years old whose rifling was worn practically smooth. The railway company's old employees, both officers and men, turned over *en bloc*, but were strengthened by temporary men who were not nearly so satisfactory. However, they were all seamen of sorts, with the result that they were not seasick and could keep a good look-out aloft. In addition the ship had a few Royal Fleet Reserve men and later some very welcome R.N.R. ratings were added. Her captain, who had not had time to get his uniform delivered after being retired for some years, commanded her with a cutlass slung over his civilian clothes and wearing a bowler hat.

The duties which found their way into the routine of the fleet messengers were too numerous to be mentioned in detail, but Captain Gwatkin-Williams' book is worth quoting as showing something of the routine in the *Tara*. She had been painted grey and by stowing coal everywhere her speed had been reduced from 21 to 17 knots. The ship put to sea from Holyhead with sealed orders, and it was discovered that she was to go to the North Channel and patrol until further orders, putting into Larne whenever she wanted bunkers. As no other ship was put on to this patrol she contrived an extraordinary amount of sea time, doing thirteen days at sea for one day in harbour and steaming something like 75,000 miles in the first year. After the *Audacious* was mined the importance of this North Channel patrol was better realised and the *Tara* was reinforced by a number of trawlers. Incidentally it is rather interesting to note that the *Tara* on one occasion, when submarines were reported in the Irish Sea, was ordered to cruise as a merchantman, and was probably the first "Q" boat of the war, but, unfortunately—or fortunately, considering her guns—the enemy did not appear.

In March, 1917, a particularly gallant action was fought which gave the greatest credit to the Royal Naval Reserve in general and to the officer in command of the boarding steamer, Commander Selwyn M. Day, R.N.R., in particular. The raider was originally the British steamer *Yarrowdale*, which had been captured by a former raider and had been fitted out in Germany under the name of *Leopard*. The armed boarding steamer *Dundee*, normally a passenger and cargo steamer running between Dundee and London, came upon her disguised as the Norwegian steamer

Rena. A boat was lowered under Lieutenant F. H. Lawson, R.N.R., with five Reservists as a boarding and boat party. This party was well away before the actions of the raider aroused suspicion, and Captain Day had the greatest difficulty in maintaining a position astern of her. If she were raiding it was obvious that she would be very much more heavily armed than the little British ship, and, if she got comfortably into position, could blow her out of the water. As soon as she thought she was conveniently situated she fired two torpedoes, both of which missed the *Dundee.* In turn the *Dundee* opened a rapid fire with her two 4-in. guns and did the best she could to keep out of the bearing of the 5.9's with which the raider was armed, a 3-pounder which she mounted keeping up a rapid fire on the *Leopard's* bridge at the same time. The good practice of the boarding steamer, practically all of whose gunlayers were R.N.R. ratings, soon made the *Leopard's* firing very wild, and at the same time caused an explosion on board which did considerable damage. Finally, H.M.S. *Achilles* came up, and with her heavy guns soon finished off the raider, which went down fighting to the last. Unfortunately, Lieutenant Lawson and the boarding party were lost with her.

Ever since Harek of Thjotta, in the year 1018, took his pirate ship, struck his mast and sail, and by putting a tent cloth over the waist hid the greater part of his crew so that an unsuspecting Dane, thinking that he had an easy prize, came within boarding range and was promptly captured by his intended victim, ruses have been employed to lure corsairs to destruction. As early as November, 1914, it was suggested to the Admiralty that decoys should be used for the destruction of German submarines, the first two in the British Navy, beside the *Tara* already mentioned, being the *Victoria* in November, 1914, and the *Antwerp* in the following January. In December, 1914, the French fitted out a small collier called *Marguerite.* These vessels met with but indifferent success, but the Commander-in-Chief of the Orkneys and Shetlands prepared, in the early spring of 1915, the small collier *Prince Charles*, and armed her with two 6-pounders and two 3-pounders. She was manned by a naval crew under the command of Lieutenant W. P. Mark-Wardlaw. His was a naval crew, but most of the credit for the " Q " boat service belongs to the R.N.R. About the same time Vice-Admiral James Startin, serving as Captain R.N.R., fitted out the trawler *Quickly* at Granton with an armament of one 12-pounder and one 6-pounder, and went to sea, himself in command. On July 19 she sighted a submarine, which attacked her and received a welcome that she was not expecting. At first it was believed that the enemy had been sunk, but in checking through the list supplied after the surrender of the German fleet there was some doubt about the matter. Still, it was a very gallant action, especially for a man of Admiral Startin's age.

Only a few days after the *Quickly* had scored her success the *Prince Charles*, off North Rona, sighted a German submarine destroying a sailing vessel. The German, which proved to be the *U.36*, left her prey to attack the collier, who let her approach within 600 yards and then opened fire. The submarine immediately attempted to escape, but the *Prince Charles* closed within 300 yards and literally blew her to pieces, taking 15 prisoners.

In the meantime the Royal Naval Reserve, under R.N. officers, had been doing very useful work in another direction, apparently inno-

cent trawlers putting off to the fishing grounds with guns concealed, which permitted some useful captures to be made. The Germans attempted to use the employment of decoy ships as an excuse for sinking without warning, but they had commenced that practice long before decoy ships were employed. Other trawlers towed submarines of the "C" type, submerged, connected with a telephone, and by this means one or two German submarines were destroyed. All this work, of course, required the finest discipline and coolness on the part of the Royal Naval Reserve ratings, on whose shoulders the greater part of it fell, and it may be claimed that they responded gallantly and gave all that was asked of them.

As the famous case of the *Baralong* has been used in German quarters to discredit the Royal Naval Reserve ratings, who formed the greater part of her crew, it is worth recording in full. She was regularly commissioned and specially prepared as a "Q" boat, carrying three 12-pounders carefully concealed, and being under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Godfrey Herbert. Most of her officers and ratings were R.N. Reservists, while in addition she carried a detachment of 10 Royal Marines under a corporal. On Aug. 19, 1916, she came upon the German submarine *U.27* destroying the Leyland mule transport *Nicosian*, which she left to attack the apparently helpless *Baralong* while she was in the act of picking up the *Nicosian's* survivors. Sub-lieutenant G. C. Steele, R.N.R., was in charge of the armament, which opened at 600 yards, and soon destroyed the U-boat. About a dozen of her people swam to the deserted *Nicosian* without making any sign of surrender, so that it is not surprising that the marines of the *Baralong*, searching for them in odd corners of the ship, shot them before they were themselves fired at. The American muleteers of the *Nicosian* completed the work, which was described throughout Germany as being a terrible outrage and a breach of all the laws of war.

In June, 1917, Commander Gordon Campbell, R.N., distinguished himself in command of the Q-boat *Pargust*, originally the collier *Vittoria*. Her crew were mostly Reservists, and she was heavily armed with one 4-inch, four 12-pounders, and two maxim guns, with two 14-inch torpedo tubes as an experiment. Early one morning she was torpedoed without warning, the short range making the missile jump right out of the water and doing very considerable damage to the ship's side. One party abandoned ship, so that the submarine came to the surface at short range, and at as good a bearing as the *Pargust* could desire. Having signalled that they surrendered, the Germans attempted to make off, so that fire had to be reopened, and the greater part of the crew was killed. She was *U.C.29*, a minelayer. The *Pargust* was towed into Queenstown. The Admiralty overcame the difficulty of selecting the bravest deed from a particularly gallant crew by giving instructions that the crew themselves were to ballot for one officer and one rating to receive the Victoria Cross. The men chosen were both Reservists—Lieutenant R. N. Stuart, who already had his D.S.O., and Seaman W. Williams.

Another particularly gallant Q-boat action was the last fight of the *Stockforce*, a small coasting steamer which had been put under the command of Lieutenant Harold Auten, R.N.R., who had already won his Distinguished Service Cross for gallantry in these craft. She was specially prepared for her work,

filled with timber for the sake of buoyancy and fitted with alleyways through which her people could proceed from end to end of the ship without appearing on deck. She was armed with two 4-in., one 12-pounder, and a 3-pounder gun. In July, 1918, she was torpedoed without warning off the Start. The torpedo demolished the forward end of the ship and greatly weakened her from stem to stern, blowing up the 12-pounder gun and its magazine. A party detailed to abandon ship carried out their part, and Auten would have had every justification for following suit, for such an explosion left but little of such a small vessel. However, he decided to stay as long as he could, and very largely by the good work of the party in the boat he enticed the submarine within comfortable range, when fire was opened with the two 4-in. guns and the U-Boat was destroyed. Meanwhile the *Stockforce* was rapidly sinking, but Auten decided to save her if he could, and in this he was assisted by two trawlers who came to his assistance. Eventually she had to be abandoned only a short distance off Bolt Tail. For his coolness and success Auten was awarded the Victoria Cross, while the D.S.C. went to five R.N.R. officers—Lieutenants W. J. Grey, L. E. Workman, and H. F. Rainey, Sub-Lieutenant G. S. Anakin and Assistant-Paymaster A. B. Davis. These awards were richly earned by the coolness of all hands under most trying circumstances. The first thing that Auten did when he got ashore was to apply for another Q-Boat, and he was given the *Suffolk Coast*, which after the Armistice was exhibited to admiring Londoners.

Perhaps the finest of the Q-Boat actions, however, was that in which the *Dunraven*, again under the command of Captain Gordon Campbell, V.C., was sunk. On this occasion, Lieutenant Charles Bonner, R.N.R., who had already received the D.S.C., won the coveted Victoria Cross by a particular act of gallantry. The *Dunraven* took over the crew of the old *Pargust*, and in August, 1917, was attacked in the Bay of Biscay. The submarine attacked with shell fire, to which the *Dunraven* replied with her single exposed gun, and just as the "abandon ship" party pushed off and Captain Campbell was getting ready to open fire, an unlucky shell burst under his poop. It exploded a depth charge there, and Lieutenant Bonner was blown bodily out of the control position. For a moment it looked as though this had given the whole game away, but apparently the enemy took it that they had fired the ready ammunition of the exposed gun. The position was blazing furiously when Lieutenant Bonner crawled back to take charge of the party that were attempting to subdue the fire without showing themselves. Below them was the after magazine, while all round were boxes of cordite which were well alight. To seek safety was to give the *Dunraven* away as a "Q" boat, so under the lieutenant they stayed there and waited until the end. Bonner was himself wounded painfully, but he divided his time between the fire and binding up the wounds of two of his men.

Unfortunately, another explosion caused the signal to open fire to sound, so the White Ensign was broken out and fire opened with the only gun that would bear before Captain Campbell could get into position. He then sent away several more men, in the hope that the submarine would imagine that the ship was finally abandoned, but her captain took her where the *Dunraven's*

guns could not possibly bear and resumed his gunfire, at the same time spraying the helpless men in the boats with machine guns. Two torpedoes having missed the submarine, British and American men-of-war appeared on the scene and drove her off, the *Dunraven* by that time being in a sad plight with repeated explosions still recurring under the poop. For his extraordinary gallantry Lieutenant Bonner was personally decorated with his Victoria Cross at Sandringham, and Petty Officer E. Pitcher also received the coveted decoration. One D.S.O. and several D.S.C.'s were also awarded for this action, one of the most gallant in the history of the submarine war.

The German submarine blockade was just beginning to get serious in February, 1915, and several rewards were offered by private parties for the first merchant ship that should sink a submarine. The first reward was paid to the little coaster *Thordis* which had only recently been transferred from the Norwegian flag. She was attacked by a submarine off Beachy Head, and immediately rammed it, hearing it scrape along her keel and seeing oil. There was great jubilation, and when the ship arrived in port Captain J. W. Bell was met by a letter from the Admiralty, who granted him a temporary commission of lieutenant R.N.R. in order to make him eligible for the award of the Distinguished Service Cross, which came to him at the same time. Unfortunately it later transpired that the submarine was damaged and not sunk, the oil coming from her external tanks. At the same time, it was a splendid piece of work, especially for such a small steamer, and it certainly saved two transports which left Dover soon after the incident and which passed quite close to the scene of the affair. The Germans bitterly resented the honours paid to Captain Bell, and their Press was full of indignation at the attempted slaughter of an innocent submarine.

When finally the German submarine blockade forced British shipping to turn to the old convoy system, each convoy was put under a commodore, who was usually either a Captain or Commander R.N.R. Another R.N.R. officer was the Vice-Commodore, who was usually chosen because he knew the convoy business inside and out and had already obtained plenty of experience at it. Before they sailed they had a conference on board the cruiser that acted as flagship, and discussed ways and means, a proceeding which naval officers found to be a really excellent way of getting into close touch with the Merchant Service. As the convoy proceeded without lights, and as the Merchant Service officers were responsible to their owners, it usually became necessary for the naval officers to accept full responsibility for collisions, and it was agreed that naval ships should give way to merchantmen. R.N.R. watch-keeping officers were generally appointed to the cruisers engaged on convoy work, their knowledge of merchant shipping being invaluable to their naval seniors.

The foregoing is only a small selection, taken almost haphazard, of the jobs that the R.N.R. had to tackle in the big ships. Incidents could be found to fill a big book, but they have mostly passed unrecorded and are only to be heard in odd snatches and disjointed sentences when sailormen gather together. Yet when the Officers' Reserve was first suggested there were those who maintained that the Merchant Seaman could never be taught the mechanism of such ironclads as they sent to sea in the 'sixties!

Chapter XII. The Trawlers and Small Craft.

IN spite of the opinion held by Lord Charles Beresford and others, when war broke out the Trawler Section was the Cinderella of the R.N.R., and few would have dared to foretell the work that it would do or the credit that it would bring to the parent force. First the German minelayers and then the submarines gave it its chances, and the men of the force took full advantage of them.

On July 28, 1914, Commander Lionel Preston, R.N., was ordered to collect the old torpedo gunboats that had been fitted for minesweeping duties at Dover, and to hold them in readiness for further orders. These orders soon came, and on Aug. 1 they sailed for Queensferry, commencing to sweep as soon as they passed the Inner Dowsing. On Aug. 5 the Inspecting Captain of Minesweepers was ordered to take up the trawlers about which the Admiralty had made full arrangements as fast as they came in from the fishing grounds. At various points along the coast they were fitted out with their minesweeping gear, and the discovery of the minefield laid by the *Königin Luise* off Orfordness gave the Harwich Division their first serious job. At the same time every naval officer commanding a district or unit realised the value of trawlers, and immediately bombarded the Admiralty with requests for fishing craft to be detailed to him, the result being a flood of requests that could not possibly be satisfied. It was obvious that the 82 trawlers that had been selected before the war would be quite insufficient, and the work of collecting every suitable fishing steamer began. Their first work was to maintain a clear channel between the Outer Dowsing and the Downs, swept and patrolled by fishing craft. The smaller drifters were soon taken up in as large numbers as the trawlers, but it was not yet possible to find guns for them, and these little vessels went out to their work with no better protection than rifles. Admiral Christian off the Belgian coast, Admiral Jellicoe in the Far North, and every commander-in-chief in between was clamouring for trawlers and more trawlers.

On Aug. 17, 1914, the Admiralty formed the Northern Trawler Flotilla of 16 vessels, each one fitted with a modified sweep and two three-pounder guns of ancient pattern. They were chartered and commissioned at Lowestoft, and the first were at Scapa ten days after the order had been issued. Their particular duties were to sweep the mines in the manner in which they had been trained and also to maintain a patrol against enemy submarines, for the bases were quite unprotected.

Before the war an effort had been made to form the nucleus of a motor-boat patrol, and it was soon found that this could be exceedingly useful. When it was obviously impossible to commission sufficient trawlers, a new scheme was adopted by which steam yachts, trawlers and motor boats were formed into a patrol division, each unit consisting of one yacht, four trawlers and four motor boats. There was

scarcely an active service rating in the scheme, the yachts and motor boats being manned by R.N.V.R. and R.N.R. ratings mixed, with a few Royal Navy men, while the trawlers were almost entirely Royal Naval Reserve. The Navy was not long in finding out that two 3-pounder guns certainly could not be spared for a trawler, so that one was taken out of each, while the yachts were most of them armed with two 6-pounders, one forward and one aft.

At the outbreak of the war it had been the intention of the Admiralty to carry out blockade duties in the Fleet with cruisers, but it was soon proved that there was far too much danger for big ships to be used for this purpose in narrow waters. Such work had to be done by boats, and while they were being lowered the boarding ship formed an ideal target for an enemy submarine, or for the ship which they were about to search, should she prove to be a German raider. Accordingly, the Merchant Service was called in, and all sorts of armed vessels were commissioned as boarding steamers. Some of them were the medium-speed packet steamers, ships of about 1000 tons gross, with a speed of 15 knots, which were maintained by all the railway companies, and from this type they ranged down through armed yachts to tugs. These tugs were the favourites wherever weather conditions permitted their use, for the skippers were used to bringing their ships alongside, and it was currently said that they could crack a nut between the hull of their ship and that of the vessel alongside which they were coming, and that if they did they would take very good care not to lose the kernel.

The skippers of these tugs were made Lieutenants R.N.R. — or R.N.V.R. if they were not certificated—while the men were engaged on the T.124 Agreement. The signalmen were usually Royal Marines, and the boarding officers were occasionally regular officers in the Navy. Generally, however, they were Royal Naval Reserve officers, and special preference was given to men who had served their time in sail, and who were used to boatwork. To watch some of these men in the Downs or in the mouth of the Thames was wonderful. The demand was always for more boarding steamers, and it became necessary to attach some to all the cruiser squadrons, as the danger of being torpedoed like the unfortunate "Cressies" made it impossible for the cruiser to do this work herself, and the alternative was to leave suspicious ships alone. In October Admiral Jellicoe asked for a dozen more boarding steamers for examination purposes with the Grand Fleet, which affords some idea of the demand.

Considering the fact that practically no preparations had been made beforehand, the manner in which the various units of the Mine-sweeping Service fell into their places and worked successfully was wonderful, but it was obviously necessary to put the organisation on to a proper basis, and in September, 1914, the office of Admiral of Mine-sweepers was created, with Rear-Admiral E. F. B. Charlton to fill it. He took charge of all mine-sweeping operations between St. Abb's Head and the Downs, with the exception of the Harwich and Nore areas, which were under other officers. All kinds of mine-sweepers came under his control, but patrol craft only in certain circumstances. By the end of September the Navy had control of 300 fishing craft, and others were being fitted out every day. The "modified sweep," as it was

officially called, or "explosive" sweep, to use a more descriptive title, was the weapon generally favoured for these vessels, and Commander L. A. B. Donaldson was made Commander Superintendent of Modified Sweeping. Meanwhile the Grand Fleet demanded trawlers for creeping in and out of the numerous rocks and lochs on the Scottish coast and for examining neutral ships that passed through the Minch and Pentland Firth.

It has been mentioned how casual the Navy had become on the matter of mines, and, although it should have been warned by the loss of the *Amphion* in the first days of the war, there was still a tendency to run unnecessary risks, especially by the men in the Auxiliary Patrol. They received a sharp lesson on Sept. 3, when the drifter *Lindsell*, on patrol, struck a mine near the Outer Dowsing Lightship off the Humber and immediately sank, while within a quarter of an hour the torpedo-gunboat *Speedy*, which was in charge of the mine-sweeping operations in that area, met her fate in similar fashion. At the same time the German submarines began to get really active and redoubled the demand for patrol craft.

By the end of October, 1914, a definite organisation had been decided upon for the Trawler Divisions. They were divided into divisions of six, the biggest or most seaworthy being the leader and fitted out to accommodate a commissioned officer of the R.N.R.—a lieutenant when he was available; otherwise a sub-lieutenant. Such a leader was also fitted with wireless, but in the early days it was not possible to give all the trawlers this luxury. They were given a gun apiece (although it was not yet possible to give them any sort of a uniform armament) and also a modified sweep for submarine hunting. Where she was available an armed yacht was attached to each division.

Fishing vessels built to usual designs soon proved that they often had too much draught for mine-sweeping in safety, the average trawler drawing 12 ft. 6 in. of water and many of them falling victim to the mines that they were supposed to render innocuous. Therefore in the autumn of 1914 it was decided to convert some of the paddle excursion steamers into minesweepers, the first two being the *Devonia* and *Brighton Queen*, which were well known to excursionists on the South Coast. They drew little water and were fast and surprisingly seaworthy for little vessels of their size which were popularly supposed to be nothing but "paper boats," with the result that they were soon followed by the *Cambridge*, *Westward Ho*, *Glenavon* and *Lady Ismay*, all boats of a similar type. Some of these proved, however, that they had not the structural strength to steam at full speed against a head sea drawing a heavy sweep, so that they were paid off; but the design of the best and most seaworthy of them was used as a basis for the drawings on which the Navy's paddle sweepers were built. Needless to say, all these ships were manned by Royal Naval Reserve and mercantile ratings on T.124 agreement.

During the Scarborough raid of December, 1914, the Germans took the opportunity of laying an extensive minefield in a very awkward position for British and neutral shipping. With the raid the R.N.R. is scarcely connected, but the work of clearing a passage through the field kept it very busy. Only two days had elapsed before the work began. The operations were led by a naval officer flying his pennant in the paddle steamer *Brighton Queen*, but apart from him practically the

whole of the force consisted of Grimsby trawlers manned by Reservists, with a few naval officers. The first victim was the trawler *Passing*, commanded by a naval officer, which was so badly holed that it seemed impossible for her to float, but which was safely towed in by the flagship. Next the *Orianda* was sunk, with one casualty, and then the *Star of Britain*. Lord Pirrie's yacht *Valiant*, commanded by Admiral Barlow, who had come back with the rank of Commander R.N.R., took part in the work, but she was too big and deep for the purpose, and was seriously damaged by a mine when taking up position. Other trawlers on patrol and minesweeping duties fell victims, together with a number of fishing vessels, so that the blood of the fishermen was up and the minesweeping offices were besieged with applicants for billets in the R.N.R.

In October, 1914, the German auxiliary cruiser *Berlin* (now the White Star liner *Arabic*) succeeded in laying a big minefield off Tory Island, off the North Irish Coast. The intention was principally to hamper the flow of Canadian troops to Britain, for the German Admiralty had received information that the route to be taken was northabout. Although they failed in this they did what might have been even more useful work from their point of view, for they sunk the battleship *Audacious* and practically blockaded the Grand Fleet in Lough Swilly, while the presence of the field was known but before there was any indication of its size or direction. There was an immediate call for trawlers, but all that could be done to begin with was to send four from Milford Haven. Other trawlers were sent round from Lowestoft for the purpose of keeping clear the passages into the Irish Sea, while, as a preventive to mining in these waters, 12 Liverpool sea-going tugs were commissioned, six to patrol the North Channel and six the southern part of the Irish Sea. They were not so effective as the trawlers, and they were only kept in commission until further fishing craft could be brought up.

In some ways the trawler patrol was assisted by the minefields which the Germans had laid in August, for until this breach of international law was carried out they had to cover a huge area, while as soon as we had the exact dimensions of the field it was only the comparatively narrow passages between which needed attention. At the same time it was decided that as much as possible of this patrol work should be done by trawlers, for the object of the minor German minelayers was as much to divide British attention as it was to destroy British tonnage. To pursue these small craft with cruisers and destroyers would be to play the German game.

At the beginning of the war it was realised that trawlers would be necessary at Dover, so that four were sent straight down from Milford Haven immediately they had discharged their fish, without preparation of any sort. Lieutenant-Commander W. C. Rigg, R.N., who after his retirement had joined the Royal National Life-Boat Institution, took charge of them, and within four days they were sweeping with their fishing gear. As soon as they could be spared, four more were sent down. When the German submarine minelayers came out it was necessary very greatly to augment this force, and to trawlers were added paddle mine-sweepers and motor launches. The casualties were heavy, but they did magnificent work in a spot that was absolutely ideal for the German purpose.

As soon as it was seen that German submarines were pushing their way through the Strait of Dover in spite of the surface patrols, the drifter barrage was established under the command of Captain Humphrey W. Bowring, R.N. Most of the drifters taken up were wooden craft, scarcely fast enough to undertake a definite patrol in the Channel, but amply sufficient, and, by their original design, admirably suited to the work of keeping the nets in position. Various types of net had been tried, but the most satisfactory were light nets supported on the surface by pellets, and kept in position in very much the same way as the herring nets usually handled by these drifters in peace time. The ground covered was from the Varne to the Ruytingen, and the nets were allowed to drift under control. In bad weather, of course, they drifted too fast and too far, whereupon the drifters took them in and re-shot them in the required positions. These drifters were divided into divisions of half-a-dozen boats apiece, each division under the command of a R.N.R. sub-lieutenant or lieutenant, while the flagship of the whole was an armed yacht, which in the early days was always commanded by a R.N. officer. These nets were not supposed to stop a submarine, merely to indicate her position to the patrol craft on the surface; but when the drifters had an enemy in view the only weapon that they had against her was the lance-bomb, a fearsome weapon which was exceedingly dangerous to those who handled it, but which did very little harm to the enemy. It did, however, lead to the invention of the depth charge which made so much difference to the course of the war.

The indicator nets in the Channel troubled the German submarines far more than our people gave them credit for. Admiral Bacon was most dissatisfied with results, and determined, in spite of the colossal difficulties, to throw a boom right across the Channel from Folkestone to Grisnez, with a gate at either end for the passage of traffic. It consisted of a long line of buoys suspending a heavy anti-submarine net of a type similar to that which was used to defend the principal naval harbours. The strength required made it obvious that this boom would give a lot of trouble, but it seemed the only way, and accordingly orders for huge quantities of material were placed. A lot of this was diverted to the Dardanelles for the defence of the base at Mudros, but experience proved that the difficulties had been rather over-estimated, and the nets did splendid work.

In 1916 the net barrage across the Strait of Dover was very greatly improved, but the German cutting devices were improved too, with the result that they still managed to get through and attack shipping in the Channel. Finally, a large number of mines were laid, and the drifters and trawlers in the Channel were employed to keep the waterway as brilliantly lighted as Piccadilly. The result was that the submarines were bound to dive, and quite a large proportion of them dived right on to the minefield. By that time the British mines could not be treated as a joke and were quite as efficient as the Germans.

When Admiral Bacon got his first division of six monitors to Dover for operations on the Belgian coast, the drifters were given a new duty, that of escort. The first three monitors to arrive were *Sir John Moore*, *Prince Rupert* and *Lord Clive*, each having a maximum speed of a little over six knots. They had been tried in the lonely waters at

the mouth of the Thames, and it was from there that the first bombardment of Zeebrugge was launched. Quite a little fleet was made up from the Dover Patrol and started on the way across, having to take a long route in order to avoid the minefields. First came the paddle sweepers, then the monitors in single line ahead, with a line of drifters on either side of them, and eight destroyers in and out and round about all over the place. It was the first time that drifters had been asked to keep station, and they did it wonderfully, not only acting as an excellent screen but avoiding collision with the destroyers in a remarkable manner. Both the skippers and the engineers of these drifters deserved and were given full credit for this station-keeping. During the bombardment drifters went close inshore to save the lives of the spotting officers on board the tripods that were erected for observation purposes, should they attract the attention of the German gunners, and they were very lucky to escape destruction from the shell-fire that was opened on them.

As the efforts of the R.N.R. during the war were directed so much against the German submarine campaign, it is rather interesting to note that the first recorded attack on a merchant ship by an underwater vessel occurred on Oct. 20, 1914, when the 866-ton steamer *Glitra* was caught by the German submarine *U 17* off the Norwegian coast. The submarine fired a warning shot, and then sent a boat on board the merchantman with an officer, who immediately ordered all hands to leave the ship and told them she would be sunk in ten minutes. This was done by opening the sea-cocks, after which the survivors were towed in the ship's boats towards the coast and finally left to be picked up by a neutral torpedo boat. This incident caused a tremendous sensation at the time, but it soon sank into insignificance beside the appalling outrages committed by the German submarines, and from an historical point of view it is interesting only as being the first example of a new method of warfare.

The first capture by the Trawler Patrol in the German submarine campaign came in November, 1914, when the German submarine *U 18* nosed her way right up to the boom at Scapa Flow and observed that the Grand Fleet was not there. As a matter of fact it was indulging in one of its periodical sweeps. She was sighted off Hoxa Head by the trawler *Tokio*, and immediately afterwards was rammed by the *Dorothy Gray*, under the command of Skipper A. Youngson, R.N.R., who damaged her severely forward. As a consequence the submarine became unmanageable, and after hitting the bottom of the sea, broke surface just ahead of the destroyer *Garry*, which rammed her fairly, although her captain still had time to sink her by opening her sea-cocks and so preventing her falling into British hands. A reward of £100 was given to the crew of the *Tokio* for first sighting the submarine and £500 to the crew of the *Dorothy Gray* for their share in the sinking.

Many authorities had been doubtful of the wisdom of spending large sums of money on indicator nets, and plainly intimated that they did not believe that this method would achieve any result. The destruction of *U 8* in March, 1915, was their first success. One of the drifters watching the nets saw the floats moving in a most unnatural manner, and immediately called up the attendant destroyers. Finally H.M.S. *Gurkha* found her mark with an explosive sweep, and as the *U 8* came to the surface she was shelled unmercifully by the waiting flotilla. It was they

who got the credit for the destruction of the submarine, but the Admiralty appreciated the part that had been taken by the drifters and distributed £500 among their crews. It was not long before the Germans perfected a net-cutter with steel teeth set at an angle of about 45 degrees from the head of the stem, while a similar cutter ran down towards the keel. In addition, all submarines were provided with jumping wires which carried everything clear of the conning tower and housed periscope, and also made an exceedingly useful aerial for wireless.

In February, 1915, the Admiralty devised an improved method of net laying. Until that time the anti-submarine nets had been handled in precisely the same manner as the drift nets would be handled if the fishermen were after herring, but of course such a system limited the net to the length that could be conveniently stowed on board one small boat with none too much deck space. Therefore, two large paddle excursion steamers, the *Queen Victoria* and the *Prince Edward*, which had been designed for the Isle of Man service, were commissioned and manned almost entirely by R.N.R. ratings with naval officers. With their huge clear decks they soon proved themselves ideal for the purpose. They could each stow nearly 5000 ft. of net, which could be made on a much heavier standard than that used by the trawlers. Everything that could check the run of the nets was removed, and the ships were able to carry on their work at high speed at night. The watching, of course, was still left to the trawlers and drifters. The next move was to make the indicator nets in sections, secured by patent clips that would be strong enough to hold them together in any tideway, but that would give way and release any section of net when a submarine got into it. The net would thus fold right round her and with luck would foul her propellers. The first big operation of the *Queen Victoria* and the *Prince Edward* was carried out in April, 1915, when they were sent from Harwich to lay a line of blockade nets off Ostend. Unfortunately, when they arrived at their position they found that all the sea marks had been removed, so that it was not possible to do the work in darkness as had been hoped. However, they laid a mile and a half of nets before they were discovered and were driven off by heavy fire.

Generally speaking, the German submarines were not anxious to meet the patrol trawlers on anything like even terms; although U-boats were invariably more heavily armed, they realised their vulnerability, and they were generally out after larger game. However, it was part of their tactics to keep as many men-of-war as possible tied up in the task of supporting patrols, and, therefore, in July, 1916, four powerfully-armed German submarines concentrated on the *Onward*, *Nellie Nutten*, and *Era*, of the Peterhead Division. Lieutenant Claude Asquith, R.N.R., was in the first-named boat, which was armed with a 12-pounder, the other two having nothing bigger than an antique 3-pounder apiece. Considering that they were hopelessly outranged and outmatched, the three little trawlers put up a gallant fight, but they were sunk one after another. The skipper of the *Nellie Nutten* contrived to get his boat alongside a Dutch fisherman before she went down, with the result that she had only one man killed, but the crew of the *Onward* were taken prisoners, together with the survivors of the *Era*. Lieutenant Asquith received a Distinguished Service Cross for the gallant fight that he had put up. The great

lesson learned was that it was necessary to arm the trawlers with something better than a 3-pounder.

One form of submarine decoy which was manned by the Royal Naval Reserve was the armed smack. The old sailing smacks formed a tempting bait to the German submarines, being absolutely defenceless, and it was decided to give a few of them concealed guns. The *Nelson,* which was under the command of Skipper P. Crisp, was given one of the short 13-pounders that were originally fitted in the motor launches. In August, 1917, she was fishing under sail off the East Coast when she was suddenly fired upon by an enemy submarine. A shell hit the smack on the lee water line, but Crisp put her on the other tack, so lifting the damaged part of the hull out of the water, Immediately afterwards he was hit; his son, who was acting as second hand, took the tiller and went on with the action. The gun-layer attempted to help the dying skipper, but he was immediately ordered back to his gun, while a message was sent by pigeon telling of the attack. The smack sank with the dying skipper on her deck, a posthumous V.C. being his well-earned reward.

The entry of large numbers of fishermen into the Trawler Section of the R.N.R. called for special consideration as to the method of discipline, for they had their own ideas on certain subjects that were sacred to the naval service, and to treat even the skippers as warrant officers in the regular service would merely be to waste magnificent material. Accordingly, in December, 1915, it was decided that a court-martial or a disciplinary court sitting on a skipper of the Trawler Section should have the power to punish with the forfeiture of pay for a period not exceeding 30 days when such a punishment would appear appropriate. It was a very wise move in the Admiralty's dealings with this invaluable class of man. It must be admitted that in the early days of the war the discipline of the Trawler Patrol left much to be desired. Some of the men had undergone training before the war, and with those there was comparatively little trouble, but others had come forward with patriotic enthusiasm and had little use for naval tradition. Certain naval officers also were not blameless in this matter, for they attempted to enforce the strictest of naval discipline on men who were in no way fitted to obey it. In this way there came to be a good deal of ill-feeling between the regular Service and the Trawler Reserve, but early in 1915 the difficulties began to clear up and each side developed a genuine admiration for the other. There was very much less trouble with the men, who saw the use of discipline and who also began to appreciate the qualities of the officers who were leading them. As a result, no more cases were reported of trawlers being out of action because every man in the crew except the captain was in cells.

One of the principal difficulties of the patrol trawlers and drifters was to keep steamers in the dredged channels, and they often wandered off into the minefields. One that did this was the *Gallier,* and in consequence she was seriously damaged by the explosion of a mine. Skipper E. V. Snowline was in command of a division of drifters, headed by the *Hilda and Ernest.* Calling the drifter *Eager* to his assistance, he went through the minefield and finally contrived to bring the injured *Gallier* safe to Scarborough. For this both skippers were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, and the award caused tremendous

enthusiasm in the whole of the Trawler Reserve.

When they are fishing it is customary for drifters to be manned by close connections, and very often the crew is derived almost entirely from one family. The Admiralty saw the advantage of this family spirit, and as they commissioned the drifters for net work they took every care to keep the crew together, transferring them to another ship *en bloc* when it was necessary.

Some of the skippers of these Scottish drifters saw opportunities for making money in the course of their duties, and were prone to take them, although this seldom caused any neglect of their real job. A little drifter, under a skipper who was also her owner, was employed taking naval dispatches to one of the outlying Hebrides, and as other communications were suspended, he made a lot of money carrying passengers to the intermediate islands. This might have gone on indefinitely had he not done so well over his passengers on one trip that he forgot all about his dispatches and carried them back to the base intact. "And so," he used to explain afterwards, "they took ma ain bonnie wee boat awa' from me and they ga'e me this yin instead." Other cases were apt to be more serious, but they were few in number considering the large number of officers and men who had been brought into the R.N.R. without any proper examination as to their character and suitability. In the circumstances it is wonderful that there was not more trouble of this kind.

The Admiralty soon realised that in bringing into the service a large number of men who had never been subject to naval discipline or imbued with naval ideas they were creating new problems which had not been faced since Crimean days. The work that the temporary R.N.R. men did was magnificent, but they all needed to be kept up to the scratch, and the difficulty was to devise a really satisfactory method of doing so. The award of the Distinguished Service Cross for particularly gallant actions was very much appreciated, the more so as the Honours Branch took the trouble to dive below the surface to discover the true facts of the case and to assess the rewards accordingly. At the same time, nobody appreciated the value of hard cash better than the men of the Trawler Reserve, so that monetary rewards, either for destroying enemy submarines or for putting up a particularly gallant fight, even though it was not successful, made a huge difference and earned their cost many times over.

The Gallipoli Expedition called for the services of a large number of trawlers and auxiliary small craft, and although attempts were made to send out the bigger boats that usually operated in the Icelandic waters and the White Sea, the supply was insufficient and it ended in all sorts of fishing craft going out. A story was told and very generally accepted in the Eastern Mediterranean, although its truth is more than doubtful, of a trawler which suddenly appeared at the gate at Mudros without the private signals. Her skipper was asked if these had not been given to him at Malta, and he replied that they had not. He was then asked if the authorities had not given him his chart at Malta, and again he replied in the negative. On being asked how on earth he had found his way out there, he replied that he had found quite a good map of the locality at the back of his Bible. Another and rather better authenticated story is that of a cruiser which met, somewhere off Gibraltar, a trawler going out to the Dardanelles, which asked her exact posi-

tion. Having given this, the cruiser captain asked if the trawler was all right otherwise, and received a cheery affirmative. Not feeling quite so sure, he asked if their compass was all right, and was told that it was not so bad when the ship's head was pointed north of east and west; when it came south the compass usually followed the gun. During these amphibious operations the Royal Naval Reserve proved itself invaluable in hundreds of ways, in the big ships, in small craft, and on the beaches.

The attempt to sweep up the Kephez minefield at the entrance to the Dardanelles resulted in a certain amount of criticism being levelled at the Trawler Reserve, but this was generally acknowledged to be unjust. In the preliminary operations in March, 1915, the work of clearing the Turkish mines was a very hazardous one, for it meant operating inshore close to powerful batteries of quickfirers backed by searchlights. In addition, the currents kept the sweeping vessels almost stationary with their sweeps, so that they offered an ideal target of which the Turks took full advantage. Endeavours to knock out these searchlights had proved unavailing, and although the actual casualties sustained by the trawlers from gunfire were remarkably small, this fact was obviously due more to luck than anything else. On two or three occasions the trawlers tried to carry out their difficult task, but retired in face of heavy shell fire, until it was realised that these men, who could face any sea and who had proved their gallantry time and again against mines, were not able to face an enemy of which they had no previous knowledge, and required stiffening. As soon as regular Naval and Naval Reserve officers were shipped in the trawlers, their crews were quite willing to try again, and made a gallant attempt to clear the field, but the longer they stuck to it the heavier their casualties were. Eventually they were forced to retire with heavy losses, but all stigma arising from their former failure had been wiped out. Backed by their big batteries at short range, the Dardanelles minefields were practically impregnable.

The track of the munition-carriers to North Russia had to be kept open at all costs, and efforts were necessary to establish a boarding and examination service in order to prevent minelaying by German auxiliaries or by ships under neutral flags. The Russians had plenty of material available on the spot, and should have been able to establish the service without any difficulty, but they made no effort to put it on a proper basis and seemed quite helpless, until finally the matter was put into the hands of the Royal Naval Reserve, who, using Russian material, got the service under way. It was not long, however, before the German minelayer *Meteor*, which was formerly a British packet steamer, contrived to lay a very dangerous field, so that some specially large trawlers, which normally worked on the White Sea and Iceland fishing grounds, were commissioned at Lowestoft and sent up.

German ships were in the habit of slipping up the Norwegian coast for the purpose of raiding and minelaying as well as for commerce, and all the efforts of the British cruisers and auxiliary cruisers could not stop them. Finally an armed trawler, the *Tenby Castle*, under a reserve officer, was sent in July, 1915, to watch these waters, and succeeded in damaging one German ship and sinking another. Later, however, the Norwegians claimed a territorial limit which no other country was inclined to grant, and they regarded the British action as

an outrage on their territory. A good deal of unpleasantness followed, but the claim to a four-mile limit had never been acknowledged, with the result that the British authorities stuck to their guns, and shortly afterwards detailed six more trawlers to maintain the patrol.

On May 15, 1917, the drifters of the Otranto barrage, manned almost entirely by Reservists, suffered a disaster at the hands of the Austrians, who came down with three fast cruisers and a number of destroyers. The drifters were watching the nets of the barrage, some 38 boats in all, mostly armed with only 3-pounders or 6-pounders. Crossing the line, the cruisers divided and cut it in three places, firing as they went. One did all she could to permit the crews of the drifters to abandon their vessels; the other two opened as heavy a fire as possible. The drifter *Gowan Lea*, under the command of Skipper J. Watt. of the Trawler Section, opened a gallant fire with her popgun against one of the cruisers at little more than a hundred yards range. How she escaped being sunk is a mystery, but a shell from the cruiser soon put her gun out of action, and the Austrian vessel then passed down the line to deal with the other drifters. The *Gowan Lea*, although badly damaged, was still afloat, and went down to assist the *Floandi*, which was in a very bad way. All the R.N.R. ratings in the drifters showed the greatest gallantry, but 13 of the 38 boats were sunk, and the Austrians got away with 72 prisoners, pursued by British, French and Italian ships. This action, and the fight that the drifters put up against odds that were hopeless from the first, aroused great enthusiasm for the Trawler Section from end to end of the country.

The business of evacuating the Serbian Army from Durazzo was a ticklish one, and one in which the drifters stationed in the Adriatic took full part. The Austrians, by means of surface craft and submarines, had contrived to lay a number of minefields directly in the path of the transports, and several merchant ships and men-of-war fell victim. The drifters did magnificent work saving the survivors, frequently running alongside, and in at least one case being in great danger of being dragged under water by the big ship. British and Italian cruisers maintained a patrol, but the main line of defence was the force of drifters, inside and outside the port, carrying out a ceaseless patrol and supporting the nets which protected the embarkation from the attention of submarines. As the Austrians worked down to the coast, however, their heavy artillery gave these little drifters a very bad time of it, while bad weather made matters still worse. They sustained many casualties, and finally they had the work of destroying the material which could not be removed, including a number of barges and lighters that would have been invaluable to the Austrians. Several decorations were awarded for this work. It is impossible to give a full account of the work of the trawlers, but sufficient incidents have been mentioned to show the extraordinary diversity of the jobs they tackled.

Chapter XIII. *The Force To-day.*

THE war proved the colossal strength of the R.N.R., but it also of course displayed its weaknesses and one of the first things to be done at the end of the struggle was to consider all the facts that had been brought to light and on them to mould a post-war force that should have all the virtues but none of the defects of the old. The changed situation all over the world, the natural reaction after a long war, the urgent need for economy without failing to provide for the uncertain future, all combined to make the subject a thorny one. And first of all there was the problem of demobilisation and provision for the men who had served.

Although they were not finally to be decided upon and published until two years later, the principles of the post-war R.N.R. regulations were laid before the House of Commons when it went into Committee of Supply on the Supplementary Naval Estimates at the end of 1920. Sir James Craig, then Financial Secretary of the Admiralty, stated that the Admiralty had that morning received the final support of their scheme for the future organisation of the Reserves. The experience of war had shown that the trust reposed in the Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve had been abundantly justified, and the Admiralty had decided to retain and maintain both forces on much the same lines as before the war.

They considered that it was neither necessary nor possible to maintain a permanent Reserve of sufficient size for all the inevitable requirements of war, and they therefore proposed to retain only a sufficient number of officers and men to meet the needs of the fleet on mobilisation and in the early days of war, but at the same time to preserve the machinery necessary for the rapid expansion of the force as soon as hostilities commenced.

The personnel of both forces would be organised in three classes, for fleet service, for patrol service, and for shore service, the first to include service in the ships of the Regular Navy, auxiliary cruisers and various other auxiliaries, the patrol service to include only the anti-submarine, minesweeping and coastal escort duties. All men on enrolment were to undergo a preliminary training to include naval discipline, seamanship, signalling and gunnery, and when they had completed a second term of training they would be classified for fleet or patrol service and be allowed to specialise in the class of work for which they had expressed their preference. It was also proposed to set up a permanent advisory committee for R.N.R. matters, of which the Admiral Commanding the Reserves was to be President.

The R.N.R. Advisory Committee was formed to assist the Admiral Commanding the Reserve in matters affecting the Royal Naval Reserve and the Mercantile Marine, without in any way interfering with his complete control of the administration. The members were recommended by the Admiral Commanding to the Admiralty, and it was proposed to have sufficient of

them to ensure the Admiral always having at his disposal ample expert advice on any subject that might come up for discussion. The Chairman was the Admiral Commanding, assisted by any of his staff that he might consider necessary, and, in addition, the Committee consisted of the Registrar-General, who was directly responsible for the administration of the force, or his representatives, representatives of the Shipowners' Associations, senior R.N.R. officers from each branch, and a secretary.

In September, 1919, the Admiralty announced that junior R.N.R. officers who had been appointed acting lieutenants under the special regulations issued in the latter days of the war should be permitted to retain their acting rank. This order was subject, in the case of permanent officers who had not qualified for their masters' certificates, to their obtaining such certificate within twelve months from the date of the termination of the war. In July, 1920, however, it was decided that such officers should normally be allowed twelve months from that date in which to obtain the certificate, failing which they would have to revert to the rank of sub-lieutenant.

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One manner in which the war work of the R.N.R. was acknowledged after the Armistice was the concession at the beginning of 1921 for lieutenants and lieutenant-commanders R.N.R. who had obtained specific qualifications to rank for command with their opposite numbers in the Royal Navy according to seniority. Executive authority had first been granted to Lieutenant-Commanders in 1918. The officers who had obtained this status were known as "Qualified Officers," and against their names in the Navy List appeared a star in a circle. Full details of the concession as later coded will be given when I come to deal with the post-war R.N.R. regulations. This improved status, and the fact that it made possible promotion to the ranks of commander and captain, very much as in the Royal Navy, was greatly appreciated in the Reserve.

Considering the work that had been found for every Royal Naval Reserve officer and man immediately war broke out, there was considerable disappointment expressed in many quarters when it was announced in March, 1921, that the establishment authorised under the estimates for the year was only 2029 officers and 9000 men. In June, 1921, it was notified by an Admiralty Fleet order that men re-enrolling in the Royal Naval Reserve after serving during the war, whether for

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hostilities only or as members of the permanent force, were not to be treated as new entries in the matter of kit, but were to be paid allowances for the upkeep of kit laid down in the regulations—£4 per annum in the case of chief petty officers and men in similar uniform, £2 per annum for men dressed as seamen. At the same time another Fleet order announced that men with over twelve months' mobilised service as deck hands in the Trawler Section might, if they were otherwise eligible, be entered as A.B. in the Royal Navy. They would be drafted to big ships, where they would be given opportunities of passing their examination, and they would be required to qualify in seamanship, gunnery and torpedo matters within twelve months of their transfer.

During the war numbers of R.N.R. officers had done so well as navigators of submarines that in May, 1921, the Admiralty issued an order making special provision for the post-war training of officers for the submarine service. Sub-lieutenants were to be eligible to volunteer for the service, and selection was to be made before they started their twelve months' training afloat. They would go down to Fort Blockhouse for two months instead of undertaking the usual gunnery course, after which they would have ten months' sea service in submarines. At the end of four, however, a report was to be made as to whether they showed promise of becoming efficient submarine officers, and those found unsuitable were to revert to the general service at once to complete their training in big ships. Reservists satisfactorily carrying out their twelve months' submarine service were to be marked "S.B." in the Navy List, and were to undergo periodical training at a submarine depot until they reached the age of 32. On mobilisation they would become third officers of submarines, but were not to be appointed for such work when over the age limit. After that age they were to receive their subsequent training in the auxiliary patrol, with a special view to anti-submarine duties. Later, however, it was decided not to appoint officers to anti-submarine courses.

The new regulations were finally settled and published in 1922. They did not escape severe criticism. The spirit of the authorities had changed since the early days of the war, however, and every regulation criticised was carefully examined, and, where necessary, changed. The result was not only a very practical set of regulations, but a full realisation by the thinking members of the force that the R.N.R. was justly appreciated by the Admiralty, whose heads were ready and willing to do everything possible to promote its efficiency.

It was laid down that no application for appointment to the R.N.R. would be considered unless the applicant were a British-born subject of pure European descent, and the son of either a natural-born or naturalised British subject. Any officer of the R.N.R. who elected to take out naturalisation papers in a foreign country had to report his action immediately to the Registrar-General and to resign his commission at once. There were two classes of service for officers, the skippers being the only exception to the undertaking to serve on general service at home or abroad according to the requirements of the Navy. Candidates who had seen commissioned war service in the Navy, Naval Reserve or R.N.V.R., would not be required to put in any time as probationers in the ordinary way, but in practice they often had to.

Normally, probationary midshipmen had to be between 16 and 18 years of age, just as they were when the rank was first started in the early 'seventies, but in special cases this age limit might be raised to 19. As before, probationary midshipmen could be entered either from the training ships or directly from sea when they were serving as cadets, midshipmen or apprentices. Such applicants had to fill in a form giving all the usual details as to birth and parentage, and also a declaration that they intended to follow the sea as a profession. Those who came from the sea had to give full details of their sea service and submit copies of testimonials. They then had to undergo a medical examination, and their application was sent in to the Registrar-General of Shipping and Seamen, who checked the information, added such additional items as he had in his records, and then sent the form to the Admiral Commanding Reserves, and so through to the Admiralty. The candidate was then required to present himself before a Board of Selection at the Admiralty (a board on which the Admiral Commanding or one of his assistants always had a seat) and be approved by them. Being entered on probation, the midshipman could not be confirmed until he had completed his six months' training in H.M. ships and been recommended as suitable by his seniors.

As before, other youngsters were entered directly from sea as sub-lieutenants. The regulations at first provided that these entrants should be between 21 and 24 years of age and possess at least a Board of Trade first mate's certificate of competency, but in 1925 a slight amendment was made. If the applicant had only a first mate's certificate he would not be accepted after 24 years of age, but if he had already got his master's certificate the age limit was raised to 27, and the compulsory age of retirement was similarly raised from 28 to 31 in the case of sub-lieutenants who entered in this way. The medical examination and the board of selection at the Admiralty had to be passed in precisely the same way, and the sub-lieutenant was not confirmed in his rank until he had completed three months' naval training, consisting of a course of five or six weeks in a gunnery ship, with the balance of the term in a sea-going man-of-war. He also had to obtain a satisfactory certificate on completion of such training, and receive favourable reports from his commanding officers.

After the war there were a large number of temporary officers, some of them with very distinguished service, who applied for appointment to the permanent list. At that time the Reserve was in something of a state of flux, and it was very difficult to make such appointments, with the result that finally it was decided that no additions to the permanent list would be made until things were more settled. In 1924, however, it was seen that the result of the post-war gap would be a complete stagnation of promotion, and a most inconvenient gap between the very senior and very junior officers. Accordingly it was decided to appoint 100 probationary lieutenants to fill this gap, it being provided that every one must have at least twelve months' war service and a master's certificate. In order to facilitate promotion and an even flow to the senior ranks, the appointments were spread over three years, the first batch being ante-dated to Dec. 31, 1923, the second batch being given seniority Dec. 31, 1924, and the remainder 1925.

As before, applications from officers for their promotion up to the rank of commander had to be

addressed to the Registrar-General, or, in the case of accountant officers, to the Admiral Commanding Reserves. The Admiralty still had the power of promoting officers of all branches to a higher rank if it considered them deserving and the step advisable, whether they had the qualifications ordinarily required by the regulations or not.

The junior officers were promoted very much in the same way under the new regulations as they were under the old, but a number of concessions were granted. For instance, sub-lieutenants who had gone through a complete short course in both gunnery and torpedo might reckon each course for which qualifying certificates and satisfactory reports had been obtained as being equivalent to three months' service as first mate for promotion purposes, while, for purposes of promotion, service in the fleet was to count as service in the rank held by the officer in the Mercantile Marine at the date of his appointment for temporary service in the Navy. Lieutenants who had performed twelve months' naval service as sub-lieutenants and who had become qualified officers under the regulations within two years of their promotion to their second ring would be granted one year's seniority as lieutenant, while similar officers who had not performed their twelve months' service would be granted six months' seniority. It was laid down that any lieutenant who had not obtained his master's certificate of competency before he was 27 years of age would be called upon to resign his commission unless he could give a satisfactory explanation. Lieutenants with eight years' seniority in that rank, with twelve months' continuous naval training served, and satisfactory reports from their mercantile employers, were eligible for promotion to lieutenant-commander, while those who had not completed their twelve months' training but were otherwise eligible would be permitted to apply for promotion to acting lieutenant-commander at eight years' seniority, on the understanding that they would commence their twelve months within a year of their acting promotion. If they failed to do this they would be placed on the retired list.

Promotion over the rank of lieutenant-commander was always to be by selection from among those qualified. The qualifications were that the officer must have attained three years' seniority as lieutenant-commander, must have served his naval training satisfactorily, must have had the command of a British ocean-going steamer for two years, or have been chief or first officer of a British ocean-going liner for four years, and must have won consistently good records of service in the Merchant Service. If he had not obtained his command he had to produce a certificate from his employers to the effect that he was in all respects suitable for the command of an ocean-going ship.

For promotion to the rank of captain, the highest rank to which the average R.N.R. officer could hope to attain, the officer had to have at least five years' seniority as commander, have served at least three years in command of a British liner, have performed particularly good service for the Royal Naval Reserve or the Merchant Service, and be very strongly recommended by his employers and the competent authorities. The captains' list of the R.N.R. at the moment contains some of the finest names in the British merchant service; the tragedy is that in the present scheme for using the R.N.R. there is little enough chance of these gallant gentlemen being employed on active service in wartime,

although naturally their experience would be of the greatest service to the authorities.

After the war, also, the authorities established the rank of Commodore 2nd Class as an honorary rank granted in peace time in recognition of particularly good service to a few of the senior captains. This rank did not entitle an officer to seniority which he did not already possess as a captain, or to an appointment as Commodore if called out for active service, nor did it confer on him any right to hoist a broad pennant or to claim a salute. On the other hand, he had the right to retain the rank on retirement.

Long before the war a retired list of R.N.R. officers was established, in many cases giving a step in rank, but it was not until December, 1924, that an Order in Council gave permission for Commanders R.N.R. who had served in that rank on the Active List during the war to be considered by the Admiralty for the retired rank of captain. It was, however, immediately pointed out that many very zealous and active officers of the R.N.R. were not able to serve in H.M. ships owing to their being invaluable to the Merchant Service, so that in February, 1925, the Order in Council was amended to include certain commanders who were on the Active List of the Reserve at the commencement of the war, who were not called out for active service, but who, nevertheless, rendered valuable services in the Mercantile Marine.

It was provided in the amended regulations that officers would be compulsorily removed from the Active List in certain circumstances. Captains would be removed after four years' unemployment at sea in the Merchant Service, commanders or below after three years from the date of their last appointment at sea in the Merchant Service, except in such cases as marine superintendents, whose retention on the Active List was of the greatest importance to the R.N.R., but whose work debarred them from going to sea. Each case was to be considered on its merits, but in no case would the compulsory age limit of retirement be exceeded. An acting lieutenant-commander who failed to commence his twelve months' naval training within one year of his promotion would also be removed. Lieutenants who had not obtained their master's certificate of competency before reaching the age of 27, unless the Admiralty were satisfied with the reasons that they were able to give, and engineer officers who had given up the sea as a profession and were not employed in approved positions connected with marine engineering, would be called upon to resign their commissions or warrants at the expiration of four years from the date of their last employment. Service in H.M. ships and occasional short trips to sea were not sufficient to save an officer from retirement in these circumstances.

The ages of the compulsory retirements were revised and fixed at 55 years for captains, 50 for commanders, 45 for lieutenant-commanders. In the case of lieutenants retirement was not a question of age; they would be retired on reaching eight years' seniority if they had not qualified or applied for promotion to lieutenant-commander as required by the regulations. Sub-lieutenants appointed under 24 years of age were compulsorily retired at 28, while sub-lieutenants who were appointed between the ages of 24 and 27, owing to the possession of a master's certificate, were allowed to remain until 31. For midshipmen the age was 23, and for

skipper-lieutenants, chief skippers and skippers, 50. Generally speaking, the other branches followed the lead of the executive line.

Registrars on ceasing to serve as Registrars, Assistant-Registrars or Deputy-Registrars would be removed from the Active List, but might be placed on the Retired List of their respective ranks at the discretion of the Admiralty. Should they resume office at any time they might be reinstated on the Active List, but the time that they had been away was not allowed to count for promotion.

Officers could also be removed from the list for failing to satisfy the regulations as to their efficiency, probationary lieutenants, if they were not confirmed within two years of first appointment, acting and probationary sub-lieutenants within four years, midshipmen after two years from the date of ceasing their last civil employment at sea, or on attaining 23 years of age, whichever came first, probationary midshipmen if not confirmed within three years, probationary skippers if not qualified for confirmation within one year of first appointment, and so on.

The new regulations provided for the granting of honorary commissions as Commander, Engineer-Commander, Paymaster-Commander, Lieutenant-Commander and Lieutenant in all three branches. This privilege was limited to gentlemen who had, in the opinion of the Admiralty, rendered or were rendering such exceptional services in promoting the interests of the Reserve as to merit special recognition. At the same time, honorary commissions as Captain and Engineer-Captain might be granted to officers who fulfilled certain conditions: First, that they must have held a commission as Honorary Commander or Engineer-Commander for five years, and, secondly, that they must be recommended by their companies as the competent authorities. The number of Honorary Captains and Engineer-Captains was limited to 15, exclusive of such officers as might have retired from the capacity for which they were promoted.

The new regulations also finally settled the vexed question of relative rank, and for the first time the Royal Indian Marine was dropped from the table. The order of precedence was fixed as Royal Navy, Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, and officers were to take preference in that order, rank for rank, irrespective of seniority, except in the case specially provided for with regard to qualified officers R.N.R. of the rank of Lieutenant or Lieutenant Commander. These officers, who had certain specified qualifications, were specially designated Qualified Officers, and were distinguished in the Navy List by a star in a circle against their names. Such officers, when they came into active contact with officers of the Royal Navy, were to rank and command according to their seniority, and were only to be inferior to the R.N. officer in the case of exactly equal seniority. For example, a lieutenant R.N.R. who had qualified would take command before a lieutenant R.N. of less seniority, whereas, if he had not so qualified, he would take command after a lieutenant R.N. of any seniority. On the other hand, the Admiralty might grant naval commands of authority to any unqualified officer R.N.R. during the tenure of his particular appointment, and such officers would rank and command as if for the time being they were qualified officers. A lieutenant R.N.R. with the star and circle was deprived of it as soon as he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-commander, but could

have it granted again for the higher rank, and in the same way the retention of the qualification was conditional upon the officer complying with the regulations for naval training and receiving good reports from his naval superiors.

At the same time, regulations were laid down as to the qualifications required to improve the status of a qualified officer. To begin with there was a distinction drawn between officers who had served during the Great War and those who had not. For those who had seen at least six months' service in one of H.M. ships with a rank above that of midshipman it was required that they should have a recommendation by their commanding officer R.N., not below the rank of commander, satisfactory gunnery, torpedo and signal reports, or alternatively, the command for not less than 12 months of one of H.M. ships in war time. Service in submarines was not allowed to count for this. Officers who had not fulfilled the requirements with regard to war service might receive the distinction if they had satisfactorily completed their gunnery, torpedo and signal courses, had seen a year's continuous service in a man-of-war as a lieutenant, with an extra three months if they had not put in their six months' training as midshipmen, and possessed a strong recommendation by an R.N. officer under whose command they had served for not less than six months. Lieutenant-commanders who had not satisfied the war clause were made eligible for the status provided they were granted the status as lieutenant, had served for the period of twelve months in the R.N. with the rank of lieutenant-commander, and had received the necessary recommendations from their naval seniors.

Later a modification was made in the regulations to the effect that in any future war lieutenants and lieutenant-commanders who might serve for not less than twelve months in a man-of-war might be recommended for the status of qualified officer without having passed the gunnery, torpedo and signal courses. The recommendations which the senior naval officer had to make were to the effect that the candidate was qualified to take charge of a watch at sea in one of H.M. ships, and as an officer of quarters in the primary armament of the ship from which he was recommended, that he had a good knowledge of service customs and discipline, that he was in all respects able and recommended to perform the ordinary duties of a lieutenant or lieutenant-commander R.N. of similar seniority in the class of vessel in which he was serving and from which he was recommended. Another later amendment was to the effect that officers who had served in command of one of H.M. ships for not less than twelve months during the war, and who had been well reported on in this capacity, were exempted from all formalities and were eligible for the status of Qualified Officer at once.

Provision was made by the authorities for R.N.R. officers to specialise in the submarine, patrol, mine-laying or mine-sweeping services, and officers who volunteered were to be given special courses of training for their subjects. Only in the case of the submarine service were officers allowed to specialise before they reached the rank of lieutenant, and in each case they were allowed to perform their obligatory training in such vessels as were most suitable for teaching them the subjects in which they were working. But the number tackling any of these special jobs was to be limited by the circumstances at

the time, and an officer getting an adverse report from his commander could be withdrawn from the special branch which he had selected, and returned to general service.

The regulations for training R.N.R. officers, laid down in 1922, differed in many respects from those holding before that date. Skippers of all sorts had to do 28 days' naval training every two years, but in 1923 this was altered to 14 days' naval training in each of the first three years of service, after which 14 days every other year was sufficient. It was at first laid down that probationary midshipmen should do their six months' training in one of H.M. ships immediately on joining the R.N.R. Later, however, this was altered. Candidates coming in from the training - ship establishments were to perform their six months immediately they joined the force, but in the case of cadets, midshipmen or apprentices entered direct from the mercantile marine, application to perform the training might be made at any time at which the youngster could obtain the necessary leave.

Within two years of an officer being promoted to acting sub-lieutenant he had to put in three months' continuous naval training —five or six weeks in a gunnery school and the balance afloat. The probationary sub-lieutenants and probationary lieutenants by direct entry had the same liability. Midshipmen, acting sub-lieutenants and probationary sub-lieutenants who failed to qualify for certificates during these periods might be given a further period of naval training as an alternative to discharge, if the Admiralty considered that it was worth their while. After this, sub-lieutenants and lieutenants had to perform 28 days' training every other year, the first to commence within two years of completing the three months' training referred to. Lieutenant-commanders had to do 28 days' training every other year for four years, after which it was 28 days every three years. Commanders had to do a 21-day course in gunnery, 21 days in torpedo, seven days in navigation, and 14 days in a combined signal, submarine and aircraft course within six years of their promotion, and requalifying courses in these subjects had to be taken at intervals of not less than five or more than seven years. The captains were under the same regulations as the commanders.

Confirmed sub-lieutenants, lieutenants and lieutenant-commanders of under four years' seniority were made eligible for appointment for twelve months' training in H.M. ships, and the gunnery qualifying course and this twelve months was obligatory save in exceptional circumstances. In some cases officers were allowed to combine their gunnery requalifying and torpedo or signal qualifying or requalifying courses with this twelve months' training, in which case the whole period was not allowed to exceed 365 days. This period was to count from the date of appointment, and was to include time of passage to and from the ship. An officer undergoing his twelve months' training might be appointed to a torpedo-boat-destroyer for the last one to three months if recommended by his commanding officer, and officers who had completed their twelve months' training were to be excused further obligatory training for a period of three years—that is to say, the calendar year in which their twelve months' training terminated and the two succeeding calendar years.

The fact that the compulsory training was rather more stringent than it was before the war did not

rob keen officers of their opportunities of voluntary training. Executive officers between the ranks of midshipman and commander were allowed to take gunnery, torpedo, submarine, signal, navigation, auxiliary patrol and mine-sweeping, anti-submarine, minelaying, and such other courses as might be rendered desirable by the development of naval warfare. It must be remembered that opportunities of training in this way were eagerly sought for in the early days of the Reserve, but were always refused. In addition to their twelve months' training, officers could volunteer for short service in H.M. ships during manœuvres and sea exercises, and might on occasions be appointed to a man-of-war in lieu of a naval officer. Captains and commanders could take the war courses which were held half-yearly at the Royal Naval War College at Greenwich. Each of these courses lasted about four months, and dealt with strategy, tactics, command and cognate subjects. Unfortunately, only one captain or commander R.N.R. could be appointed to these courses at one time, with the result that it was strictly laid down that officers would be permitted to take the course only once during their careers. Skippers, chief skippers and skipper lieutenants were allowed to volunteer for the auxiliary patrol and mine-sweeping course, anti-submarine course, minelaying course, and for short spells of service in vessels of the patrol force during manœuvres or sea exercises.

Experience has proved that many R.N.R. officers were as keen as mustard to undertake any naval service open to them, and it was accordingly laid down that officers who volunteered might be accepted for service in lieu of regular naval officers of similar rank. Such appointments would be for periods of from six months to two years, and might in exceptional circumstances be renewed up to a maximum of three years, after which no further appointment would be made. The number of such appointments, however, was entirely dependent upon the requirements of the fleet, and it was laid down that only in very exceptional circumstances could a lieutenant-commander or a lieutenant be appointed as senior lieutenant of a ship. Nor would he be eligible for any allowance for acting as such unless his commanding officer had applied specially to the Admiralty for his services in that capacity. Skipper lieutenants, chief skippers and skippers were also permitted to volunteer for service in trawlers in any emergency which did not warrant calling out the R.N.R. by Royal Proclamation. Engineer officers might be appointed for periods of from six months to two years. Accountant officers would not be appointed for less than three months or more than one year, although they might get a further year with the express permission of the Admiralty. All ranks were also permitted to volunteer for temporary service in the fleet during manœuvres, firing exercises or on special occasions.

The matter of the status of non-executive officers was the cause of a good deal of discussion, but finally the Admiralty decided that non-executive officers of the equivalent rank of lieutenant and lieutenant-commander R.N.R., duly confirmed in their rank, would, at the discretion of the Admiralty, be eligible to be granted the status of qualified officer, provided that they had served for at least six months in one of H.M. ships during the war with good reports, that they were considered to be qualified professionally by reason of their naval experi-

ence and training, and that they had obtained a recommendation from the commanding officer and from the senior officer of that branch of the ship in which their training had been performed—28 days in the case of engineer officers and 14 days in the case of accountant officers. As a general rule, however, engineer officers were not to be recommended unless they had satisfactorily performed three months' continuous voluntary naval service or training at sea. In all cases the commanding officer had to give a recommendation to the effect that the officer had a good knowledge of service customs and discipline, and that he was in all respects able and recommended to perform the ordinary duties of a naval officer of corresponding branch and seniority in the class of vessel in which he had been serving and from which he was recommended.

The post-war regulations slightly amended the orders with regard to uniform. It was pointed out that officers were not to wear their R.N.R. uniform when on the ordinary service of the mercantile marine, but only when borne on ships' books for service or training in H.M. ships or establishments and on state and other occasions of ceremony within the British Empire. If worn, it had to be the uniform which was appropriate to the occasion. The story was formerly told of a captain on the Australian service who was exceedingly proud of the work which he had put in in the Royal Naval Reserve, and at the same time was of a deeply religious disposition. His invariable custom was to appear in full R.N.R. uniform on Sunday mornings for divine service, but before he commenced to read the service he would invariably unship his sword and hand it to a steward in attendance. Officers embarking in H.M. ships or shore establishments for training, or officers apprenticed to short courses of gunnery, torpedo, signals or the like, were required to provide themselves with only a monkey jacket, waistcoat, blue trousers and cap, undress belt and sword—the sword being optional for midshipmen—with the mess undress jacket, waistcoat and plain blue trousers. They also had to provide themselves with such white flannel trousers, jerseys, &c., as might be appropriate for the drill or service which they were undertaking. The other items of the officers' full-dress uniform were not necessary except for officers appointed for twelve months' training, although officers who were keen enough on service matters to desire to provide themselves with frock-coat, &c., were in no way debarred. Skippers, warrant officers and engineers had similar lists published for their guidance.

When first the new regulations were published the only difference between the uniform of the R.N.R. rating and his brother in the regular Navy was that men not dressed as seamen wore a small "R" on each sleeve above the cuff—gold, red or blue, according to the uniform with which it was worn—and men dressed as seamen an "R" on the sleeve of the jumper just above the cuff and the Royal Naval Reserve cap tally, while all ratings wore an "R" on each side of the collar of the overcoat. Later these single letters were replaced by the letters "R.N.R." on the left sleeve of the coat or jumper in all cases, a change which made for pride of service and was also far more distinctive. Opportunity was taken in the new regulations to bring in an entirely new scale of clothing gratuities and allowances, a scale which was greatly appreciated by the men and removed many hardships.

The entry of engineer officers was very considerably curtailed after the war, but the regulations provided that probationary engineer-lieutenants should not be over 30 years of age, should hold a Board of Trade first-class engineer's certificate, and have a satisfactory record of service, both during their time in the shop and in the merchant service. Engineers employed in factories or workshops ashore were also eligible, provided they were employed on marine engineering work and fulfilled the other requirements. Probationary engineer-lieutenants could be confirmed in their rank after they had completed three months' training in one of H.M. ships, with the usual recommendation from the commanding officer.

Chief engine-room artificers or engine-room artificers between the ages of 28 and 40 who had been specially recommended at the end of their period of training with the fleet were made eligible for promotion to probationary warrant engineer, and eligible for confirmation in this rank after they had completed three months' training on probation with satisfactory reports and recommendations. A man with ten years' seniority as warrant engineer and satisfactory records would be promoted to a commissioned engineer automatically, while specially selected commissioned engineers and warrant engineers could be promoted to the rank of engineer lieutenant at the discretion of the Admiralty.

For an engineer lieutenant to get his half ring, he had to have eight years' seniority, including the time that he was on probation. He must also have completed the six months' naval training with satisfactory reports, undergone his drills regularly and satisfactorily, and be generally approved for promotion. For his third ring he was dependent entirely on selection by the Admiralty. He was not eligible unless he had three years' seniority as engineer lieutenant-commander with consistently good reports of service. When the new regulations were first published an engineer-commander could be promoted to engineer-captain with five years' seniority in the rank, very strong recommendations from his employers, and a first-class record of service in the R.N.R. or the merchant service. In May, 1925, however, the rank of engineer-captain R.N.R. was abolished, but officers of special merit and position might be promoted to the rank of honorary engineer captain.

Engineer lieutenants or over might volunteer for a period of six months' training afloat, on satisfactory completion of which, in addition to the obligatory training, they were to have the date when their next period of obligatory training would become due advanced two years without in any way depriving them of their training fees.

Confirmed paymaster sub-lieutenants and paymaster lieutenants were allowed to volunteer for training in H.M. ships up to a total of 91 days, as long as not less than 14 days were performed at one time. They could, however, volunteer to add seven days to their obligatory training. Officers carrying out this 91 days' voluntary training in one period were excused obligatory training for two years.

The probationary warrant engineers had to undergo three months' training in H.M. ships, one month of which had to be performed within a year of their promotion to probationary warrant engineer. Commissioned engineers and warrant engineers had to undertake 28 days' training in every other year, probationary engineer-lieutenants three months' con-

tinuous training in a man-of-war within one year of their appointment, engineer lieutenants 28 days' training every other year, engineer lieutenant-commanders the same for four years after promotion, and subsequently 28 days' every three years. After promotion to engineer-commander it was necessary for an officer to undertake 28 days' training every three years, either in one period or in two spells of a fortnight each. For the first few years after the war certain officers who had served afloat during the period of hostilities were exempted from this training, but it was specially laid down that all training should be in H.M. ships afloat, and that the old system of courses of instruction in dockyards and naval schools was to be abandoned altogether.

The qualifications necessary to make a man eligible for appointment as a probationary paymaster sub-lieutenant except in the case of registrars were that he was between 21 and 25 years of age and that he had a very good knowledge, and at least three years' experience, of banking or cash accountancy, with very good testimonials from his employer, or alternatively that he had two years' service as purser or assistant purser in the merchant service. There was a very general feeling, however, that far too few pursers entered as accountant officers, for the work that they did during the war was conspicuously successful, and it was felt that, having their knowledge of ships and the sea, they had a chance of proving themselves particularly useful. After having completed 28 days' training on board one of H.M. ships on the staff of the accountant officer, passing an examination before he left the ship, and receiving the usual recommendation from his commanding officer, a probationary paymaster sub-lieutenant was eligible to be confirmed in his rank. As before, commissions as paymaster sub-lieutenant R.N.R. were to be granted by the Admiralty to such registrars, assistant registrars, and deputy registrars, as performed duties in connection with the Reserve which were considered deserving of recognition, provided they were recommended by the Registrar-General.

Paymaster sub-lieutenants could get their second ring on attaining three years' seniority, including probationary time, with the requisite naval training and satisfactory records. Eight years' seniority as paymaster lieutenant was necessary for the half ring, with the usual satisfactory reports, while paymaster commanders were chosen by the Admiralty from those who had qualified by attaining four years' seniority as paymaster lieutenant - commander, acting or confirmed. Registrars who received R.N.R. paymaster commissions would be promoted to paymaster-lieutenant after putting in two years as sub-lieutenant, and to lieutenant-commander on attaining eight years' seniority as lieutenant. Promotion to paymaster-commander was made only as a reward for very special service, and the officer so distinguished had to be 48 years of age, stationed at one of the chief ports of the United Kingdom, and have served 18 years as registrar or assistant-registrar. It must be remembered that these registrars did not receive a penny extra salary for the work that they did for the R.N.R., although it was on their efforts that the success of the force mainly depended. Several applied for permission to go to sea for training and so qualify for the retaining fee, but this was not permitted as it was felt that their ordinary duties would keep them fully occupied in peace and war. The mobilisation of

1914 had proved their value to the force and also the value of the whole organisation built up by the Registrar-General.

Probationary paymaster sub-lieutenants had to undergo 28 days' continuous training on board a man-of-war within one year of their appointment, after which they had to have 14 days every other year, until they got their half ring, and then 14 days every three years. The evening classes of instruction, which were formerly held at the Admiralty, were abandoned, and in 1925 it was specially laid down that no instruction in coding or cyphering should be included in the peace training of the accountant officers unless and until they had been granted the status of qualified officer. They might then receive the instruction necessary to enable them to carry out routine duties efficiently under supervision, but the majority of the cypher duties which fell to the lot of R.N.R. accountants during the early days of the war were transferred to other branches.

Under the new regulations the conditions for granting the Royal Naval Reserve Officers' Decoration were slightly altered, although they remained the same in principle. As had been laid down in the original draft, 15 years' service rendered an officer eligible for the Decoration, but under the new code this 15 years was total commissioned service, except time as temporary acting sub-lieutenants. Registrars alone were allowed to count honorary time for the Decoration, but they had to put in 20 years instead of the 15 required from the other recipients. Normally, executive officers had to complete their 12 months' continuous naval training and to have attained the rank of lieutenant, engineer officers having to complete their six months and hold rank as engineer lieutenants. However, officers otherwise qualified who had not been able to undertake such training, but who had performed specially good service, could receive the Decoration at the discretion of the Admiralty, the effect of this being to put the old regulations into rather more explicit form. The new regulations also permitted officers in the R.N.R. on the 4th August, 1914, who had subsequently performed war service in any other branch of the fighting forces, including the Army or the Royal Air Force, to count their wartime as double for the purposes of the Decoration, and the same concession applied to retired officers who had been called out for active service.

The war naturally brought with it the creation of a large number of orders and medals, with the result that perhaps it was not unnatural that the Armistice saw very considerable disappointment at the status given to the Reserve Decoration. The feeling had existed before the war, but it was greatly aggravated by the number of new ribbons, and it was felt that the Reserve Decoration should certainly be placed before the fourth class of the British Empire, the Police Medal or the Jubilee Medal. Unfortunately, the movement received but little support in high places, but it was a very healthy indication of the pride with which R.N.R. officers regarded the Reserve Decoration.

The regulations for the award of the R.N.R. Long Service Medal were also slightly amended in similar fashion, and it was laid down that officers who had previously received the Royal Naval Reserve Long Service Medal and subsequently gained the Reserve Decoration might wear both.

The enlistment of men in the R.N.R. was very much simplified by the new regulations. Any seaman or fisherman who was a British subject, and the son of British-born subjects, of good character, neither under 19 nor above 25 years of age and physically fit, could be enrolled in the Royal Naval Reserve as a seaman, provided that he was able to speak and understand the English language and to sign his name, had followed a seafaring life for at least two years, and had been vaccinated. The men were first provisionally enrolled for a period not exceeding five years, and, as before, were confirmed in their rating on satisfactorily completing their preliminary 14 days' drill and 28 days' training. Instead, however, of having to seek the nearest naval or coastguard officer for the purpose of completing their enrolment, this duty was generally entrusted to the Registrars, who were perfectly well able to perform it, and to whom indeed all the enlistments are directly due. It not only saved time, but prevented many men being bitterly disappointed at having to travel many miles in order to have their enlistment officially completed.

On and after Jan. 1, 1921, all R.N.R. ratings were enrolled for general service, with the exception of chief engine men and engine men, who were enrolled for patrol service only. Men so enlisted undertook to be available for service both at home and abroad.

In the case of engine-room artificers and engine men, the limits of age were slightly different: for the former it was not under 21 nor above 30, for the latter not under 22 nor above 35. Engine-room artificers had to satisfy the Admiralty that they were fully qualified for their duties. Many ratings who had done good service under temporary agreements during the war were very anxious to rejoin permanently, and to them the age limits were frequently most inconvenient. A check was retained on the excusable keenness of such men by a regulation which provided that any man belonging to the R.N.R. who, after being enrolled, was discovered to have made any false representation, or to have produced any false papers on the occasion of enrolment, would be liable to prosecution and would be struck off the list, forfeiting all claim to his retainer and his pension or gratuity.

The post-war regulations were made to include all the lessons learned in the war as to the training of ratings, which became considerably more drastic and demanded more of the men. The old idea that the R.N.R. rating was incapable of being trained to any high pitch of perfection was dead, killed by the good service of the men between 1914 and 1918, and now they were given every opportunity of improving their status and rank.

The pay of the lower-deck ratings depended, of course, on the equivalent pay in the Royal Navy, the new scale of which was published in October, 1925. The annual retainer, however, was slightly altered, chief petty officers and petty officers receiving £12 in quarterly instalments, leading ratings £10, and other ratings £8. Men who were permitted to serve their fifth term of five years on shore or harbour services were paid half retainers, and it was specially provided that the payment of retainers would be continued to men during the period of their training in the Navy, but that they would not be payable when men were called out by Royal Proclamation. The Registrars of the various ports include the payment of retainers in their other duties.

A man who had served as petty officer in a ship on the Patrol Service, and who had commanded a British steam or motor fishing vessel for at least two years, possessed his Board of Trade certificate, good reports, and the rank of petty officer or chief petty officer, could be promoted to the rank of skipper in the Trawler Section. The promotion of skippers was first of all laid down as being half-yearly at the discretion of the Admiralty, but later the Admiralty made a concession and announced that skippers of over ten years' seniority whose records were satisfactory would be promoted to the rank of chief skipper more or less automatically. Chief skippers who had a home trade master's certificate or an extra skipper's certificate of competency, and who had attracted the attention of their seniors in the patrol service, could be promoted to the rank of skipper-lieutenant at the discretion of the Admiralty.

The appointment of skippers in the Trawler Section was rather a difficult question after the war, when the fishing industry was very hard hit, and when it was very difficult to find men of the required age who had the necessary time in command. The appointments were made by warrant from the Admiralty, and Naval Reservists and Royal Fleet Reservists were allowed to apply if their qualifications were good, such time as they had served in these forces being allowed to count for gratuity up to a maximum of five years. As before, applicants were first of all entered as probationary skippers, the qualifications for confirmation being the usual recommendation and naval training. At first this training was put down as 28 days, but in 1922 this was cut down to a fortnight, with very much more satisfactory results. Every candidate must have commanded a British steam or motor trawler for at least two years and have his skipper's certificate, with a good report from his employers. The age limits were fixed at between 25 and 34 years, and the engagements for skipper and chief skipper were to be in five-year periods, with a maximum of twenty-five years in all. The regulations as to age limits and periods of engagement were modified in 1924.

The warrant to fly the Blue Ensign by different merchant ships was also amended, the permitted ships—each ship being considered on its merits—being those commanded by officers on the retired list of the Royal Navy or officers of the Royal Naval Reserve who fulfilled certain conditions. First, the officer commanding the ship must be an officer on the retired list or an officer of the R.N.R.; secondly, the crew must include, in addition to the commanding officer, officers and men of the R.N.R. to the numbers specified from time to time. Officers on the retired and the active lists of the Royal Navy, men of the Royal Fleet Reserve, navy pensioners and men holding Royal Naval Reserve deferred pension certificates might be included in the number specified. Before hoisting the Blue Ensign the officer commanding the ship had to provide himself with an Admiralty warrant, and the fact was to be noted in the ship's articles. Any navy captain meeting a ship flying the Blue Ensign at sea had the power to send on board an officer, not below the rank of lieutenant, to make sure that the conditions of the warrant had been fulfilled. It must be noted that the Admiralty warrant was personal both to the officer commanding and to the ship, and that if they became separated the permit lapsed unless the officer

transferred to the command of another ship belonging to the same company.

In October, 1923, as near to Trafalgar Day as it could be contrived, the idea of holding a banquet for Royal Naval Reserve officers became a reality, and, with the Duke of Connaught as principal guest, the function was a striking success, over three hundred officers sitting down under the chairmanship of Sir H. Acton Blake. The Duke spoke feelingly of his connection with the Royal Naval Reserve. Next year the function was repeated, with the Duke of York as the guest of the evening, and these meetings, which reflected the greatest credit on those who had brought them into being, did much to bring the Reserve into popular notice and to cement good feeling. The Accountant officers of the R.N.R. had already been holding for some years an annual reunion dinner which has done splendid work in keeping the force together.

In the late summer of 1924 the Royal Naval Reserve sustained a very real loss in the death of Commander William F. Caborne, who had rightly been described as the "Father of the Force." He was born in 1849 and first went to sea in 1865, joining the Royal Naval Reserve as a sub-lieutenant fourteen years later, and remaining in it until he retired with the rank of commander, which was then the highest to be obtained, in 1894. In the Burmese Campaign of 1885 he commanded a Government transport and afterwards took an appointment in the Egyptian coastguard service. From the very beginning the Reserve was one of his keenest interests, and the Force felt that it was being honoured when he was given the Companionship of the Order of the Bath in the Diamond Jubilee year. He read a number of papers before the Royal United Service Institution, and wrote many articles, nearly always concerning the R.N.R. After his retirement he became a nautical assessor to the Court of Appeal and the Privy Council and held a number of important positions of similar nature. His passing was deeply regretted.

It is worth noting in passing that in January and February, 1922, three chief skippers, nine skippers, two petty officers, and one second hand volunteered for a special minesweeping course at Portland. This was the first training service performed by the ranks and ratings of the Patrol Service subsequent to the war.

The history of the Royal Naval Reserve has been traced from its conception, and it would be hard indeed to withhold admiration for the ranks and ratings of the Force. The merchant seaman is even more of a handy man than his naval brother, and during the war it is difficult to know what would have happened to the Royal Navy without the Reservists who manned its fringes. The Force has had faults in plenty in the past, but it has always been willing to learn by experience, and can now look back not only on a splendid history of sustained effort and consistent improvement, but also on a grand tradition built up during the period of greatest trial through which the Empire has ever passed.

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